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This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the combination of future changes in climate and 
development (primarily irrigation) in the Zambezi River Basin (ZRB) threatens the technical 
and economic viability of existing and planned hydropower plants, and in turn the expansion 
plans and costs of the regional power system for Southern African countries. This hypothesis 
is evaluated using the following three questions to structure the analysis. 
• How could future climate and irrigation expansion in the Zambezi River Basin affect 
hydropower generation potential? 
• How could development in Southern Africa affect power demand, and how might this 
demand be met? 
• How could the changes in water availability for hydropower (i.e. due to climate change 
and development) affect regional electricity expansion plans, generation costs and 
greenhouse gas emissions? 
The methodological tool used to address the first research question is the Water Evaluation 
and Planning (WEAP) scenario modelling system, developed by Stockholm Environment 
Institute. WEAP is a combined hydrological and water allocation model that is widely used 
internationally. The modelling demonstrates that the change in future climate is the 
overwhelming driver of future production at almost all hydropower plants in the ZRB over the 
study period of 2010–2070. The difference in mean generation under wetting and drying 
climates (i.e. difference between the values under wet and dry scenarios) is 12–16% for 
individual existing plants. This difference is as much as 30% for individual new plants, with all 
plants other than Batoka showing variation in mean annual generation of more than 13%. The 
impact of irrigation, on the other hand, is mainly an issue for plants downstream from Kariba, 
and even then the magnitude is typically less than a third of the impact of the alternative 
climates. The water modelling results therefore do not vary significantly across alternative 
development futures, because the accelerated irrigation development is still not large enough 
to dramatically impact hydropower.  
The second research question is analysed using Stockholm Environment Institute’s Long-
Range Energy Alternatives Planning (LEAP) model to trace the impacts of socio-economic 
development on electricity supply and demand. The analysis combines a simulation of current 
utility plans with a least cost optimisation to meet the remainder of supply needed over the 
long term. The analysis shows that the underlying socio-economic drivers of demand lead to 
both a dramatic increase in total electricity demand and a shift across sectors and countries 
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within the region. Total electricity demand for the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) region 
increases by 8–14 times over period from 2010 to 2070, with the combined demand from the 
rapidly growing countries of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique and Zambia 
becoming larger than South African demand by 2070. At the sectoral level, the share of total 
demand from the extractive and manufacturing sectors increases from 59% in 2010 to 70% in 
2070 under the most optimistic development scenario, based on a compound annual growth 
rate of consumption in excess of 5%. Activity level growth is the main driver of demand growth. 
Comparison with other studies in the region show that the mid-term demand estimates (e.g. 
2025–2030) in this study are generally within the range of other research, with somewhat 
higher demand estimates from the most optimistic development scenario. Total electricity 
supply required over the longer term is met through the addition of 400–1400 GW of new 
capacity, or 8–20 times the current capacity of the region. More strikingly, the power mix shifts 
from almost 80% coal-fired power to 24–44% coal by 2070, with the balance being supplied 
mainly by solar, wind, hydropower and nuclear generation. The regional shift is no less 
dramatic, with South Africa’s share of total generation declining from 84% to only a third, based 
on the higher growth rates in countries such as DRC, Mozambique and Zambia. 
The third research question is the most important in terms of the original contribution of this 
PhD thesis. Applying the WEAP and LEAP tools to an integrated multi-country system is a 
methodological advance pioneered in this thesis, showing that the integrated methodology 
can provide information to address not only the immediate questions about generation choices 
under an uncertain future climate, but also system costs and GHG emissions. The analysis 
shows that the reduction in hydropower generation under a drying climate leads to a shift in 
both capacity expansion choices and the operation of the regional power system, while the 
increases in hydropower output under a wetting climate are smaller. In other words, the 
“downside” of future climate changes is larger than the potential “upside”. At an aggregate 
level, the increases in generation costs are a small share of total generation costs (i.e. less 
than 1% over the full study period compared to the baseline climate). However, the impact on 
generation costs for hydro-dependent countries such as Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
is considerably larger, and these countries also gain more under a wetting climate. Finally, 
because some hydropower could be displaced by coal, regional GHG emissions could 
increase by more than 6 MtCO2 per year in the medium term, or the equivalent of a large coal-
fired power station.  
This research has important policy implications for the water and electricity sector in the 
region. The potential transformation of the electricity supply sector would require a 
fundamental shift in resource use, grid management and infrastructure development in the 
region. The shift in the resource base for electricity generation will pose challenges for grid 
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integration and balancing supply and demand across countries and load centres. Historically, 
the development of transmission capacity, and the resulting trade in electricity, has been 
constrained by the political and economic realities of the region. There are signs that the 
politics could be shifting, however, for political, economic and environmental reasons. In 
addition, the relatively low consumption of water in the Zambezi River Basin in the past meant 
that explicit trade-offs across sectors and across countries posed less of a challenge for the 
basin overall. This is very likely to change in the future, as increased demand from all sectors, 
and major potential changes in climate will require more explicit agreements across both 
countries and user groups on how best to utilise a limited resource. This research 
demonstrates the tools that could be used to integrate both climate change and upstream 
development demands into the feasibility studies before investment decisions are made. The 
research also illustrates the first steps toward integrating climate change and upstream 
development considerations into national and regional electricity planning. 
The electricity and water sectors are important contributors to the development of the Southern 
Africa, and hydropower in the ZRB lies at the intersection of these fields. Climate change, 
however, has the potential to add increased stress on these sectors, both directly and 
indirectly, and yet is not being considered in many individual hydropower power investments, 
or in national or regional electricity planning. The integrated scenario analysis approach in this 
thesis demonstrates how the impacts of climate change, as well as increased irrigation 
demand for water, could be assessed not only for specific hydropower plants and for the entire 
sector power sector. Preparing for this possible range of future climates can increase the 
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With the population of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region expected 
to increase from around 260 million in 2012 to more than 500 million over the next 30 years, 
and as the SADC region industrialises on its path to improved human development, the 
demand for electricity is expected to increase dramatically. As a result, the power sector is a 
key component of infrastructure that drives both regional integration and economic growth, 
with energy security being increasingly important to continued development across Southern 
Africa (African Union 2012; Eberhard et al. 2011). At the same time, the chronic power 
shortages in the region in recent years has hampered short-term economic development. The 
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), established in 1995, provides a forum for regional 
solutions to electricity generation and supply through coordinated planning and operation of 
the regional power system, which consists of generators and international inter-connectors.  
The hydropower resources of the Zambezi River Basin (ZRB) are central to the long-term 
growth prospects and security of SAPP. While hydropower remains an important but under-
represented contributor to SAPP, significant resources are located in the ZRB, with more than 
40,000 MW in generation potential (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2016). Hydropower accounts for 
roughly 40% of the regional hydropower capacity, with twice that amount planned under further 
development (Miketa and Merven 2013; Spalding-Fecher et al. 2014). Securing the 
hydropower resources of the ZRB is therefore critical to ensuring regional energy security and 
stability. Increasingly, climate-related risks have the potential to further undermine the 
contribution of hydropower resources to the regional power pool and limit economic growth 
prospects (e.g., Spalding-Fecher et al. 2014; Kling, Stanzel, and Preishuber 2014; Yamba et 
al. 2011). Furthermore, the institutional structures for managing shared water resources 
across the entire river basin are only new emerging. Currently a Joint Operating Technical 
Committee, with representatives from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, exists to provide 
limited coordination of the Kariba Dam and Cahora Bassa Dam. The entry into force of the 
“Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission” (the ZAMCOM 
Agreement) in 2011 and, more importantly, the establishment of a permanent Secretariat in 
2014, provides the foundation upon which to develop greater coordination and efficient 
resource utilisation across the SAPP countries that are part of the Zambezi River Basin. There 
is, however, still no formal institutional cooperation between the SAPP Coordination Centre 
and the Zambezi Basin Commission (ZAMCOM), or other regional water management 
institutions. In addition, while hydropower can be part of low-carbon development strategies 
for the region, loss of output due to drying climate could shift generation to fossil fuels, making 
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it more difficult for the Southern African countries to meet their climate change mitigation 
commitments under the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
While previous research has examined the impacts of climate change on specific existing and 
new hydropower plants (Beck and Bernauer 2011; Cervigni et al. 2015; Harrison and 
Whittington 2002; Spalding-Fecher et al. 2014; Tilmant et al. 2010), they have not been linked 
to any electricity supply and demand scenarios for the region. Not only does this lack of cross-
sectoral coordination jeopardise national energy and economic development, but the lack of 
risk analysis limits the possibility of attracting much-needed private investment. It is necessary 
to link the water and power sector analyses in order to assess how climate change impacts 
on ZRB hydropower plants would affect the national electricity systems of key ZRB riparian 
states, as well as the overall electricity system performance and evolution in the regional 
power sector. In addition, the superficial treatment of water demand in many previous studies 
is an important weakness, because irrigation development could become an important driver 
of water availability at specific sites, even if overall the available runoff is underutilised. This 
requires a clear set of scenarios for socio-economic development in the region as well as 
consideration of future climates, as an input to both water and energy demand modelling. 
These are the gaps in knowledge that this research seeks to address, using an innovative 
integrated scenario modelling approach. 
1.2 Hypothesis and key questions 
Hypothesis: The combination of future changes in climate and development (primarily 
irrigation) in the Zambezi River Basin threatens the viability of major existing and planned 
hydropower plants, and in turn the expansion plans and costs of the regional power system 
for southern Africa.  
To test this hypothesis requires answering three key research questions: 
1: How could future climate and irrigation expansion in the Zambezi River Basin affect 
hydropower generation potential? 
The first question is how future changes in climate (i.e. mean rainfall, timing of rainfall, mean 
temperature) and development (primarily irrigation) in the Zambezi River Basin could affect 
the potential generation from major existing and planned hydropower plants. Given the 
significant uncertainties in future climate, this research uses scenarios as a key tool to explore 
the range of future possibilities. In addition, agricultural water demand, specifically for 
irrigation, could be an important component of increasing water consumption in the Zambezi 
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Basin. Therefore, the link between potential increases in irrigation demand – both from new 
projects and existing irrigated land – and water consumption by the agricultural sector in the 
Zambezi Basin is a key component of the research. The methodological tool to address this 
research question is the Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) scenario modelling system, 
developed by Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). WEAP is a combined hydrological and 
water allocation model that is widely used internationally. WEAP is used to model the impacts 
of climate-related changes in runoff and increased irrigated agriculture on water demand and 
allocation at the sub-basin level, drawing on the Zambezi River Basin Multi-Sectoral 
Investment Opportunity Analysis study (see description in Chapter 2) for estimates of future 
potential irrigated area.  
2: How could development in Southern Africa affect power demand, and how might this 
demand be met? 
The second major question is how socio-economic development, in terms of GDP growth, 
demographic changes but also policy decisions and development investments, could affect 
demand for electricity, which includes the demand for hydropower; and how this demand could 
be met from a wide range of power supply options.  
SEI’s Long Range Energy Alternatives Planning (LEAP) model will be used to trace the 
impacts of development on energy demand, and in turn the demand for hydropower from 
various sectors of the economy. The power supply options will include not only a simulation of 
current utility plans but also an optimisation for least cost to meet the remainder of supply 
needed over the long term. 
3: How could the changes in water availability for hydropower (i.e. due to climate 
change and development) affect regional electricity expansion plans, costs and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? 
The third key question is how the net changes in water availability for hydropower generation, 
driven by climate change and development, could affect the overall regional electricity system, 
and particularly the system-wide costs of electricity, as well as the GHG emissions from the 
sector. Many ZRB countries depend on hydropower for both domestic supply and export 
revenue (e.g. Mozambique, Zambia, and possibly Zimbabwe and Malawi in the future). The 
change in availability could, therefore, affect electricity security and so the cost of generation. 
Hydro-dominated countries outside the ZRB could also be affected, but the generation 
forecasts for these countries will be held constant in this analysis, due to lack of a detailed 
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hydrological model for those other river basins (e.g. the Congo)1 under different climate and 
development futures.  
1.3 Overview of methodological approach 
The overall structure of the analysis, and the relationship between the different analytical 
components, is shown in Figure 1. The arrows show how the development and climate futures 
provide inputs to the water and power supply and demand models.2 These models then 
provide the basis for the integrated water and power scenarios. The methodological approach 
to answer the questions above will be integrated scenarios combining WEAP results for 
hydropower availability with a LEAP analysis of the power sector 
Figure 1. Overview of major analytical components and methodological tools 
 
.. 
 Water modelling methodology 
While there are variety of simulation and optimisation modelling tools available for water 
supply and demand modelling, the methodological tool selected for this analysis is the SEI’s 
WEAP modelling system (Yates et al. 2005; Sieber and Purkey 2011). There are several 
important reasons for choosing WEAP: 
• The user-friendly graphic interface and transparent simulation approach make it easier 
to present results to stakeholders and elicit their feedback on the modelling, thereby 
increasing the accuracy of the inputs and results. All the parameters and results can 
                                               
1  Chapter 2 notes that the Enhancing Climate Resilient Infrastructure in Africa (ECRIA) study (Cervigni et al. 2015) study included 
modelling of the Congo River Basin, but the detailed water model is not in the public domain. 
2  The arrow from climate futures to SAPP Power Supply refers only to the significant climate change impact on hydropower, 






















be shown in scenario format, and choices on water allocation are explicit in each 
scenario, so that policy makers can provide direct inputs and see the implications of 
those decisions.  
• The model has the built-in capability to link with an energy modelling tool (i.e. the LEAP 
model), so that the modelled availability of hydropower plants under various future 
scenarios can be used in the system-wide energy modelling. 
• The model can be implemented as a water balance tool only, if hydrological modelling 
is not required for the water simulation (see below). 
WEAP is a combined hydrological and water allocation model that is widely used 
internationally (e.g. Mehta et al. 2011; Purkey et al. 2007; D. N. Yates and Miller 2013; Varela-
Ortega et al. 2011; Howells et al. 2013; Höllermann, Giertz and Diekkrüger 2010). There are 
several different hydrological modelling choices within WEAP (e.g. FAO crop requirements), 
which can be adapted to the needs of the research project. WEAP operates on the basic 
principle of water balance accounting, and provides an integrated approach to simulating both 
water supply and demand, with equal attention given to each side of the water balance 
equation. It is a simulation tool in that the futures are driven by user input, and it does not 
optimise on any criterion. WEAP is also a database for all water supply and demand 
parameters, as well as a forecasting tool simulating water demand, supply, flows, storage and 
pollution. For this thesis research, the runoff data is imported from another peer-reviewed 
modelling project, and so the focus in this analysis is the water balance modelling. 
WEAP uses an intuitive graphical interface to show a schematic of the water system including 
all the supply sources (e.g. rivers, groundwater, and reservoirs); withdrawal, transmission and 
wastewater treatment facilities; ecosystem requirements; water demands; and pollution 
generation. The graphic interface prompts the user, highlights possible errors and provides 
on-screen guidance. Each of these components then has a corresponding data sheet with 
fixed parameters as well as time series parameters. Expandable data structures allow the 
model to evolve during the research, or be modified afterward as more detailed data becomes 
available. 
Finally, as mentioned above, WEAP has a built-in interface to SEI’s LEAP modelling system. 
This means that the two models together can provide a dynamic tool to analyse the 
implications of climate change and increased irrigation demands, not only on hydropower 
production from individual facilities but also for the energy system as whole, which is the goal 
of this overall thesis. 
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 Electricity modelling methodology 
As Bazilian et al. (2012) and Koppelaar et al. (2016) explain, there are numerous long-term 
energy forecasting and simulation modelling tools that each has its own strengths and 
weakness. As mentioned above, the tool selected for this thesis is the LEAP modelling system, 
developed by SEI (Heaps 2012), and increasingly used as part of integrated water-energy-
climate modelling analyses (see, e.g., Howells et al. 2013; Sattler et al. 2012; D. N. Yates and 
Miller 2013).  
The overall structure of LEAP is presented in Figure 2, showing the main flows of information 
through LEAP for this analysis. LEAP is not a model of a specific energy system, but rather a 
flexible software framework within which models of different energy systems can be 
constructed. Its most important features for this thesis are its support for multi-country 
analysis, alternative scenario projections, and the ability to combine bottom-up energy end-
use based demand forecasts with least-cost optimisation modelling of electricity generation3. 
Figure 2. Structure of LEAP model as applied in the electricity analysis 
 
Note: “Other drivers” does not include climate. LEAP does not directly incorporate any climate inputs. 
Source: Adapted from Heaps (2012) 
                                               
3 Note that, in addition to LEAP User Manual describing the software in detail 
(https://www.energycommunity.org/Help/leap.htm), the documentation on the OSeMOSYS optimisation modelling tool is 
available at http://www.osemosys.org/  
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Electricity system models created using LEAP are demand-driven and typically combine 
bottom-up energy end-use based demand forecasts with simulation and/or optimisation-based 
models of energy production and conversion (which in LEAP is referred to as 
“Transformation”). LEAP’s demand models are based around a straightforward accounting 
approach that calculates energy consumption as the product of some type of activity level and 
an annual average energy intensity, specified as units of energy consumption per unit of 
activity. Activity levels are typically broken down into their various components within a 
hierarchical tree structure displayed within LEAP and used to organise the main sources of 
data. For example, in the household sector energy intensities may be specified per household 
by fuel for each major end-use (cooking, lighting, appliances, etc.), while the total number of 
households in each country may be broken down into urban versus rural households and then 
into electrified and unelectrified households. The user is free to specify how each of these 
values may evolve in the future based on, for example, expected rates of population growth, 
urbanisation, electrification and technology penetration. In industry, services and agriculture 
sectors, energy consumption can be disaggregated by major subsectors, and energy 
intensities may be specified per unit of value added in each subsector. LEAP models are 
typically used for integrated energy planning that considers all fuels and the potential for 
substitution among fuels and technologies. For this research, however, the demand modelling 
is limited to consider only demands for electricity. The major macroeconomic and demographic 
assumptions used in the study are described in detail in Chapter 3.  
In terms of the electricity supply analysis, the model developed for this thesis combines a 
relatively simple set of accounting projections for transmission, distribution and own-use 
energy losses, with a multi-regional least-cost optimisation model for electricity generation. 
The existing plants and specific planned investments by the regional utilities are the starting 
point for future supply – so the simulation aspect of LEAP is used for these power sources. To 
bridge the gap between the specific planned plants and the actual future demand, a least-cost 
optimisation analysis is used, based on a set of generic power plant options for each country. 
LEAP’s optimisation calculations are based on the Open Source Energy Modelling System 
(Howells et al. 2011) and the GNU Linear Programming Kit, a software toolkit intended for 
solving large scale linear programming problems by means of the revised simplex method and 
the CPLEX Solver. This system can be used to calculate least-cost pathways for capacity 
expansion and plant dispatch in any scenario. The supply analysis is elaborated in Chapter 5.  
Note that, because the focus on this research is on how climate change affects hydropower 
output, and in turn the electricity system, the modelling scenarios only include supply-side 
responses to changes in hydropower availability. While the modelling framework could be 
used to explore how demand-side interventions (e.g. increases in end-use efficiency or 
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increases in water-use efficiency) would affect the electricity system, these are not affected 
by climate change and so are not the focus on the analysis. 
LEAP can also be used to calculate the emissions of GHGs and other local air pollutants in 
any scenario through the specification of emissions factors, typically entered as emissions per 
unit of energy combusted. In this research, LEAP’s optimisation calculations use an objective 
function to minimise total economic cost for the entire electricity system. The capability of 
coupling the electricity modelling with a water modelling system (i.e. SEI’s WEAP model) 
means that the climate change impacts on the power system can be analysed simultaneously.  
 Integrated scenario analysis methodology  
The integrated scenarios combine climate futures with alternative development futures, as 
shown in Table 1. While Chapter 5 presents the results of how the development futures could 
influence the evolution of the regional power system, this analysis assumes a fixed availability 
for the major hydropower plants in the ZRB (and often an optimistic one based on the project 
owners’ expectations). The integrated scenarios combine both dimensions of uncertainty – 
alternative development futures and alternative climate futures. To demonstrate the impact of 
different future climates, the results from the scenarios using alternative climate futures are 
compared with results under a modelled “baseline climate” – in other words, the hydropower 
generation, system costs and GHG emissions that we would expect if the climate from 2010 
to 2070 were like the historical climate. (See Chapter 4 for a more detailed explanation of this 
issue).  
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Table 1. Nomenclature for the integrated scenarios 
  Climate futures History 
 
 
Marker scenario with 
“drying” (e.g. drying in 
many sub-basins) 
Marker scenario with 
“wetting” (e.g. 















































































“GD Dry” “GD Wet” “GD baseline” 
Note: BAU = Business as usual scenario, SADC Int = SADC Integration scenario, GD = Grand Deal scenario 
While the WEAP and LEAP modelling software can transfer results from one model to another 
in real-time, the practicality of this real-time link depends on the time required to calculate the 
full set of results for a given scenario.  Because of the scale and complexity of both the water 
and energy systems in this analysis, and because the flow of information was only one-way 
(i.e. from WEAP to LEAP), the transfer of data is instead carried out off-line for each of the 
integrated scenarios. The implementation of the integrated scenario analysis includes the 
following three steps. 
1. First, the ZRB WEAP model is used to project monthly hydropower generation from 
2010 to 2070 under each of the combined climate and development scenarios (e.g. 
“BAU Dry”, “BAU Wet”, “Grand Deal Dry”).  
2. This data is extracted from WEAP and converted into “availability” (i.e. actual 
generation divided by potential maximum generation in that month, taking into 
consideration any capacity expansions) in an Excel spreadsheet. This covers more 
than a dozen of the largest hydropower investments in the ZRB, with capacity of over 
300 MW each. The time steps in the WEAP model are monthly, while the time steps 
in LEAP are seasonal and weekend versus weekday. The conversion therefore uses, 
for example, the average of June, July and August monthly availability as “winter 











weekend” and “winter weekday” availability,4 and the same with the other seasons 
(e.g. Dec, Jan, Feb for summer).  
3. The electricity supply optimisation calculations are then repeated for each scenario. 
Comparing the results for generation, costs and GHG emissions across scenarios 
therefore shows the effect of changes in intra-annual and inter-annual variability in 
generation by ZRB hydropower plants. 
1.4 Scope of the analysis 
While the analytical framework in this thesis is intended to make an original contribution to the 
field, based on the gaps identified in the literature review (see Chapter 2), there are important 
boundaries to the scope of the analysis: 
• The electricity and water modelling do not incorporate macroeconomic feedback on 
demand. In other words, if reduced water supply drives up the costs of electricity in the 
region, this could reduce the demand for electricity. This feedback loop is not included 
in the analysis because the economic and demographic inputs for the alternative 
development futures are exogenous to the electricity modelling.  
• Climate change impacts on hydropower are considered only for the ZRB and not for 
other major river basins in Southern Africa. While the ZRB is currently the most 
important basin and one of the most important in the future, in terms of potential 
hydropower capacity, the Congo basin is potentially the largest future source of 
hydropower if fully developed. 
• The optimisation algorithm for electricity supply only considers alternative generation 
sources, and not alternative transmission and distribution (T&D) investments to allow 
for more trade. This means that the optimisation is essentially a country-by-country 
optimisation and not a full regional optimisation. The T&D capacity and flows are 
exogenous to the modelling. They are derived from an earlier regional power 
optimisation study (Miketa and Merven 2013), albeit one that did not include an climate 
change or water availability impacts on power supply.  
• Only grid-connected demand and supply sources are analysed. While there are 
significant numbers of households not connected to the grid, for which distributed 
                                               
4  Obviously, there is no hydrological reason why availability would vary systematically from weekends to weekdays, though 
energy demand does vary. 
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power options may be appropriate, the large hydropower plants that could be affected 
by climate change would all be grid-connected. The demand to which those plants 
must contribute is grid-connected demand (which also increasingly includes a larger 
share of households, as grid penetration expands over time). 
1.5 Note on own contribution 
The author conducted this thesis research alongside two funded research projects, the 
members of which are noted in the acknowledgements. The author surveyed the literature to 
identify the research needs, and built both the WEAP model for the ZRB and the LEAP model 
for SAPP. The author also created all of the integrated scenarios, and the Excel tool that 
converted the WEAP outputs on hydropower generation into LEAP inputs for hydropower 
availability. Members of the research teams did provide some specific additional inputs that 
were critical to the analysis, namely, the South Africa module in the SAPP LEAP model 
(Mamahloko Senatla), review of the Zambia and Mozambique LEAP modules (Gilberto 
Mahumane, Bernard Tembo, Francis Yamba, Imasiku Nyambe), the detailed hydrological 
runoff data as an input to the WEAP water allocation (Harald Kling), and the demographic and 
economic inputs for the SADC Integration scenario (Arthur Chapman). Other contributions are 
cited as sources in the text. 
As required by UCT, I confirm that I have been granted permission by the University of Cape 
Town’s Doctoral Degrees Board to include the following publication(s) in my PhD thesis, and 
where co-authorships are involved, my co-authors have agreed that I may include the 
publication(s):  
Spalding-Fecher, Randall, Arthur Chapman, Francis Yamba, Hartley 
Walimwipi, Harald Kling, Bernard Tembo, Imasiku Nyambe, Boaventura 
Cuamba. 2014. The vulnerability of hydropower production in the Zambezi 
River Basin to the impacts of climate change and irrigation development. 
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 21(5): 721-742. DOI: 
10.1007/s11027-014-9619-7 
Spalding-Fecher, Randall, Mamahloko Senatla, Francis Yamba, Charles 
Heaps, Arthur Chapman, Gilberto Mahumane, Bernard Tembo, Biness 
Lukwessa, Imasiku Nyambe, and Grayson Himunzowa. 2017. Electricity Supply 
and Demand Scenarios for the Southern African Power Pool. Energy Policy 
101:403-414. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.10.033 
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Because these papers are the published work of the author, and are the based on the 
same research as much of chapters 4 and 5, respectively, the thesis cites the original 
primary and secondary sources used in these two areas of analysis, rather than the 
published journal articles.  In addition, some of the policy implications in Chapter 7 are 
discussed in the journal articles, but these points are not referenced to the articles 
because the conclusions are the outcome of the overall analysis undertaken in the 
thesis. 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature, with a focus on studies in the ZRB, but also including 
climate-water-hydropower studies more broadly. The chapter also notes previous studies that 
solely focused on electricity sector modelling for the SADC region. Chapter 3 then presents 
the alternative development and climate futures used in the analysis and explains how these 
futures are combined into a set of integrated climate and development scenarios. Chapter 4 
commences the quantitative analysis, presenting the water allocation modelling framework 
and the assessment of climate and development impacts on existing and planned hydropower 
plants in the ZRB. In parallel, Chapter 5 presents a model of the SAPP electricity system, with 
power supply and demand scenarios up to 2070, but without any consideration of climate 
change. Chapter 6 integrates the water and electricity modelling approaches, by analysing 
how the climate-induced changes in water availability for hydropower would impact regional 
electricity system expansion, fuel choices, costs and GHG emissions. Chapter 7 concludes by 
discussing not only conclusions on the analytical approach and quantitative results but also 




2 Literature review 
To understand how climate change and development will affect both supply and demand 
drivers for water and energy in the Zambezi River Basin, and in turn the national and regional 
electricity systems, first requires an understanding of how these issues have already been 
addressed in previous research. This chapter begins a short overview of climate, energy and 
development linkages, and then proceeds to a survey of how previous research has 
addressed specific dimensions of the overall research question. These dimensions include: 
the use of a plausible set of climate and development scenarios, the level of detail of demand 
analysis (particularly water demand from irrigation), the assumptions and modelling 
approaches for water allocation, the scope of hydropower plants included, which climate 
impact pathways are considered, and the integration of facility-level analysis with electricity 
system analysis.5 
2.1 Climate change and hydropower globally 
The overall dynamics among energy, development and climate change are complex (see 
Figure 3). More importantly, certain aspects of these dynamics are much less well understood 
than others. The role of the energy sector in providing for basic needs and development (arrow 
D in the figure) is well understood (DFID 2002; Modi et al. 2006; Spalding-Fecher, Winkler, 
and Mwakasonda 2005), as are the pathways through which economic and social 
development drives energy consumption (arrow C) (GEA 2012). While there is a vast literature 
on the contribution of energy production and consumption on climate change, in terms of GHG 
emissions (arrow A) (e.g. Solomon et al. 2007; Metz et al. 2007; Edenhofer et al. 2014), 
however, perhaps the least well understood link is the impact of climate change on the energy 
sector itself (arrow B). The challenge is that many of these impacts are indirect and have a 
variety of potential climate interactions that may have conflicting influences. For example, 
hydropower production is clearly affected by the amount of runoff available at the plant site, 
but what determines the availability of water? Beyond the obvious drivers of upstream rainfall 
and evaporation (due to changes in mean temperatures), this will also be influenced by 
competition for water with upstream irrigation development and by damage to reservoirs and 
infrastructure from flooding (Spalding-Fecher and Fedorsky 2012). 
                                               
5 While the institutional environment for the water and power sectors – and uncertainties over how this will evolve - is relevant for 
adaption to the impacts of climate change on the water and power sector, the focus on this research is on identifying and 
quantifying the potential impacts before there have been institutional or other policy responses. This chapter does not, 
therefore, cover the institutional issues in the Southern African water and power sectors. 
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Figure 3. Energy, climate change and development linkages 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
Climate change impacts studies have been conducted in many other sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
water, health, natural ecosystems) for almost two decades (arrow E), as reviewed in the 
Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (e.g. Parry et al. 2007). 
The water sector has been a major focus, starting with studies at a global level (Frederick and 
Major 1997; Arnell 2004, 1999), and followed by studies for regions or basins (e.g. Arnell, 
Hudson, and Jones 2003; Jiang et al. 2007). Only in the last decade have water sector studies 
made more explicit links with energy production (e.g. Bates et al. 2008). The literature on 
impacts in the energy sector is relatively new, and many of the early studies focused on 
climatic influences on energy demand, particularly in industrialised countries (e.g. Baxter and 
Calandri 1992; Bhartendu and Cohen 1987; Isaac and van Vuuren 2009) 
One of the most important syntheses of research on climate impacts on the global energy 
sector is a recent book from the World Bank (Ebinger and Vergara 2011) and the 
accompanying journal article (Schaeffer et al. 2012), which highlight vulnerabilities for 
hydropower production. The authors note that the magnitude of vulnerability depends on the 
share of total generation from hydropower and the level of integration of the grid(s) through 
transmission capacity – both of these are central issues in Southern Africa. Schaeffer et al.’s 
(2012) review of energy sector vulnerability not only highlights the negative impacts on 
hydropower but also the methodological challenges in this area as a relatively new field. The 
review also links the climate variability to questions of energy security. While the concept of 
“energy security” has a wide variety of meanings in the literature, a key factor is almost always 
supply security (in this case related to hydropower or other resources affected by climate). 















products on the market, at a price which is affordable for consumers”. On the supply side, both 
the performance of hydropower and the availability of biomass resources – the mainstay of 
the vast majority of poor communities in the world – are potentially vulnerable (Pöyry 2010; 
Ebinger and Vergara 2011). Given that the most important energy security issue in most 
developing countries is the lack of access to modern energy services for the majority of the 
population (Bazilian et al. 2010; Legros et al. 2009; IEA, UNDP, and UNIDO 2010), these 
negative impacts on biomass and once of the key source of electricity for many developing 
countries have important implications for energy security. 
A few studies have applied changes in climatic variables to calibrated hydrological models of 
major river basins, where the future climate parameters are used to force the model and 
estimate potential impact on hydropower (de Lucena et al. 2009; Wilbanks et al. 2007; Lehner, 
Czisch, and Vassolo 2005; Hamlet et al. 2009). A global analysis of climate impacts on 
hydropower showed that, while the impacts were highly variable, a number of countries in 
Africa could be particularly hard hit (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012). Hamududu and 
Killingtveit used forecast changes in annual mean flows as a predictor of change in 
hydropower production, bearing in mind that this assumes that current hydropower generation 
is only limited by water availability. This is not the case for Africa, of course, where total 
potential hydropower production is limited by lack of capital. In other words, there is large 
scope for harnessing more hydropower resources beyond what current plants can produce, 
but this requires large investments in infrastructure. Nevertheless, the results are instructive. 
Using an ensemble of 12 global circulation models (GCMs) and IPCC Scenario A1B,6 runoff 
for 2050 was mapped for 165 global basins, and results tabulated for each country. While the 
global average losses were small – at less than 1% of historic generation – the combined 
annual losses in hydropower production from existing facilities due to climate change in 
Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe were estimated at over 2,700 
GWh relative to historical production levels and a historical climate.  Note that this study did 
not include growth in water demand from agriculture or other sectors, and did not include the 
                                               
6  The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) used different future climate scenarios “families” and groups to characterise the 
uncertainty in future global policy decisions and socio-economic development (IPCC 2000). Those referenced in this thesis 
include A1B (rapid economic growth, regional convergence, rapid introduction of more efficient technologies, balance 
between renewables and fossil fuels), A2 (heterogenous social and economic development, with continued population 
growth, fragmented technological development), and B1 (convergent world similar to A1 but with faster decarbonisation, 
economic diversification and improved equity). The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) developed “reference concentration 
pathways” (RCP) to guide the scenario analysis, with each pathway defined by the approximate radiative forcing (RF, W m–
2) that is reached during or near the end of the 21st century, relative to the pre-industrial period (e.g. RCP4.5 is 4.5 W m-2) 
(van Vuuren et al. 2011; Moss et al. 2010). 
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demand of water from new hydropower facilities. In addition, only one future emissions 
scenario was considered. 
2.2 Studies of climate change and hydropower in Southern Africa, 
particularly the Zambezi  
Several studies have started to make the links between climate change, upstream 
development and hydropower in the ZRB, albeit not always with a complete picture of these 
future impacts. The studies reviewed in the following sections are those that analysed water 
and supply and demand in the ZRB, or in some cases more broadly in the region.7 Rather 
than providing a comprehensive description of each study, the focus is on the gaps in the 
current literature, and what the current research could add to deepen the knowledge base and 
understanding in this field. By way of introduction, the studies and their main findings are listed 
here before examining their structure and characteristics. For ease of reference, the labels at 
the start of each bullet are used throughout this chapter to identify each modelling effort.  
• ECRIA: During the latter part of this thesis research, the World Bank published the 
Enhancing Climate Resilient Infrastructure in Africa (ECRIA) study (Cervigni et al. 2015). 
The ZRB was one of seven river basins where researchers modelled future supply and 
demand across multiple end-users, and how this would change under a range of future 
climate scenarios. This project also included electricity optimisation modelling for regional 
power pools. The results showed that, under the driest scenarios, total hydropower 
generation could decline by more than 60%, while wetter scenarios could increase total 
production by 25%. A case study of Batoka Gorge showed that this range of future climates 
could reduce the net present value (NPV) by more than 100%, while the wettest climates 
could increase NPV by just over 40%. 
• ZDSS: A consortium led by HYDROC Consult, and including Pöyry Energy, developed a 
Zambezi Decision Support System (ZDSS) for the Mozambique National Institute for 
Disaster Management, as part of a larger project on responding to climate change in the 
water sector (Petersen 2012; Kling, Stanzel, and Preishuber 2014). The ZDSS included a 
comprehensive hydrological water balance model of the ZRB, with 27 sub-basins as well 
as a water allocation model. The results show a 32% decrease in discharge at Tete, 
Mozambique with only a 10% decline in mean annual precipitation, highlighting the 
sensitivity of runoff to changes in climate. Under rapid development scenarios and a 
                                               
7  For a map of the ZRB showing the location of the hydropower plants mentioned in this chapter, see Chapter 4. 
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changing climate, Cahora Bassa might not be able to release any water during the driest 
months of the year, because reservoir levels could fall below minimum operation levels. 
• Yamba et al: Professor Francis Yamba and his colleagues used a water balance model, 
the Water Resource Simulation Model (WRSM2000), to analyse future scenarios for 
hydropower in the Zambezi (Yamba et al. 2011). The focus of the scenarios was to 
examine how climatic changes up to 2070, along with continued increase in demand, 
would affect availability of water for existing and new hydropower stations. The study 
results show that gross hydropower potential at Kariba, Itezhi-Tezhi, Cahora Bassa and 
Mphanda Nkuwa could fall by more than a third on average between 2010 and 2035. The 
modelling predicts some recovery of hydropower potential in the period between 2035 and 
2050, but this is followed by continued declines after 2050.  
• Beck and Bernauer: Beck and Bernauer (2011) developed a lumped rainfall-runoff 
hydrological supply model for the region, and a demand model covering both consumptive 
and non-consumptive uses of runoff. For Kariba, the analysis shows that moderate supply 
and demand changes could reduce power output by 35%, and that a scenario with stronger 
supply and demand change could eliminate almost all hydropower production during parts 
of the year. Cahora Bassa could also see a 16% decline under the moderate scenario and 
a 65% decline under the strong supply and demand changes scenario. 
• Tilmant et al: The Tilmant et. al. (2011) team used an economic optimisation model to 
examine the costs and benefits of different priorities of users in the Zambezi. This included 
trade-offs between irrigation and hydropower. The results showed that, if irrigation is given 
priority and 464,000 ha of new irrigated land are developed over the next 25 years, regional 
hydropower generation would fall by about 10%. The represents a $200 million8 net loss 
of economic value, even considering the economic benefits from increased agricultural 
production. 
• MSIOA: The World Bank Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (MSIOA) Study 
developed a hydro-economic model to examine key trade-offs and impacts of hydropower 
and irrigation development in the Zambezi River Basin, based largely on existing flows. 
The focus was on understanding the optimum balance of irrigation, hydropower 
development, flood control and environmental flows, and whether there was any potential 
conflict between these sectors. The study used the HEC-3 reservoir and hydrology model 
and limited input from a WEAP model of the Zambezi. In terms of climate change, the 
                                               
8 In all cases in this thesis, the symbol $ refers to US dollars. 
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study found that, “the preliminary indications are that some parts of the Basin would be 
affected more than others with potential reduction of up to 30% in hydropower generation. 
As noted, this will need further detailed analysis.” 
• Harrison et al.: Harrison et al. (2006) studied the impacts on a specific project in their 
analysis of the proposed 1600 MW Batoka Gorge hydropower plant to assess how climate 
change might influence the technical and financial viability of that investment. The authors 
use a simple lumped-parameter water balance model and the HEC-5 reservoir balance 
model for part of the Zambezi River Basin upstream of Batoka Gorge. The financial 
analysis showed that a 10% reduction in precipitation would wipe out the NPV of the 
project, even with a 2ºC rise in temperature instead of a 4ºC rise. This is partly because a 
10% change in precipitation leads to a 20% decline in annual river flows. This amplification 
of the change in rainfall is also found in many other river basins in Africa (de Wit and 
Stankiewicz 2006). 
• Mukheibir: Mukheibir (2007) conducted a secondary review of the potential impacts of 
future climate change in hydropower in Southern Africa more generally. The temperature 
changes and rainfall changes were taken from analysis at University of Cape Town’s 
Climate Systems Analysis Group (Tadross, Jack, and Hewitson 2005). This paper does 
not provide a modelling methodology or detailed results, and so is not described further. 
 Development futures 
In terms of alternative development futures and how these might impact water supply and 
demand, many studies did not include any explicit consideration of the broader drivers of 
supply and demand, and almost none considered alternative futures. Beck and Bernauer did 
include more than one population and urbanisation scenario, but none of the other studies 
considered how alternative economic growth and changing structure of the regional 
economies could impact water systems. For the irrigation sector, the MSIOA did consider the 
implementation of “identified projects” versus the “high level potential” for irrigated agriculture, 
and the ZDSS took up this distinction as well but did not provide alternatives for years during 
which these levels might be achieved, nor were these linked to economic growth assumptions. 
Similarly, Beck and Bernauer had three different levels of irrigated area, but these were not 
related to any specific period. The ECRIA study only considered one possible timeline for 
hydropower and irrigation development, and one included one of the two irrigated area levels 
(i.e. “identified projects) from the MSIOA in their analysis. Given the major impact of economic 
development on water (and electricity) demand, and the large uncertainties in the future 
prospects for Southern Africa, an explicit formulation of development scenarios is important.  
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 Climate futures 
Projections of future climates have as much uncertainty – if not more – as future economic 
development projections. Most of the existing studies, however, only have one possible 
climate future in their analysis, although there are notable exceptions: Yamba et al. (i.e. 
average of three GCMs under SRES A2), the MSIOA (i.e. midrange of 23 GCMs under SRES 
A1B) use on climate future, while Beck & Bernauer use one emissions scenario (i.e. SRES 
A2) with two alternative precipitation levels from non-downscaled GCMs. Tilmant et al. do not 
consider a change in climate, and Harrison et al. do not use climate scenarios, but simply 
consider a ±20% change in precipitation across the basin. The ZDSS uses three climate 
futures based on downscaled GCM data in the WATCH dataset, which cover both drying and 
wetting futures, The ECRIA study, however, considers 121 future downscaled GCM 
simulations, covering a range of IPCC AR4 and AR5 scenarios (i.e. A1B, A2, B1, RCP4.5 & 
RCP8.5). While multiple climate futures are needed to understand the implications of both 
plausible drying and wetting climate futures, the number of alternatives should be small 
enough that they can be combined with alternative development scenarios.  
 Integrated scenarios 
Only Beck and Bernauer analysed scenarios that considered alternatives in both climate and 
development. Their two integrated studies, however, were (i) moderate demand changes with 
moderate drying, and (ii) more rapid demand growth with dramatic drying – so the possibilities 
of increased rainfall are not considered. All of the other studies either had only a single climate 
development future, or they analysed these issues separately (e.g. one development future 
but many climate futures). Given that drivers of both water supply and demand include large 
uncertainties, understanding the risks for hydropower in the region requires an integrated 
analysis that varies both climate and development drivers. 
 Level of detail of demand analysis  
The approach to water demand analysis varies significantly by study, but very few provide 
detailed demand assumptions. Yamba et al. simply used population growth as the driver of 
total water demand, without consideration of GDP, and do not model specific drivers of 
irrigation demand. Harrison et al. and Tilmant et al. used historical flows and demand, so did 
not account for potential increases in demand by any sectors. The MSIOA and ZDSS studies 
provided the most detail on reservoir evaporation and evapotranspiration from crops under 
irrigation (“identified projects” and “high level potential”), as well as including new hydropower 
plants and planned water transfers, but only the MSIOA addressed industrial demand. The 
ECRIA study used population to drive urban demand, and used one set of MSIOA 
assumptions (e.g. “identified projects”) to estimate future irrigation demand, but did not include 
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any industrial demand. Beck and Bernauer used GDP growth and earlier demand estimates 
for irrigation demand, but did not conduct a bottom-up analysis based on irrigated area by crop 
as in the MSIOA. While industrial demand – and to some extent urban demand – are a very 
small share of total demand in the ZRB, the lack of detail in many of the studies on irrigation 
demand is problematic. The foundation in the MSIOA study is the most promising for this task, 
because of the crop and sub-basin-level analysis. 
 Assumptions for water allocation 
Another key issue in the literature is how to account for different priorities – explicit or implicit 
– given to different sources of demand. This is not only an issue across sectors (e.g. irrigation 
versus urban demand) but also between upstream and downstream demand, particularly give 
the number of large hydropower plants in the lower Zambezi. The ZDSS, Yamba et al. and 
the MSIOA treat hydropower demand as residual, so this is only met after irrigation and urban 
demand, although the MSIOA includes many variations on which other sources of given 
priority. Beck and Bernauer, on the other hand, prioritise hydropower over irrigation, while 
Tilmant et al. explore the implications of changing the priorities of different demand sources. 
The ECRIA study assigns higher priority to upstream demand sources, and within a given sub-
basin prioritises irrigation over hydropower in most cases. Given that there is no basin-wide 
cooperative water sharing or prioritisation in place currently, assigning higher priorities to 
upstream demand sources is an important aspect of this analysis. This should be true at each 
abstraction point or reservoir along the entire river basin system. In addition, however, the 
priorities should clarify the trade-offs between hydropower reservoir filling versus hydropower 
generation (i.e. how important it is to keep a reservoir full). 
 Scope of hydropower plants included 
The ECRIA study has the most comprehensive set of existing and planned hydropower plants 
in the literature. The only run-of-river plants not included in that study that were added in this 
research were Kabompo (40 MW), Kapichira II (64 MW), Boroma (160 MW), Lupata (550 MW) 
and Mpatamanga (310 MW). More importantly, however, the ECRIA study did not include the 
possible second phase of Mphanda Nkuwa (as additional 1125 MW) or the two phases of the 
Chemba hydropower reservoir (1,000 MW total), all in Mozambique – which are all part of this 
research. The MSIOA covered all of the existing hydropower plants, and eight new 
hydropower plants of the 22 plants considered here (for discussion of specific new plants, see 
Chapter 5). The other studies generally include the four or five largest existing plants or 
reservoirs (e.g. Kariba, Cahora Bassa, Kafue Gorge, Victoria Falls, Itezhi-tezhi) and between 
two and five new plants (e.g. Mphanda Nkuwa, Batoka, Boroma, Mupata), while Beck and 
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Bernauer did not specify which new plants were included and Harrison et al. only analysed 
Batoka.  
 Climate impact pathways considered  
There are four main pathways for direct climate change impacts on the water availability for 
hydropower generation. They are (i) change in rainfall; (ii) impact of temperature change on 
evapotranspiration (i.e. crops and natural vegetation); (iii) impact of temperature change on 
reservoir evaporation; and (iv) impact of temperature change on evaporation from wetlands. 
Only the ECRIA and ZDSS studies consider all four of these pathways. Beck and Bernauer 
and the MSIOA consider all of these except the impact on wetlands (which is significant, given 
the number and size of the major wetlands in the ZRB), although Beck and Bernauer did not 
model reservoir evaporation in detail. Harrison et al. considered only rainfall and 
evapotranspiration. The Yamba et al. study only included rainfall changes. 
 Integration of facility level analysis with electricity system analysis 
None of the studies reviewed attempted to integrate the facility-level hydropower analysis with 
a model of the entire regional power pool, except for the ECRIA. The ZDSS only provides 
water availability, while Yamba et al. provide hydropower potential at selected individual 
plants. The other studies that include multiple hydropower plants report on the change in 
generation (for those limited number of plants included) but do not place this in the context of 
the overall regional power system. The ECRIA study includes the Zambezi, Orange and 
Congo River basins, as well as a model of the SAPP using the Open Source Energy Modelling 
System (OSeMOSYS) (Howells et al. 2011). The results of the ECRIA study therefore show 
how a variety of climate futures could affect regional power generation economics, but only 
based on climate change – not based on alternative assumptions about how electricity 
demand could evolve (see section 2.2.1). 
2.3  Summary and limitations of previous studies 
Tables 2–5 summarise the different aspects of the climate change and hydropower studies 
reviewed, highlighting their key characteristics. Several overall observations emerge from this 
review: 
• While the global studies are interesting in pointing to overall risks, they are at too high a 
level of aggregation (i.e. too coarse a resolution) to provide meaningful results for 
individual plants or even national systems. 
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• Many studies did not include any explicit consideration of the broader drivers of water (or 
electricity) supply and demand, and almost none considered alternative development 
futures. 
• Most studies have only one climate scenario, which implies a certainty about future 
changes in climate that does not exist. Even those studies that include more than one 
scenario do not necessarily represent the possible range of both increases and decreases 
in rainfall in different sub-basins. 
• While many studies include different supply and demand climate impact pathways (e.g. 
reservoir evaporation, runoff changes, evapotranspiration from crops and natural land 
use), only two include all four of these pathways. Very few studies address climate impacts 
on demand for water from reservoir and wetlands evaporation. 
• Most of the literature does not address projections of future water demand in any detail, 
particularly the potentially large increase in agricultural demand due to both increased 
irrigated area and increased evapotranspiration rates.  
• Where priorities are explicitly assigned to different water demand sources, these do not 
necessarily reflect the actual conditions in the river basin (e.g. the de-facto priority of 
upstream users and irrigation), and the studies do not generally consider maintaining 
reservoir storage as an explicit priority. 
• While several studies analyse changes in water availability and power production at a 
specific site, only the ECRIA study follows this dynamic effect through to the impact on 
national and regional power systems (e.g. impacts on expansion plans and total systems 
cost). This is particularly important in light of the dependence of the regional utilities’ plans 
for new supply on hydropower projects in the Zambezi. Even this study, however, does 
not present integrated development-climate-water scenarios that would demonstrate the 
interaction between the assumptions about future climate with a range of alternative socio-
economic development pathways. 
• The range of hydropower plants included in most of the studies is limited, particularly for 
future planned plants. 
• In addition, while some studies present their model calibration results explicitly, this is not 
the case with all of the studies, and some of the studies only calibrate to mean annual 
runoff, rather than also calibrating to the variability of this runoff (i.e. standard deviation 
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Table 3. Climate impact pathways considered by the studies reviewed 
Study Rainfall Temperature 
impact on 
evapotranspiration 
Temperature impact on 
reservoir evaporation 
Temperature impact 
on wetlands demand 
ECRIA Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ZDSS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yamba et al. Yes No No No 
Beck & 
Bernauer 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Tilmant et al. No No No No 
MSIOA Yes Yes Yes No 
Harrison et al Yes Yes No No 
Mukheibir Yes No No No 
Note: For complete citation for studies, see the beginning of Section 2.2. 
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Table 4. Key data sources in the studies reviewed 
Study Climate projections and 












ECRIA SRES A1B, A2, B1, RCP4.5, 
RCP8.5 
0.5 x 0.5 (50 x 50 km) 1948–2008 World Bank 
MSIOA 
N/A 2010–2050  UN medium variant, 
allocated geograph-
ically by sub-basins 
ZDSS CRNM, ECHAM and IPSL from 
WATCH under SRES A2 
0.5 x 0.5 (50 x 50 km) 1960–1990 World Bank N/A 2020–2100 N/A 
Yamba et al SRES A2 
CCCMA, CSIRO Mk2, 
HADCM3 
3.75x3.68 
5.61x3.14 (625 x 350 
km) 
3.75x2.5 




(1) HADCM3 lowest mean 
precipitation; (2) GFDL-CM2.0 
higher mean precipitation 
(ClimateWizard) 












rural vs urban 
Tilmant et al. N/A N/A 10 years   N/A  
MSIOA CRU TS 2.1, from IPCC SRES 
A1B 














+20% and –20% precip, both 
with +4ºC 
N/A New et al. (2000), 
CRU for climate; 
historic flow at Vic 
Falls 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Mukheibir UCT CSAG study used SRES 
A2 and regional climate models 
CSAG study uses 0.5 x 
0.5 (50 x 50 km) 
UNEP Vital 
Climate Graphics 
N/A N/A CSAG study is 
2071-2100 
N/A 
Note: For complete citation for studies, see the beginning of Section 2.2. 
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Table 5. Hydropower projects examined in the studies reviewed 
Study Existing Planned Hydropower demand for water 
ECRIA All plants covered Most new plant options listed in this thesis, 
except Kabompo, Kapichira II, Boroma, 
Lupata and Mpatamanga 
Largely residual 
ZDSS Kafue Gorge, Itezhi-tezhi, Kariba, 
Cahora Bassa  
Mainly Batoka and Mphanda Nkuwa Only shows water availability – no demand 
Yamba et al Kafue Gorge, Itezhi-tezhi, Kariba, 
Cahora Bassa 
Batoka, Mupata, Mphanda Nkuwa Residual 
Beck and Bernauer Kariba, Kafue Gorge, Cahora 
Bassa, Vic Falls 
Related to SAPP and SADC projections; 
limited treatment 
SAPP 2007 estimates 
Tilmant et al Nkula/ Tedzani/ Kapichira, Kariba, 
Cahora Bassa, Kafue Gorge, 
Victoria Falls 
Boroma, Mphanda Nkuwa, Itezhi-tezhi, 
Batoka Gorge 
Based on water availability and planned 
capacity 
MSIOA All plants covered Mphanda Nkuwa, Kafue Lower, Batoka 
N/S, Rumakali, Songwe I-III, Lower Fufu, 
Kholombizo, Itezhi-tezhi, plus extensions 
Kariba, Cahora Bassa, Kapichira  
Not clear how system and plant demand 
determined 
Harrison et al N/A Batoka Gorge N/A 
Mukheibir Not specific plants Not specific plants N/A 
Note: For complete citation for studies, see the beginning of Section 2.2. 
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2.4 Studies on regional electricity modelling in Southern Africa 
Because this research aims to understand not only how climate change will affect specific 
hydropower plants but also how this will affect the dynamics of the regional power systems, 
other regional electricity modelling studies are also relevant, even though none have yet 
integrated climate change impacts into their analysis. Since the early days of SAPP, numerous 
studies have examined the outlook for power sector expansion in the region, as well as the 
potential benefits from increased trade and cooperation on regional projects, but without any 
consideration of climate change impacts (Alfstad 2005; Bowen, Sparrow, and Yu 1999; 
Economic Consulting Associates 2009; Nexant 2007; Rowlands 1998). More recently, two 
studies have looked in more detail at the role of renewable energy in the development of the 
SAPP system – the SADC Renewable Energy Strategy and Action Plan (RESAP) (CEEEZ 
2012) and a study by the Energy Research Centre and the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (Miketa and Merven 2013). In addition, the SAPP Coordination Centre compiles the 
demand and supply forecasts from the national utility members and publishes this 10-to-15-
year outlook each year, although without any further analysis (e.g. SAPP 2014, 2013). While 
these studies often provide detailed supply optimisation analysis, none of them include 
detailed bottom-up demand analysis. In fact, most of the studies either rely on utility estimates 
(which are rarely based on bottom-up analysis) or simply use a constant annual growth rate 
over the study period. In addition, the time frame for most studies is limited to 20 years, or 
even 10 years for the SAPP reports (CEEEZ 2012; Economic Consulting Associates 2009; 
Miketa and Merven 2013; Nexant 2007; SAPP 2014). Even the recent IRENA study, which 
extended the timeframe to 2050, simply used an extrapolation of earlier national growth rates 
for this longer period. The one additional study that did include bottom-up demand analysis 
up to 2030 (Merven, Davis, and Hughes 2010), did not include any supply analysis. A 20-year 
timeframe for analysis has two important limitations: first, the declining costs of renewable 
power alternatives may take several decades to tip the balance away from fossil fuel 
dependence in supply planning; second, the vulnerability of the hydropower plants to climate 
change may only be visible over 30–50 years (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2014; Stanzel and Kling 
2014). A final important issue with earlier studies is that the underlying drivers of electricity 
demand, such as population growth, economic growth and the shifts in the structure of the 
economy, are generally not presented as internally consistent storylines or scenarios. This 
makes it difficult to compare the results, because the underlying visions of the future may be 
quite different from study to study, and this is not made explicit in those estimates.  
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2.5 Conclusions 
This literature review highlights the climate change-related risks to hydropower in Southern 
Africa. More importantly, the review demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive 
analysis that combines the following elements, which were already highlighted in the thesis 
methodology in Chapter 1: 
• Detailed bottom-up demand modelling for electricity and water, based on a set of plausible 
alternative development futures. 
• Detailed water supply modelling based on a set of plausible alternative climate futures, 
considering all the relevant climate impact pathways on water availability.  
• Explicit prioritisation of water demand sources based on the current situation in the region 
and the need to maintain reservoir storage levels. 
• Detailed electricity supply modelling considering the full range of existing and planned 
hydropower plants in the ZRB, based on consultation with the national utilities and SAPP. 
• Transparent calibration of both the water and electricity models to observed data. 
• Linking the electricity modelling to the water modelling, by deriving hydropower availability 
at major ZRB plants from the water modelling analysis under different climate futures, to 
provide integrated scenarios that systematically combine the alternative development and 
climate futures. 
The next chapter introduces the climate and development futures that will be used for the 
water and electricity modelling and to develop the integrated scenarios. 
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3 Climate and development futures for water and electricity 
scenarios  
One of the key challenges with evaluating the various energy and water analyses for Southern 
Africa in the literature is that studies often have very different underlying assumptions as well 
as different conceptual modelling approaches. To see a meaningful impact from different 
future climate projections, the analysis must be over a long enough period to see major climate 
change signals, which is why this thesis considers the period up to 2070 (in comparison with, 
for example, other SADC studies such as CEEEZ (2012)). When considering such a long time-
frame, however, small differences in assumptions about economic and population growth can 
have dramatic impacts on the results. In addition, because climate impacts the water and 
energy sectors through multiple pathways, a consistent and comprehensive set of climate 
projections needs to be applied in both the water and energy analyses. This chapter presents 
the overall scenario approach used for both the water and energy modelling, and the common 
assumptions about economic growth, demographics, and climate futures that serve as input 
to all the later analysis. 
Figure 4. Role of this chapter in overall methodology 
 
3.1 Scenario approach 
Given a long time frame (i.e. 2010–2070) of analysis, and the scientific and political 
uncertainties within the ZRB, this research utilises a scenario approach for the development 
and climate inputs to the modelling, as discussed briefly in Chapter 1. In classical scenario 
planning, the scenarios are essentially storylines about alternative possible futures, with an 
internally consistent set of assumptions for each alternative (Kahane 2000; Van der Heijden 
1996; Kahane 1992; Shell 2001; Kahane 2012). The IPCC has pioneered the application of 
scenario planning to GHG emissions trajectories and the possible impacts of those emissions 





















economic pathways” (SSPs), which will include qualitative and quantitative aspects of future 
development, including the policy responses to climate change (Arnell et al. 2011). The 
scenarios in this research combine socio-economic drivers and potential future climates to 
organise and explain different possible futures. The analysis can therefore illustrate the 
impacts of these different socio-economic and climate assumptions on energy and water in 
the Southern African region.  
Scenarios are characterised by the elements of uncertainty that they incorporate. The first 
dimension of uncertainty that must be addressed by the scenarios is socio-economic 
development, which includes not only GDP and population growth, but also the level of 
investment in irrigation and hydropower. The developmental drivers, and their combinations 
into different development futures, are elaborated in Section 3 below. The second dimension 
of uncertainty is climate, and particularly how patterns of precipitation and temperature could 
change in the future within the region. The climate uncertainty is characterised by two possible 
futures that describe the range of projections by downscaled climate model data for the ZRB9. 
In particular, these alternative futures cover both decreases and increases in mean 
precipitation compared to the historical climate, as these are both plausible under IPCC 
scenarios. Note that, while many studies focused on future climate modelling or climate 
impacts use a large ensemble of models and scenarios to describe a range of future outcomes 
in statistical terms (e.g. mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation across the entire 
ensemble), using a limited number of climate scenarios is necessary to create a meaningful 
set of integrated scenarios that overlay climate uncertainties with development uncertainties. 
The current level of development and historical climate are key determinants of the current 
performance of the hydropower sector. While this actual historical production could serve as 
a baseline, to eliminate any model bias the baseline should be modelled using current 
development levels (e.g. current hydropower plant characteristics) with historical climate data. 
The modelled baseline can then be compared to the future scenarios to see the impacts of 
climate change and development trends without any bias from the model. The scenarios that 
overlay alternative climate futures on current development levels show the impact of climate 
change on its own, without any new demands from new hydropower plants or irrigation 
developments. Then, the scenarios that combine both climate futures with different rates of 
                                               
9 There are, of course, also uncertainties in the modelling of the hydrological systems that link future climate to projected available 
run-off in the river basin. The availability of accurate gauge data for long time periods and the density of precipitation 
monitoring stations in the region, for example, will affect the accuracy of this hydrological modelling.  As discussed in Chapter 
3, however, the hydrological modelling was outside the scope of the thesis and surface run-off simulations were sourced from 
other peer-reviewed modelling studies. 
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development show how these two drivers interact. We would expect the potential for conflict 
of water resources to be highest under a drying climate with rapid development, and the lowest 
conflict to be under a wetting climate with slower development, but this must be tested in the 
modelling. The modelling scenarios are the combination of climate and development futures, 
as explained in Chapter 1. 
As mentioned earlier, because climate change only occurs over many decades, the timeframe 
for the analysis is from 2010 to 2070. For the water modelling, to calibrate the model, historical 
data from the 1960s to the present are used. Key water and climate data from 1961 to 1990 
are used, because this period has the highest number of reporting weather stations in the 
ZRB, particularly in the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC) dataset (see Figure 
5). 
Figure 5. Number of reporting precipitation stations in GPCC (red line) and CRU (blue line) 
datasets for the Zambezi River Basin 
Source: Kling 
et al. (2014) 
3.2 Development futures 
The context for the demand and supply models across the water and electricity sectors is the 
future economic and social development of the SADC countries, particularly those within the 
ZRB. Because both water and electricity demand are driven by inter-linked demographic and 
economic trends across all the continental SADC countries (i.e. excluding Madagascar, 
Mauritius and Seychelles), assessing future risks in the energy system requires a consistent 
set of assumptions about the economic and social development of the region across both 
water and electricity demand models. While these assumptions can be compared with other 
data on GDP or population projections in the literature (e.g. official projections, country-level 
research papers), realistic and consistent scenarios for the future should avoid using possibly 
conflicting assumptions from different sources. This section first presents a high-level 
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description of the three development futures, and then elaborates on key parameters use in 
the modelling, and how these vary across the alternative futures.  
For electricity demand, the main drivers are population and wealth, as well as electricity 
access and urbanisation. For water, the most important distinction in the development futures, 
however, is the speed and degree to which irrigation and hydropower investments are 
realised. This is because, for the ZRB, reservoir evaporation and irrigation currently consume 
16% and 1.4% of total runoff, respectively, while domestic use is less than 0.1% of runoff 
(Euroconsult and Mott MacDonald 2007, Table 4.10)   Conceptually, more rapid investment in 
irrigation and hydropower is correlated with stronger GDP growth and investment. The positive 
economic climate promotes more investment in these two infrastructure sectors, which then 
have strong “downstream” economic effects. This is why the earlier commissioning dates and 
higher GDP growth are associated with the futures with more rapid economic growth. 
Each socio-economic future is described in broad terms in Box 1. Two of these futures are 
derived primarily from the work of research groups supporting the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) SSP development (O’Neill et al. 2014; Nakicenovic, Lempert, and 
Janetos 2014; van Vuuren and Carter 2014). As explained by Nakicenovic, Lempert, and 
Janetos (2014): 
The concept of SSPs [has] emerged to identify, quantify (to the extent possible), and 
analyze sets of assumptions about ways in which societies may evolve, independently 
of their decisions about climate change policies. As such the SSPs constitute multiple 
baseline pathways, which can be combined with studies specifically about climate 
related policies, both mitigation and adaptation, for new insights into the sensitivity of 
strategies to underlying socioeconomic trends, as well as to study the interactions of 
mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
SSPs essentially provide the underlying development futures against which climate policy 
interventions and future climate change impacts are assessed within the framework of the 
IPCC and the broader scientific community supporting these assessments.  
A third source of forecasts for developing these alternative futures is International Futures 
(IFs) (Chapman 2012; Hughes et al. 2009; International Futures 2014), which is “a large-scale, 
long-term, integrated global modelling system. It represents demographic, economic, energy, 
agricultural, socio-political, and environmental subsystems for 183 countries interacting in the 
global system”. As Hughes et al. (2009) report, “IFs uses a general equilibrium structure for 
its 6-sector economic module. IFs is useful for modelling stocks and flows of elements such 
as goods and services, money, human well-being, environmental conditions, materials status, 
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and knowledge. IFs also has functions for many non-market socio-economic interactions.” IFs 
has a standard embedded scenario known as the Base Case that has been developed using 
extensive data from United Nations and other official international and peer-reviewed sources. 
The Base Case contains mid-range projections using standard international data, and 
essentially simulates a continuation of status quo trends. It is a “scenario portraying a 
reasonable dynamic evolution of current patterns and trends”, or a central tendency scenario 
(Hughes et al. 2009). Two other scenarios that were considered for use with IFs from which 
to develop forecasts include the “African Renaissance” scenario (see Cilliers, Hughes, and 
Moyer 2011), which is quite optimistic, with greater investment in development, increased 
international trade, improved productivity across almost all sectors, and increased foreign 
direct investment in Africa. The result of these changes is to accelerate economic and social 
development and reduce population growth. The Arrested Development scenario from the 
same source models a positive African economic, social and governance environment within 
a negative global economic climate but at a slower growth rate. All of these three scenarios 
are already incorporated into the IFs modelling system (International Futures 2014).  
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The most important distinction in the development futures is the degree to which irrigation and 
hydropower investments are realised. For hydropower, the development futures include 
different timeframes for constructing the potential hydropower plants. For irrigation, the 
difference in the development scenarios will be the year in which the “identified irrigation 
Box 1. Qualitative description of development futures 
“Business as Usual” (BAU) is a continuation of current and recent historical trends in 
the region without major policy changes or major changes in the external (global) 
environment. This is not the same as remaining at the current level of development, 
because economic and social development would continue to improve over time, but 
only at the rates typical either currently or in recent decades in Southern Africa. 
Resource development (e.g. mining, oil production) would be limited by lack of access to 
capital and by poor governance and policy environments. In addition, limited capital for 
exploration means that newly discovered resources are not able to replace current 
dwindling reserves. Technology development would also be slow, including increases in 
energy efficiency, as would trade within the region relatively limited. Electricity sector 
integration in the region would improve only slowly, with continued delays in major 
investments for power generation, transmission, and irrigation development, as has 
been the case in recent years. Population growth would be higher than in other 
scenarios, because of the lower rate of GDP per capita growth, given that higher 
economic and social development generally reduces total fertility. This future is 
analogous to the IPCC Share Socioeconomic Pathway SSP2 (Middle of the Road or 
Current Trends Continue). This scenario has the lowest economic growth rates and 
highest population growth rate of the three. 
“SADC Integration” (SADC Int) describes a future where the region takes the initiative 
to move forward more rapidly on the development of shared resources – particularly in 
the energy sector – even without major changes in the external (global environment). 
The bottlenecks to major regional projects are removed through stronger political 
cooperation and joint financing of major infrastructure investments that benefit multiple 
countries. This leads to more rapid economic growth and development of key economic 
sectors. This still takes place, however, in a global environment that has not made major 
shifts to a low-carbon economy or a comprehensive North-South partnership for 
development. This means that capital flows to the region are still a constraint to 
economic development, even though a more positive political climate can facilitate more 
rapid project implementation. Resource development outside of the energy sector is 
more rapid than in BAU, but still constrained. The economic development envisioned 
here is derived from the IFs’ model “Base Case”, which, although the name implies 
moderate “baseline” growth, in fact includes relatively rapid economic development for 
the region (International Futures, 2014). 
In contrast to the first two futures, which assume no major changes in global trends, 
“Grand Deal” (GD) is a characterised by a significant global commitment to sustainable 
development, which further supports region efforts at integration and shared 
development. The global commitment includes keeping mean global temperatures 
increases below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, as well as providing universal access to 
modern energy services. Rapidly falling clean technology prices (for energy efficiency as 
well as renewable energy supply) and mobilisation of climate finance leads to both 
greater investment in low carbon development but also more rapid growth in economic 
and human development in SADC. At the same time, short to medium term inflows of 
capita allows for greater resource exploration and development, albeit with higher 
efficiency in mining and beneficiation of basic resources. The future therefore includes 
the lowest population growth, and highest economic growth, and more rapid investment. 
This future is analogous to the IPCC Shared Socioeconomic Pathway SSP1. 
 37 
projects” and “high level potential irrigation”, as defined in the Zambezi MSIOA study, will be 
reached (see Table 6). Conceptually, this means that more rapid investment in irrigation and 
hydropower is a result of stronger GDP growth and investment. The positive economic climate 
promotes more investment in these two infrastructure sectors. This is why the earlier 
commissioning dates and higher GDP growth are associated with the higher growth futures. 
Table 6. Summary of development futures 
 
BAU SADC Int GD 
GDP per capita growth Low Medium High 
Population growth Highest Lower Lowest 
Hydropower and irrigation 
investment 
Slower Faster Much faster 
Other clean energy 
investment 
Limited Some Rapid 
Investment in energy-
intensive industry 
Current trends Faster Faster, but with better 
technology 
Regional trade Limited Large Large 
Grand Inga Much later Later Soon 
Technology learning for 
renewable energy 
Moderate Moderate Fast 
Improvement in industrial 
energy intensity 
None Moderate Fast 
 
The following sub-sections elaborate on the more details assumptions on economic growth, 
demographic changes, and investment in hydropower and irrigation. 
 Economic development 
Current GDP per capita in the region varies widely, as shown in Table 7. The per capita income 
for the World Bank country classifications is the average income of that group, not the 
minimum.10 In 2010, only Botswana had per capita income (measured using purchasing power 
parity exchange rates) above the average of upper middle income countries, while Angola, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland were above the average of lower-middle-income 
countries. 
                                               
10  In 2014, the minimum income for Lower middle, upper middle and high income country groups was $1,045, $4,125 and 
$12,746, in current dollars using the Atlas method of exchange rates (i.e. a rolling average market exchange rates). 
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Table 7. GDP per capita in SAPP, with PPP and MER exchange rates ($2011) 
 PPP MER 
Country 1990 2010 CAGR (%) 1990 2010 CAGR (%) 
Angola 4,232 7,047 1.7 1,736 2,891 2.6 
Botswana 8,056 13,286 1.7 4,185 6,902 2.5 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1,269 632 -2.3 334 170 -3.3 
Lesotho 1,307 2,229 1.8 573 986 2.8 
Malawi 636 737 0.5 212 246 0.7 
Mozambique 434 885 2.4 210 427 3.6 
Namibia 5,758 8,394 1.3 2,998 4,583 2.1 
South Africa 9,935 11,862 0.6 5,447 6,500 0.9 
Swaziland 5,372 6,512 0.6 2,263 2,743 1.0 
Tanzania 1,001 1,501 1.9 328 492 2.0 
Zambia 2,537 2,779 0.3 759 832 0.5 
Zimbabwe 2,532 1,484 -1.8 761 439 -2.7 
Low-income 1,095 1,487 
 
324 441  
Lower-middle-income 2,910 5,286 
 
722 1,284  
Upper-middle-income 4,916 11,474 
 
1,979 4,395  
Upper-income 27,403 37,514 
 
25,463 34,455  
Notes: CAGR = compound annual growth rate; PPP = purchasing power parity; MER = market exchange rates. The values for 
MER per capita income have been converted from $2005 to $2011 using a USA GDP deflator (BEA 2014). The PPP exchange 
rates are based on the 2011 International Comparisons Project (ICP). 
Source: World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators 
As Figure 6 shows, historical growth in GDP per capita across the region, measured in 
purchasing power parity (GDPPPP) has been very low, at only 0.3% from 1990 to 2010 when 
weighted by population. This is even lower than the average for the poorest performing 
developing countries between 1970 and 2010 elsewhere in the world, according to the World 
Developing Indicators data (World Bank 2014). The middle- and highest-performing groups of 
developing countries achieved 3% and 4%, respectively, by comparison. We use PPP in 
preference to market exchange rates because we are not measuring financial flows or 
frequently traded products, which would indicate the use of market exchange rates, but a 
comparison of many other economic variables and non-traded goods.11 
The IFs Base Case scenario is quite optimistic, with GDP per capita above those of the best 
performing developing countries historically (based on results from IFs version 
7.03)(International Futures 2014). However, the OECD SSP scenarios (Dellink et al. 2015) 
                                               
11  Argument based in part on an IMF document at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/03/basics.htm.  
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also include much higher growth rates for SADC than recent history, and include very 
optimistic outlooks in terms of growth rates. We provide the two other IFs scenarios, “Arrested 
Development” and “African Renaissance” (see Cilliers, Hughes, and Moyer 2011), by way of 
comparison. This is not taken further, however, as it appears less plausible than the IFs Base 
Case and the respective OECD SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios (see Figure 1). The advantage of 
both of these modelling groups (IFs and OECD) over using simple growth rate extrapolations 
for the region (e.g. 2%, 3%, and 4%), is that these dynamic models provide an annual time 
series for each of the SAPP countries and, more importantly, internal model feedbacks that 
regulate the growth rates of populations and economies through the effects of wealth 
accumulation and other effects – providing non-linear outputs from a dynamic simulation.  
Figure 6. Real GDP PPP per capita compound annual growth (%), (2010–2070 for all 
projections) 
 
Note: Growth in GDP per capita is based on GDP measured in purchasing power parity ($2011 international dollars) divided by 
population in the relevant years, so the growth rates are real growth, as opposed to nominal growth. SADC 1990–2010 is the 
weighted average for 12 continental SADC countries from 1990 to 2010; “DCs” are a group of 72 developing countries 
(excluding China) with data for GDP per capita in 1970 and 2010 in the World Development Indicators database, with the 
weighted average (by population) income growth of the lowest, middle and highest performing thirds of that group. 
Sources: Dellink et al. (2015), International Futures (2014), World Bank (2014), and author’s analysis 
 
To match the overall scenario storylines in the development futures outlined in the previous 
section to forecasts, BAU is represented by the SSP3 projections from the OECD, SADC 
Integration in represented by the IFs Base Case, and the Grand Deal is represented by the 
SSP1 modelling from the OECD. The Arrested Development and African Renaissance 
forecasts (see Cilliers, Hughes, and Moyer 2011), while informative, were dropped from the 
set of chosen forecasts. Unconstrained growth of 5.0–5.8% per year for 60 years is highly 
unlikely, given historical compound annual growth rates from a minimum of –2.3% to the 
maximum of +2.4% from 1990 to 2010, with a median near 1%. The high growth scenario, 
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Grand Deal, is represented by the OECD SSP1 with a GDP PPP compound annual growth 
rate of 5.3%, the upper-bound forecast (Figure 6). The lower-bound BAU scenario is 
represented by the OECD SSP3 forecast. 
The resulting GDP PPP per capita in 2070, as well as the current average GDP per capita of 
the World Bank country classification groups “high-income” and “upper-middle-income”, are 
shown in Table 8. In the Grand Deal future, nine of the countries would have GDP per capita 
in 2070 that is greater than the global average of high-income countries today. Of course, 
high-income country economies would also grow over this period and might be two or three 
times their current levels. Nevertheless, this comparison provides a “mental picture” of how 
these SAPP countries could look in 60 years. In the SADC Integration forecast, only three 
countries are above the average level of current high incomes countries, while four more are 
above the average current upper-income countries (as opposed to the current situation in 
Southern Africa, with only one country above the average of upper-middle income and none 
above high income – see Table 7). Total GDP is shown in Table 9. Note that, because the 
socio-economic assumptions are taken from other peer-reviewed scenario analyses, rather 
than being simply based on different compound annual growth rates, they are not necessarily 
in the same order in each individual year for each country. In other words, the ranking of 
scenarios and countries (e.g. by GDP) may not be exactly the same in each time period, 
because the complex systems models generating the socio-economic scenarios have their 
own internal dynamics and assumptions about the interactions between social, economic and 
environmental drivers.  As an example, in Table 8 below South Africa’s 2030 GDP in the SADC 
Int scenario is actually lower than in the BAU scenario, even though by 2070 the GDP in the 
SADC Int is higher than for the BAU scenario.  
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Table 8. GDP per capita assumptions by scenario ($2011 at PPP) 
 
Current 2030 2070 








Angola 7,047 8,806 14,903 10,215 8,230 49,685 35,689 
Botswana 13,642 21,320 27,661 28,682 34,088 62,686 66,465 
DRC 632 2,907 1,189 2,689 7,662 6,578 46,599 
Lesotho 2,235 2,440 4,109 5,218 11,581 15,509 49,470 
Malawi 737 1,448 1,122 1,706 3,497 4,843 20,842 
Mozambique 930 819 2,490 2,893 5,192 24,017 34,301 
Namibia 8,433 13,430 14,176 16,845 25,466 33,716 54,333 
South Africa 12,087 20,971 17,461 21,494 28,893 49,726 55,703 
Swaziland 5,862 11,967 7,052 9,002 14,030 15,224 47,902 
Tanzania 2,081 3,618 4,304 5,557 10,664 36,390 46,978 
Zambia 3,451 6,124 7,980 9,152 17,899 52,347 77,997 
Zimbabwe 1,484 7,058 3,164 3,923 15,319 14,339 62,674 
Upper income 39,149       
Upper-mid income 11,080       
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity. 
Table 9. GDP assumptions by scenario (billion $2011 at PPP) 
 
Current 2030 2070 








Angola 138 295 531 319 545 3,535 1,593 
Botswana 27 57 66 66 86 174 166 
DRC 39 198 125 260 1,453 1,307 6,422 
Lesotho 4 10 10 12 32 46 112 
Malawi 11 34 29 42 250 238 842 
Mozambique 22 77 98 98 305 1,621 1,442 
Namibia 18 42 43 47 99 134 168 
South Africa 614 1,132 1,004 1,314 1,985 3,213 3,528 
Swaziland 7 10 11 13 25 33 74 
Tanzania 94 328 332 386 1,744 5,069 4,533 
Zambia 46 162 180 189 954 2,003 2,358 
Zimbabwe 19 50 61 60 321 356 814 
Total 1,040 2,395 2,490 2,806 7,798 17,730 22,050 
Notes: PPP = purchasing power parity. Future GDP projections are normalised to historical data so that all scenarios have the 
same starting point (e.g. if one source reports 2010 population for Angola of 20.0 million, then the 2030 projections are 
multiplied by 0.975 (19.5/20.0)). In addition, values originally reported in $2005 are converted to $2011 by multiplying by 1.12, 
based on USA GDP deflators. 
Source: 2010 to 2014 = World Bank (2014); BAU = OECD Env-Growth analysis of SSP3 (IIASA 2012a; Dellink et al. 2015); SADC 
Integration = IFs Base Case (International Futures 2014), Grand Deal = OECD Env-Growth analysis of SSP1 (IIASA 2012a; Dellink 
et al. 2015); GDP deflators = US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015) 
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The sectoral share of GDP is also an important means of more accurately relating GDP to 
energy demands, through decomposition, thereby improving the description of the factors 
driving energy intensity within an economy. Two countries sharing the same GDP might have 
very different energy demands because the structures of their economies may substantially 
differ. For example, one economy may be dominated by the manufacturing and extractive 
sectors and another by the services sector. Energy demands in each are likely to be very 
different when compared on a $GDP/kWh basis. The current sectoral shares are shown in 
Table 10. For future sectoral share, only the IFs model provides this – so we use the IFs Base 
Case (i.e. SADC Integration scenario for GDP growth) as the assumptions for future share 
(Table 10). 
Table 10. Sectoral share of GDP assumptions (% total GDP) 














Angola 10 6 54 30 0.1 11 24 65 
Botswana 3 7 34 57 1 14 14 71 
DRC 46 5 18 32 2 13 47 39 
Lesotho 10 13 18 59 1 21 10 67 
Malawi 30 12 8 50 2 25 14 59 
Mozambique 30 14 9 47 1 22 20 58 
Namibia 8 14 16 63 1 9 19 71 
South Africa 3 14 9 68 0.4 17 19 63 
Swaziland 8 46 4 42 4 40 11 45 
Tanzania 28 10 15 47 1 15 26 58 
Zambia 13 24 10 53 1 12 33 54 
Zimbabwe 18 18 17 47 3 25 22 50 
Note: the same sectoral share is used for all scenarios in 2070 
Source: Current = World Bank (2014), except Zambia (Central Statistics Office 2010), 2070 = IFs Base Case (International Futures 
2014) 
 Population 
For the energy model, population is the primary driver of residential energy consumption, and 
also influences transportation demand (Price et al. 1998; Raupach et al. 2007; Wolde-Rufael 
2005). For the water model, only urban population projections are used, because rural 
domestic water demand is very small compared to other major demands (e.g. irrigation). 
Urban demand growth rates are estimated from national growth rates and urbanisation trends. 
Current population and growth rates over the last 50 years are shown in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Historical and current population (million) 
Country 1960 2010 CAGR 
Angola 5.0 19.5 2.8% 
Botswana 0.5 2.0 2.7% 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
15.2 62.2 2.9% 
Lesotho 0.9 2.0 1.7% 
Malawi 3.5 15.0 2.9% 
Mozambique 7.6 24.0 2.3% 
Namibia 0.6 2.2 2.6% 
South Africa 17.4 50.0 2.1% 
Swaziland 0.3 1.2 2.5% 
Tanzania 10.1 45.0 3.0% 
Zambia 3.1 13.2 3.0% 
Zimbabwe 3.8 13.1 2.5% 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
The three sources of population projections include the IFs model, a set of IIASA scenarios 
for the IPCC SSPs, and the UN population forecasts for low, medium and high fertility 
(UNDESA 2012a). All of the projections are for much lower growth rates than in the historical 
period (see Figure 7), because of the inverse relationship between increasing incomes and 
decreasing population growth rates. The SSP1 and SSP3 analysis by IIASA provide a 
reasonable range, albeit with lower growth rates than the highest UN projections. The IFs 
Base Case includes projected population growth similar to the SSP3 analysis. For consistency 
with the GDP per capita assumptions, the BAU scenario is represented by the SSP3 
projections, SADC Integration by the IFs Base Case, and Grand Deal by SSP1.  
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Figure 7. Compound annual population growth rates (2010–2070) for SADC overall from 
various sources, compared to historical growth 
 
Note: historical period is 1960–2010. 
Sources: World Bank (2014), IIASA (2012a), KC and Lutz (2014), UNDESA (2012a)  
Because population growth is inversely correlated with economic growth and human 
development, the growth rates are lowest in the Grand Deal scenario, as shown in Table 12. 
Note that for some countries population in the SADC Integration scenario is somewhat higher 
than the BAU scenario. This is because the IFs Base Case (the source for this scenario), while 
projecting total population for the region between the BAU and Grand Deal scenarios, includes 
different dynamics for particular countries, so some may show higher population, while others 
show lower in comparison to the BAU scenario.  
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Table 12. Population assumptions by scenario (million people) 
 
Current 2030 2070 








Angola 19.5 34.5 35.6 31.2 66.2 71.1 44.6 
Botswana 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.5 
DRC 62.2 105.4 105.0 96.7 189.6 198.7 137.8 
Lesotho 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.3 
Malawi 15.0 27.5 25.9 24.6 71.6 49.2 40.4 
Mozambique 24.0 36.5 39.4 33.8 58.7 67.5 42.0 
Namibia 2.2 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.9 4.0 3.1 
South Africa 50.8 59.8 57.5 61.1 68.7 64.6 63.3 
Swaziland 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.5 
Tanzania 45.0 78.8 77.1 69.4 163.5 139.3 96.5 
Zambia 13.2 24.0 22.6 20.7 53.3 38.3 30.2 
Zimbabwe 13.1 17.1 19.4 15.3 21.0 24.8 13.0 
Total 250.1 392.7 392.0 361.7 703.5 665.5 477.3 
Note: future population projections are normalised to the historical data so that all scenarios have the same starting point (e.g. if 
one source reports 2010 population for Angola of 20.0 million, then the 2030 projections are multiplied by 0.975 (19.5/20.0)). 
Source: Current = (World Bank 2014); BAU = IIASA WiC v9 analysis of SSP3 (IIASA 2012a; KC and Lutz 2014); SADC Integration = 
IFs Base Case (International Futures 2014); Grand Deal = IIASA WiC v9 analysis of SSP1 (IIASA 2012a; KC and Lutz 2014); 
The household size assumptions shown in Table 13 are used to convert from total population 
to number of households in urban and rural areas. This is necessary because residential 
electricity consumption is estimated per household rather than per capita.  
Table 13. Household size assumptions 
Country Rural Urban 
Angola 4.3 5.1 
Botswana 4.5 3.9 
DRC 4.5 4.6 
Lesotho 4.4 4.4 
Malawi 4.5 4.6 
Mozambique 4.4 4.4 
Namibia 5.6 4.1 
South Africa 4.2 3.3 
Swaziland 5.2 3.2 
Tanzania 5.1 4.3 
Zambia 5.3 5.1 
Zimbabwe 4.3 4.3 
Source: IIASA (2012b), Central Statistics Office (2010); Euromonitor International (2013) 
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 Urbanisation 
Because residential energy consumption and the mix of fuels used vary significantly between 
urban and rural areas, the level of urbanisation is a key driver of residential energy demand. 
It also influences urban water demand, which is driven by total urban population. Both IFs and 
a set of scenarios from National Center for Atmospheric Research (IIASA 2012a; L. Jiang 
2014; L. Jiang and O’Neill 2015) for the SSPs provide urbanisation levels, so that these can 
be matched to the same scenarios as in the GDP forecasts. The same matching process is 
used, where the IFs Base Case is used for the SADC Integration scenario, the analysis for 
IPCC SSP1 is used for Grand Deal, and SSP3 is used for Business as Usual. This provides 
internal consistency across the drivers, scenarios and forecasts. The current and future 
urbanisation levels are shown in Figure 4. In all cases, the UN urbanisation prospects 
projections for 2050 (UNDESA 2012b) fall between the lowest and highest values used in our 
development futures, suggesting that this is a reasonable “envelope” of future possibilities to 
investigate. The share of population living in urban areas is shown in Table 14 for each 
scenario. 
Table 14: Percentage of households in urban areas (%) 
   2030   2070  




BAU SADC Int Grand 
Deal 
Angola 58.5 63.7 72.5 73.7 69.2 88.1 92.4 
Botswana 61.1 65.9 75.8 75.4 68.8 87.2 91.7 
DRC 35.2 37.2 49.0 54.9 42.6 71.1 81.2 
Lesotho 26.9 31.6 42.8 51.6 41.3 69.5 84.0 
Malawi 19.8 23.9 23.8 36.5 31.6 40.3 72.6 
Mozambique 38.4 44.5 41.5 60.4 51.9 56.4 83.3 
Namibia 38.0 41.6 50.3 56.7 47.4 71.1 81.0 
South Africa 61.7 65.2 78.0 75.2 69.2 89.1 91.4 
Swaziland 21.4 25.8 19.7 40.0 34.6 19.4 71.6 
Tanzania 26.4 29.3 37.2 45.4 37.2 64.4 76.5 
Zambia 35.7 38.9 40.3 55.3 45.4 55.1 81.6 
Zimbabwe 38.3 40.8 37.3 55.9 46.0 44.5 79.9 
Source: for 2010, BAU and Grand Deal, source is L. Jiang and O’Neill (2015); for SADC Int, source is IFs Base Case 
(International Futures 2014) 
 Irrigation investment 
The MSIOA addressed irrigation expansion with two different irrigation levels (roughly in 
2025), one based on “identified projects” in national plans and the other on “high level” 
irrigation potential (i.e. closer to maximum theoretical potential). The advantage of using the 
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same future irrigation projections is that the MSIOA study contains detailed analysis of 
irrigation area by sub-basin and crop for each level. Given the long time-frame for this analysis, 
the question is when these levels of irrigation will be reached, rather than whether they will be 
reached. Table 15 shows the years where each level of irrigation expansion is reached in the 
different development futures. 
Table 15. Irrigation expansion in each development future 
Development future BAU SADC Int Grand Deal 
Year when “identified projects” have been 
realised 
2030 2025 2020 
Year when “high level” irrigation potential has 
been realised 
2060 2050 2040 
 Hydropower investment 
For hydropower infrastructure development, the scenarios include different timeframes for 
constructing the potential hydropower plants. Because the Grand Deal scenario is the one 
with the greatest inflow of investment to the region, and greatest capital availability, this is the 
scenario with the most optimistic commissioning dates. Given the continued delays in most 
major projects, the start dates reported in the SAPP expansion plans and periodic SAPP 
updates are considered the most optimistic. For the SADC Integration and BAU scenarios, the 
commissioning dates are delayed by four and seven years, respectively. The exception is 
plants with an optimistic start date of 2015 or 2016, where the delays are then two and four 
years in the two scenarios. 
Examples of dates and capacity for new plants are shown in Table 16 below, while the detailed 
technical characteristics for these plants will be presented in the main electricity modelling 
report.  
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Table 16. Examples of hydropower expansion in each development future12 
Plant Capacity 
(MW) 
Year of commissioning in each  
development future  
 BAU SADC Int Grand Deal 
Cahora Bassa North 1,245 2019 2017 2015 
Mphanda Nkuwa I 1,500 2029 2026 2022 
Kariba South Extension 300 2025 2022 2018 
Kafue Gorge Lower 750 2026 2023 2019 
Devil’s Gorge 1,000 2033 2030 2026 
Batoka Gorge 1,600 2030 2027 2023 
Boroma 200 2029 2026 2022 
Lupata 600 2028 2025 2021 
 
3.3 Climate futures 
The development futures having been considered in detail, this section turns to climate futures. 
In contrast to the previous sections, however, the climate futures were drawn entirely from an 
external source, as explained in this section. For the climate futures, two criteria are important 
for this analysis. First, the climate futures should illustrate both possible overall wetting and 
drying trends in the ZRB. Second, where possible, these futures should use data similar to 
that in the major studies already undertaken in the Basin. This is to allow for comparison with 
the results from earlier studies and to build on the stakeholder engagement that already 
occurred for previous studies. A significant advantage of the downscaled-global circulation 
model WATCH dataset is that no further bias correction is required, because it has been used 
in previous studies in the region.  The WATCH (Water and Global Change)13 climate dataset 
includes the statistically downscaled results of three different GCMs, which span the range of 
wetting to drying in the ZRB (see Figure 8). For this reason, the CNRM14 results are used to 
represent the “wetting” scenario, while the ECHAM15 results are used for the “drying” scenario. 
                                               
12 Note that all these commissioning dates were in the future at the time this analysis was conducted during the thesis research 
process. 
13  The Integrated Project Water and Global Change (WATCH, 2007–2011), funded under the EU FP6, brought together the 
hydrological, water resources and climate communities to analyse, quantified and predicted the components of the current 
and future global water cycles and related water resources states, evaluated their uncertainties ,and clarified the overall 
vulnerability of global water resources related to the main societal and economic sectors (http://www.eu-watch.org/).  
14  CNRM-CM3 global coupled system is the third version of the ocean-atmosphere model initially developed at CERFACS 
(Toulouse, France), then regularly updated at Center for National Weather Research (CNRM, METEO-FRANCE, Toulouse) 
(http://www.cnrm.meteo.fr/scenario2004/references_eng.html).  
15  ECHAM is a comprehensive general circulation model of the atmosphere from the Max Planck Institute for Meteorology. The 
ECHAM GCM has its original roots in global forecast models developed at ECMWF. This model has been modified for climate 
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The mid-range IPSL16 results were not used. The sub-basin numbers shown in the figure are 
the same as in the water supply model (see Chapter 4), moving roughly from upstream to 
downstream in the basin. 
Figure 8. Change in annual precipitation (compared to the 1961–90 mean) of different sub-
basins projected by the GCMs of WATCH.  
 
Source: Kling and Preishuber (2012) 
3.4 Conclusions 
The development and climate futures presented here underpin the inputs to the water and 
electricity modelling presented in the following two chapters. The next chapter presents the 
ZRB water supply and demand modelling, while Chapter 5 presents the SAPP electricity 
modelling. 
                                               
research, and its development continued to the current cycle ECHAM5 
http://www.mpimet.mpg.de/en/wissenschaft/modelle/echam.html).  





4 Water supply and demand scenarios17 
This chapter presents the water supply and demand modelling that is the first major 
component of the integrated climate-water-energy analysis. To answer the first research 
question (How could future climate and irrigation expansion in the ZRB affect hydropower 
generation potential?) requires a detailed understanding of the drivers of water supply and 
demand in the basin, and a water balance modelling framework that can incorporate both 
supply- and demand-side effects (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Role of this chapter in overall methodology 
 
 
Figure 10 presents the methodological elements required specifically for modelling water 
supply and demand scenarios for the ZRB.   
These elements are each addressed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, following an introduction to the 
modelling approach. Section 4.3 demonstrates the validity of the model through the calibration 
analysis. Section 4.4 then presents the results of the modelling for each of the major 
hydropower plants, based on the scenarios outlined earlier, and is followed by conclusions on 
water supply and demand in Section 4.5. 
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Figure 10. Water scenario inputs and results 
 
4.1 Water supply model 
 Hydrological features 
The supply model includes all the major rivers in the ZRB, as well as existing and planned 
reservoirs that include hydropower production (see Figure 11 and Figure 12). The level of 
detail for the river definitions are the same as those in the ZDSS and more detailed than the 
MSIOA study (see Chapter 2 for details of these studies).  
The Lake Malawi system is modelled separately from the Shire River, with calibrated outflows 
from the outlet of the lake from the ZDSS used as the head flows of the Shire River. The 
reason for this is the complexity of the Lake Malawi system, the steep gradient in precipitation 
along the length of the lake, and the fact that the focus of this thesis is on major ZRB 
hydropower plants. Note that the major hydropower plants in the ZRB outside of Malawi are 




















confluence of the Shire and the Zambezi. However, for the sake of presenting a complete 
picture of the entire river basin, the Lake Malawi system is still included in this thesis, albeit at 
a coarser level of detail. 
While groundwater is also important in some areas of the ZRB, the source of the groundwater 
is still rainfall (i.e., it is not fossil groundwater). Because the timing of groundwater 
replenishment and use is not the focus of this thesis, all the rainfall-runoff flows are treated as 
surface water. 
 Sub-basin boundaries and catchments 
The sub-basin boundaries correspond to the ZDSS, with additional sub-divisions for runoff 
inflows and irrigation catchment areas to take into consideration the placement of new 
hydropower plants within a given sub-basin. The 27 main sub-basins used (see Figure 11) are 
more detailed than the 13 sub-basins used in the MSIOA study.  
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Figure 11. Schematic of rivers, reservoirs, irrigated areas and run-of-river hydropower plants 
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Note: Natural and man-made reservoirs are green triangles. Run of river hydropower plants are blue rectangles. Irrigated areas are green circles. Only modelled hydropower plants are shown. 
Green triangles without labels represent the aggregation of multiple small irrigation storage reservoirs. 
Source: WEAP model developed by the author, including GIS files provided by Harald Kling, Pöyry Energy, Vienna 





















Note: Natural and human-made reservoirs are green triangles. Run of river hydropower plants are blue rectangles. 
Source: WEAP model developed by the author, including GIS files provided by Harald Kling, Pöyry Energy, Vienna 
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Although the WEAP model contains almost all the plants mentioned in the literature on the 
ZRB, not all of these are modelled in detail, because of both the limitations of data availability 
and the negligible impact of many plants on major hydropower investments. Having the plants 
in the model, however, allows for future development and expansion of the analysis in 
particular sub-basins, where more data is made available. The plants included in the modelling 
are discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.2. 
Because of limitations in the spatial resolution of the hydrology modelling (see next section), 
some smaller hydropower plants and their catchment areas were combined into larger 
catchments. Examples include the following:  
• The Lunsemfwa and Mulungushi Rivers in Zambia are combined into one catchment 
area, and the two existing power plants on those rivers treated as a combined plant. 
• The three future potential plants on the Revubue River mentioned in the earlier 
Euroconsult Mott McDonald (2007) study are combined into one catchment area. 
• The two future potential plants on the Luia and Capoche Rivers mentioned in the earlier 
Euroconsult Mott McDonald (2007) study are also combined into one catchment area. 
In addition, some of the small plants were not modelled, because of both lack of data and their 
negligible impact on downstream activities. These include Wovwe in Malawi (5 MW) and 
Lusiwasi in Zambia (12 MW). 
 Hydrology and runoff inputs 
While WEAP has several built-in hydrological models, a fully calibrated hydrology dataset for 
all the sub-basins is available through the ZDSS tool introduced in Chapter 2, developed by 
Pöyry Energy for the Mozambique National Institute for Disaster Management.18 This model 
and dataset are in the public domain, and are flexible enough to allow extraction of surface 
inflows at any point in the river network. The underlying precipitation and temperature data 
can also be similarly extracted. The ZDSS has been calibrated against stream flow gauge data 
for all of the key sub-basins and reservoirs in the Zambezi, and shows very high correlation at 
multiple river locations, not only in terms of mean flows but also in terms of seasonality and 
variability of flows. An example of the calibration of the ZDSS at key points on the Zambezi is 
shown in Figure 13. This runoff data provides surface inflow inputs to the rivers in the WEAP 
                                               
18  Freely available at http://zdss.ingc.gov.mz/. A full explanatory report (Kling and Preishuber 2012), including hydrology calibration 
results, is available on the website.  
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model, net of any evapotranspiration from vegetation (irrigated agriculture or natural 
vegetation).  
Figure 13. Simulated and observed monthly flow rates at key gauging stations on the 
Zambezi from the ZDSS, 1960–1992 
 
Source: Kling and Preishuber (2012), Kling, Stanzel, and Preishuber (2014)  
The only adjustment necessary to the ZDSS surface inflow is related to runoff from irrigated 
areas. This means that the runoff estimates already include any excess precipitation from 
irrigated land (i.e. when rainfall exceeds the demand from crops and the ability of the soil to 
absorb the moisture). The irrigation demand calculations in WEAP, however, also assume that 
runoff may occur from irrigated land if the precipitation is in excess of the “effective 
precipitation” level. This could lead to some double counting in sub-basins where irrigation 
land is a significant share of total land area (see sub-basins 11, 24, 26 and 27 in Table 17). 
For those sub-basins, the ZDSS runoff inputs are reduced by the share of irrigated land of the 
total sub-basin area, so that the runoff calculations for irrigated areas are calculated in WEAP. 
The share of irrigated land in those sub-basins increases over time, reaching the “current + 
identified projects” level in 2020 or 2030 and “total” (i.e. including high level potential as well) 
by 2040 or 2060, depending on the scenario. Note that this adjustment is much less important 
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for sub-basins 26 and 27, because there are no hydropower plants downstream of the surface 
inflow points.19 
Table 17. Irrigated area versus sub-basin size 
  
Irrigated areas (ha) 
 

















2,500 5,000 10,000 17,500 79,821 0.22 0.09 
2 Kabompo 350 6,300 10,000 16,650 66,459 0.25 0.10 
3 Lukulu 1,000 500 10,000 11,500 66,345 0.17 0.02 
4 Luanginga 750 5,000 10,000 15,750 32,989 0.48 0.17 
6 Senanga 200 7,008 10,000 17,208 46,329 0.37 0.16 
7 Katima Mulilo 620 300 15,000 15,920 113,501 0.14 0.01 
8 Kwando 1,575 13,346 12,300 27,221 71,014 0.38 0.21 
9 Gwaai 1,300 566 0 1,866 39,117 0.05 0.05 
10 Sanyati 21,600 5,203 0 26,803 45,340 0.59 0.59 
11 Kariba 3,711 98,637 430,000 532,348 73,107 7.28 1.40 
12,13 Mswebi & 
Itezhi-tezhi 
4,177 6,000 0 10,177 106,569 0.10 0.10 
14 Kafue Gorge 35,021 6,650 25,000 66,671 46,167 1.44 0.90 
15 Upper 
Luangwa 
1,000 1,479 0 2,479 96,838 0.03 0.03 
16 Lower 
Luangwa 
9,100 4,651 25,000 38,751 45,209 0.86 0.30 
17 Middle 
Zambezi 
1,960 6,823 0 8,783 33,223 0.26 0.26 
18 Panhane 22,085 7,521 0 29,606 24,404 1.21 1.21 
19 Cahora Bassa 10 0 100,000 100,010 35,036 2.85 0.00 
20 Luia 0 0 0 0 28,698 0.00 0.00 
21 Luia 10 150 0 160 28,698 0.01 0.01 
22 Revubue 0 0 0 0 16,262 0.00 0.00 
23 Luenha 12,713 11,661 0 24,374 53,581 0.45 0.45 
24 Mutarara 315 11,000 100,000 111,315 26,166 4.25 0.43 
25 Liwonde 25,391 23,887 50,000 99,278 132,277 0.75 0.37 
                                               
19  This adjustment is affected in WEAP using a Key Assumption for “runoff adjustment”, interpolating the values for 1960 (zero), 
2000 (current), 2025 (current + identified) and 2050 (2025 + high level). The surface inflow data from the ZDSS is then 
multiplied by (1 – runoff adjustment). 
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Irrigated areas (ha) 
 















26 Chiromo 17,025 35,625 300,001 352,651 19,259 18.31 2.73 
27 Delta 6,998 77,055 100,000 184,053 22,246 8.27 3.78 
 
While this thesis uses the runoff data from the ZDSS, WEAP is used for the water balance 
model. The runoff data is input as surface inflows at various points along the river network, 
corresponding to the catchments areas from which the runoff estimates are derived. The 
advantage of using runoff data and simulations from the ZDSS is that it is a well-calibrated 
model that has been tested against actual historical flow gauges, and allows calculation of 
inflows at any point in the river system. The WEAP model created by the author is used for all 
demand calculations and for water balance modelling and allocation, which is the main value 
added of this thesis (in addition to linking WEAP to the energy modelling system).20 The ZDSS 
also provides projected runoff under the future climate scenarios discussed earlier. 
Annex C shows the list of surface inflow points and describes their location and which sub-
basins they represent. The sub-basin numbers from the ZDSS and the MSIOA are given for 
clarity. The rationale for the selection of surface inflow points is to ensure that flows above 
each hydropower plant (existing and potential) and irrigation abstraction point are in the correct 
order so that the combined impact of upstream abstractions and flows on each hydropower 
plant can be analysed. This means that, for example, if there is more than one hydropower 
plant in a sub-basin, two inflow points may be needed in the model – one above and one below 
the hydropower plant.    
 Wetlands 
There are three key wetlands areas within the ZRB: Barotse, Kafue Flats, and Chobe-Caprivi. 
These are modelled in WEAP as shallow reservoirs, to ensure that evaporation from wetlands 
is captured, and, in some cases, with an additional “virtual reservoir” to delay the peak in the 
hydrograph.   
For Kafue Flats, the relationship between discharge and storage volume is taken from the 
ZDSS, which analysed observed trends in releases over time. These and the other 
                                               
20  As discussed earlier, the WEAP model was constructed, tested and utilised entirely by the author, while the ZDSS data was 
obtained from the authors of that study and re-formatted to be used as an input to the WEAP model. 
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characteristics used for Kafue Flats are shown in Table 18. Because WEAP does not have 
the capability to calculate releases from instantaneous storage, the expression used for 
discharge requirements from the natural reservoir is linked to the storage levels in the previous 
two time steps, using a linear equation derived from the data in the table21. In addition, 
research has shown that water takes up to 90 days to travel between Itezhi-tezhi reservoir and 
Kafue Gorge, through the Kafue Flats, so a shift in the hydrograph is expected. 
Table 18. Hydrological assumptions for Kafue Flats wetlands 
Volume (mcm) 15 77 303 989 2,143 3,616 5,285 7,094 8,039 9,006 9,498 
Elevation (m amsl) 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 983.5 984 984.25 
Area (km2) 30 114 405 950 1,340 1,586 1,745 1,865 1,915 1,955 1,975 
Release (cms) 2 11 42 137 298 502 734 985 1,117 1,251 1,319 
Source: Beilfuss (2001), Table 4-3, except for release, which is from ZDSS model 
For the Barotse Flood Plain, a different approach is used, because of the importance of the 
observed shift in the hydrograph, such that the peak moves from March to April. Two 
reservoirs are used in the model. The first has the shallow shape and size of the Barotse as 
reported in the literature. To ensure that this reservoir is modelled to fill during the wet season 
(i.e. instead of the water simply passing through), the reservoir filling priority is set higher than 
downstream demands. This means that WEAP will allocate water to fill the reservoir even 
when there are downstream hydropower and irrigation demands. This simulates what 
happens in the natural setting, where the flood plain expands dramatically in size during the 
wet season, and this is not affected by the large downstream hydropower plants. The second 
reservoir is large enough to hold two months of peak flow, and discharges an amount in each 
time period equal to the inflows in the previous time period. In this way, it shifts the hydrograph 
by exactly one month, so that peak flows are in April, while the first reservoir attenuates the 
difference between peak and low flows. 
The Chobe-Caprivi wetlands are modelled using the reservoir shape from the literature as 
shown in Table 19, sourced from the ZDSS. 
                                               
21  Release = 0.5 x S(p) x 0.1389 + 0.5 x S(t) x 0.1389, where S(p) is storage volume in previous period and S(t) is storage 
volume two periods previously. 
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Table 19. Hydrological assumptions for Chobe-Caprivi wetlands 
Volume (mcm) 0 180 720 
Area (km2) 0 10 2,000 
Elevation (m amsl) 1,000 1,018 1,018.3 
Source: ZDSS model 
To improve the simulations of natural reservoirs, operational assumptions about “buffering” 
were also included in the modelling (see section 4.3.1). A “buffer zone” in operational terms is 
the reservoir volume at which there is a limit placed on monthly releases, to ensure that the 
reservoir is not drawn down too fast. The “buffer coefficient” is the percentage of the remaining 
buffer zone volume that can be released in the next time period. Buffer zones are specified 
relative to the desirable top level of the reservoir (i.e. the “Top of Conservation” level of the 
reservoir), which may vary over the year where there is a Design Flood Rule Curve (DFRC) 
in place (Table 20).  
Table 20. Buffering assumptions for natural reservoirs 




Barotse (both reservoirs) 75 10 
Chobe-Caprivi 75 10 
 Abstraction points 
The irrigation abstraction points in the model are implemented as irrigated catchment areas, 
with a transmission link from the relevant water source and a return flow for any unused runoff 
or excess rainfall. This list of abstraction points, and their relationship to previous research 
under the MSIOA study, is shown in Table 84. 
4.2 Water demand model 
The largest current source of demand on available runoff is reservoir evaporation, at 16%, as 
shown in Table 21 below.  
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Table 21. Demand sources and share of runoff for Zambezi River Basin 
 
(Mm3) (%) 
Available run off 103,224 100.00  
Reservoir evaporation 16,989 16.46 
Irrigated agriculture 1,478 1.43 
Urban domestic consumption 175 0.17 
Rural domestic consumption 24 0.02 
Industrial consumption 25 0.02 
Mining 120 0.12 
Environmental/flood releases* 1,202 1.16 
Livestock 113 0.11 
Total water demand 20,126 19.49 
Note: * From Itezh-tezhi only, released for downstream ecosystems so not available  
for agriculture or hydropower from Itezhi-tezhi. 
Source: Euroconsult & Mott MacDonald (2007), Table 4.10 
The second-largest source is irrigated agriculture at 1.4%. Urban demand follows at 0.17%, 
which is small but has been included because of the possible significant increase in urban 
populations in the ZRB. The focus on the demand analysis is therefore hydropower 
demand/reservoir evaporation, irrigated agriculture, and urban demand. 
 Reservoir evaporation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, changes in reservoir evaporation are one of the key climate impact 
pathways on the water-energy system. Both historical data and future projections under 
different climate futures are needed for net evaporation from both natural and human made 
reservoirs. The operators of the major hydropower reservoirs – particularly Lake Kariba, Lake 
Cahora Bassa and Itezhi-tezhi – have historical data on rainfall and evaporation, although 
these data are often estimated from a small number of stations and need to be corrected for 
the difference in conditions between standard pan evaporation tests and evaporation from a 
reservoir surface (e.g. relative humidity, wind speed) (Allen et al. 1998). The ZDSS provides 
monthly evaporation and rainfall data by sub-basin, which has been used for the reservoirs in 
those sub-basins. This is a finer resolution of climate data than the MSIOA study sub-basins 
(i.e. 13 vs 26 sub-basins in this thesis). As an example, Figure 4 shows the shows average 
historical (1960-1990) monthly evaporation and rainfall for Lake Kariba, and how this 
compares to the assumptions used by Beilfuss and dos Santos (2001).  
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Figure 14. Evaporation, rainfall and net evaporation at Kariba (mm) 
 
Note: Z = from ZDSS, B = from Beilfuss and dos Santos (2001) 
For Lake Kariba, the reservoir with by far the most surface area, the average net evaporation 
data from the ZDSS and the data presented in Beilfuss and dos Santos (2001) are within 2%. 
For the other reservoirs, however, such as Cahora Bassa and Itezhi-tezhi, parameters are 
considerably lower than those reported in Beilfuss and dos Santos. The reason for this is that 
the Beilfuss paper uses a pan evaporation correction factor of 0.9, while the ZDSS uses much 
lower values. Typical pan correction factors range from 0.35–0.85 (Allen et al. 1998), and the 
ZDSS aligns with the lower values based on local conditions. 
The sensitivity of evaporation to changes in mean temperature is the same as the sensitivity 
of reference evapotranspiration. Reservoir evaporation can be calculated using the same 
basic equations used for evapotranspiration (Kling, Stanzel, and Preishuber 2014) but 
modified for the non-typical surface of the reservoir and the potential for heat transfer with the 
water body (e.g. as presented in Allen et al. 1998). The relative change in reservoir 
evaporation due to increasing temperatures is the same as for potential evapotranspiration. 
As explained in Section 4.2.3, a one-degree Celsius increase in temperature leads to a 2.5% 
increase in evapotranspiration, and therefore evaporation as well. Applying the temperature 
projections from the two climate futures in the relevant sub-basin for each reservoir provides 
the basis for calculating future evaporation. This combined with future precipitation in each 
climate future yields future net evaporation.22  
                                               
22  Note that all of the data on evaporation and rainfall for the different climate futures is sources from the ZDSS model, and the 

















 Hydropower demand for water 
4.2.2.1 Historical data 
The WEAP model utilises required energy production and the characteristics of each reservoir 
or run-of-river plant to determine the flows necessary for meeting specified hydropower 
demand. The actual production then depends not only upon water availability, but also other 
demands upstream and downstream. If more water must pass through the dam than is 
necessary to produce the required energy demand (e.g. to comply with the Design Flood Rule 
Curve (DFRC) or to meet a high priority downstream demand), then WEAP pushes this water 
through the turbines, up to the specified maximum turbine flow. If the maximum turbine flow is 
reached, the water is discharged through spillway gates up to the specified maximum hydraulic 
flow. 
For the historical period, the simulation uses actual monthly hydropower production (see Table 
22), generation efficiency, and head height (fixed or variable depending on the plant type) to 
determine the flows going through the turbines. For plants with reservoirs, the volume-
elevation curve is also used, and for the largest plants the modelling includes the tailwater 
rating curves and DFRC. DFRCs are used for Kariba (ZRA 2013; SADC 2011), Cahora Bassa 
(from ZDSS analysis of recent operations at this reservoir), and Itezhi-tezhi (Beilfuss and 
Brown 2010). Table 22 shows the cases where annual or monthly data was available, and for 
what years. For plants with no annual or monthly data, the average annual production data 
was used, as per Table 24. Note that both plants on Lake Kariba are treated as one reservoir 
hydropower plant, with combined energy demand for Kariba South and Kariba North, for 
practical modelling reasons.  
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1976–77  1977–2012 2004–2013 HCB HCB 
Kafue Gorge 
Upper 
1968  1993–2012 1993–2012 ZESCO ZESCO 
Kariba South 1958  1990–2009  IEA IEA 
Kariba North  1959  1993–2012 1993–2012 ZESCO ZESCO 
Victoria Falls 1972  1993–2012 1993–2012 ZESCO ZESCO 
Mulungushi 1955      
Lunsemfwa 1944      
Nkula Falls A 1966   2005–2012  ESCOM 
Nkula Falls B 1981   2005–2012  ESCOM 
Tedzani I & II 1977   2005–2012  ESCOM 
Tedzani III 1995   2005–2012  ESCOM 
Kapichira I 2000   2005–2012  ESCOM 
 
For Cahora Bassa, the average turbine discharge from October 1998 (when the plant was fully 
back on line after reconstruction) and April 2007 (last data from Mozambique National Water 
Directorate) was 1,310 cubic metres per second (cms), which would mean the tailwater 
elevation was approximately 202 m amsl (see Table 70 for rating curve). Over the same 
period, the mean reservoir elevation was 322 m amsl, so the net head was 120 m. This 
corresponds to a generation efficiency of 95.6% (see 0 for relationship between net head and 
efficiency). Similarly, for Itezhi-tezhi, the tailwater elevation is estimated from an average net 
head of 40 m (Euroconsult and Mott MacDonald 2007) and the average reservoir surface 
elevation between 1977 and 2002 of 1,025.8 m amsl (Walimwipi 2012). 
For generation efficiency for the other plants, all plants in Zambia are assigned the same value 
as Kariba and Kafue Upper (88%) given in Beilfuss (2001). All new plants in Mozambique are 
assigned the same efficiency as that of Mphanda Nkuwa (94%), as given by HMNK (2012). 
For plants in Malawi and Tanzania, a benchmark efficiency of 90% is used to represent a 
typical hydropower plant (USBR 2005). For technical availability (i.e. net of planned and 
unplanned outages), where this is not specified by the utility, 93% is used, based on the earlier 
SAPP Pool Plan Study (Nexant 2007). Plant-specific availability was only available for Cahora 
Bassa (96%) and Mphanda Nkuwa (91%). Maximum hydraulic flow (turbines and spillway) is 
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only specified for Lake Kariba (9515 cms) (Beilfuss and Brown 2010) and Cahora Bassa 
(16,250 cms) (Beilfuss and dos Santos 2001).Maximum turbine flow is a key parameter in 
WEAP, and must be specified for the model to allow electricity generation. Turbine flow should 
correspond to the rated capacity of the plant, taking into consideration the net head, efficiency 
and availability of the plant. In some cases, the reported maximum turbine flow had to be 
adjusted to match the stated capacity of the plant. For example, Cahora Bassa has a rated 
output of 2,075 MW and reported maximum turbine flow of 2,250 cms. With an efficiency of 
96% and availability of 96%, however, this would produce 2,300 MW at the average net head 
of 116m. Because WEAP will always direct streamflow to turbines first, the maximum turbine 
flow must be adjusted downward to 2000 cms to ensure that the model does not yield higher 
generation than the rated power plant capacity. Other maximum turbine flows are defined for 
Kariba (1,794 cms), Victoria Falls (117 cms) (MEWD 2010), Kafue Upper (252 cms) (Beilfuss 
and dos Santos 2001), Nkula Falls A & B (246 cms) (World Bank 2010b), Tedzani I, II & III 
(276 cms) (World Bank 2010b), and Kapichira I (134 cms) (ESCOM 2013a).23 
As the catchment area of a hydropower plant decreases, so the certainty of the climate and 
runoff projections also decreases, because of the relatively low density of reporting weather 
stations in much of the Zambezi River Basin. For this reason, small stations such as Lusiwasi 
(12MW) and Wovwe (5MW) are not included in the modelling. In addition, the Lunsemfwa 
(18MW) and Mulungushi (20MW) plants are combined in one “virtual plant” with the larger 
reservoir and catchment area, to reduce the uncertainty in runoff projections. 
As with natural reservoirs, buffering parameters (see section 4.1.4 for explanation) are also 
specified for the existing human-made reservoirs, as shown in Table 23, while Table 24 
summarises the key data on existing plants. 
Table 23. Buffering assumptions for existing reservoirs 




Cahora Bassa 58 6 
Kafue Gorge Upper 75 10 
Kariba 62 6/2 (>2000)** 
Itezhi-tezhi 40*** 5 
Notes: * Calibration for Itezhi-tezhi was most accurate without buffering, so these are not included for this reservoir. 
** After 2000, the buffering coefficient for Kariba  is reduced to 2%, because of the vulnerability of drying climate and irrigation 
demand leading to excessive reservoir draw down loss of net head for power production. 
                                               
23  Because WEAP requires a non-zero maximum turbine flow to allow water to flow through the turbines, for plants without 
maximum turbine flow specified in the literature, a dummy value of 1000 was used. 
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*** The Itezhi-tezhi DFRC bring the top of the conservation level down to 45% of the storage capacity for flood control 
purposes, so buffer zone cannot be above this level. 
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Table 24. Key characteristics of existing hydropower plants in the Zambezi River Basin 

















   
(MW) (year) (GWh) M m3) (km2) (m amsl) (m) 
Cahora Bassa Mozambique Zambezi 2,075 1976–77 14,729 51,704 2,665 326 116 
Kafue Gorge Upper Zambia Kafue 990 1968 5,160 785 805 976.6 394 
Kariba South Zimbabwe Zambezi 750 1958 3.584 64,798 5,577 488.5 95 
Kariba North Bank Zambia Zambezi 720 1959 2,859 64,798 5,577 488.5 95 
Victoria Falls Zambia Zambezi 108 1972 612 N/A N/A N/A 112.7 










Itezhi-tezhi Reservoir Zambia Kafue N/A 1977 N/A 4,925 374 1,029.5 40 
Nkula Falls A Malawi Shire 24 1966 161 N/A N/A N/A 52 
Nkula Falls B Malawi Shire 100 1981 575 N/A N/A N/A 57 
Tedzani I & II Malawi Shire 40 1977 276 N/A N/A N/A 37 
Tedzani III Malawi Shire 53 1995 312 N/A N/A N/A 42 
Kapichira I Malawi Shire 64 2000 427 N/A N/A N/A 54 
Note: Commission date is for turbines. 
Sources: National utilities and energy ministries (HCB 2013; ZESCO 2013c; ESCOM 2013b; MEWD 2010) Beilfuss (2001), Beilfuss and dos Santos (2001) , Beilfuss and Brown (2010), Burian et al. (2012), 
Euroconsult & Mott MacDonald (2007) 
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4.2.2.2 Future water demand – planned hydropower plants 
Table 26 shows the planned additional hydropower plants in the basin. As with historical 
plants, these inputs are used to determine the flow requirements at each location. Less data 
is available on most of these plants, however. In some cases (see table), plants were only 
reported with their potential capacity in the literature and so could not be included, because 
this is not sufficient to calculate flow requirements. Where generation efficiency and availability 
was not specified, the same assumptions as for existing plants were used (see previous 
section).  
Maximum turbine flow was not reported for many of the proposed plants, or the reported 
values in the literature were too low to yield the projected capacity. For example, the reported 
maximum flow at Mphanda Nkuwa is 662 cms (HMNK 2012), but 2,568 cms would be required 
to produce the rated output of 1500 MW for the first phase.24 The reported maximum flow to 
Itezhi-tezhi of 312 cms (MEWD 2010), however, is sufficient to deliver the rated output of 108 
MW.  
For Kariba North, 455 cms would be sufficient to produce 360 MW output. Because this 
expansion will be used in peaking mode, the expected load factor is very low, however (12%). 
For the Kariba South expansion, 425 cms is needed for the 300 MW capacity rating. Batoka 
Gorge is estimated at 1,089 cms maximum turbine flow based on the installed generation 
capacity, net head, efficiency and availability.  
The buffering assumptions for the new reservoirs are shown in Table 25. Itezhi-tezhi maintains 
the same operating rules as currently (see Table 23). 
Table 25. Buffering assumptions for new reservoirs 




Batoka Gorge 75 10 
Chemba 75 10 
Devils Gorge 60 5 
Mpata Gorge 80 5 
Mphanda Nkuwa 75 10 
 
                                               
24  The reported value may be for a single turbine. 
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Table 26. Future planned hydropower plants in the Zambezi River Basin included in this analysis* 

















        (MW) (GWh) (M m3) (km2) (m amsl) (m)  
Cahora Bassa North Mozambique Zambezi HCB 1,245 2,835 existing 0 0 116 2015 
Mphanda Nkuwa I Mozambique Zambezi Mozambique 1,500 8,600 2,324 97 207 67 2022 
Mphanda Nkuwa II Mozambique Zambezi Mozambique 750 4,200 “ “ “ “ 2025 
Batoka Gorge Zam/Zim Zambezi ZRA 1,600 8,728 1,680 25.6 762 166 2023 
Chemba I Mozambique Zambezi EdM 600 5,920     2020 
Chemba II    400 total 20,080  98 43 2022 
Itezhi-Tezhi Zambia Kafue ZESCO/ 
TATA 
120 611 existing 0 0 80 2016 
Devils Gorge Zam/Zim Zambezi ZRA 1,240 5,604 31,200 710 592 103.5 2026 
Mpata Gorge Zam/Zim Zambezi ZRA 1,086 4,200 20,400 1190 381 55 2025 
Kariba South Ext Zimbabwe Zambezi ZESA 300 1,183 existing 0 0 95 2018 
Kariba North Ext Zambia Zambezi ZESCO 360 380 existing 0 0 95 2014 
Kafue Gorge Lower Zambia Kafue ZESCO 750 2,400 N/A 0 0 186 2019 
Boroma Mozambique Zambezi EdM 160 1,168 N/A 0 N/A 17 2022 
Lupata Mozambique Zambezi EdM 550 4,171 N/A 0 N/A 27 2021 
Kapichira II Malawi Shire ESCOM 64 469 N/A 2 N/A 54 2014 
Kholombizo Malawi Shire ESCOM 100  N/A N/A N/A N/A 2018 
Mpatamanga Malawi Shire ESCOM 265  N/A N/A N/A N/A 2020 
Note: *While there are other potential plants that are mentioned in the literature, these are either much smaller or at such an early stage of conceptual development that insufficient technical data 
was available to include them in the modelling.  
Sources: National utilities and energy ministries (HCB 2013; ZESCO 2013c; ESCOM 2013b; MEWD 2010) Beilfuss (2001), Beilfuss and dos Santos (2001) , Euroconsult & Mott MacDonald (2007), Nexant 
(2007), ZRA (2013) 
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The timing of the investments is explained in Chapter 3, while the earliest start date is shown 
in Table 26. Given that the objective of this thesis is to assess impacts on major plants, most 
of the analysis focuses on the expansions of Kariba and Cahora Bassa, and the new plants 
of Batoka Gorge, Chemba, Mphanda Nkuwa. Kafue Gorge Lower and Itezhi-tezhi are also a 
focus due to their importance for Zambia. Devils Gorge and Mpata Gorge are also considered 
briefly due to their size. 
 Irrigation demand 
Irrigation demand for water is a function of acreage, crop type, growing cycles (and their 
corresponding crop coefficients), reference evapotranspiration, and effective precipitation 
within the irrigated area. Using the “irrigation only” demand model in WEAP, the model first 
calculates the crop requirements and determines whether effective precipitation is sufficient. 
If it is not, water will be abstracted from the river via the transmission link, taking into 
consideration the efficiency of the irrigation system. Any rainfall that is above the effective 
precipitation level, or rainfall in months when there is no crop demand, becomes runoff. This 
runoff was discussed in section 4.1.3. 
The location of the irrigation abstraction points in the river network is specified to reflect the 
approximate location of major projects and/or potential development areas. These locations 
have been established based on geographic data provided in the MSIOA and ZDSS, and are 
presented in Annex C. Acreage and crop type is provided by detailed tables in Volume 4 of 
the MSIOA study (World Bank 2010b). This study provides current area, area of identified 
irrigation projects (e.g. short-to-medium term) and high-level irrigation potential (e.g. long 
term) (see Annex B for detail). The development futures differ by the year when each level of 
irrigation area will be achieved, as shown in Table 15.  
Table 27. Irrigation expansion in each development future 




Year when “identified projects” have been realised 2030 2025 2020 
Year when “high level” irrigation potential has been realised 2060 2050 2040 
 
Note that the MSIOA study provides acreage for dry season, wet season and perennial crops, 
but the actual equipped area is less than the sum of these three areas since some land is 
used for both dry and wet season crops. Unfortunately, there is no simple correspondence 
between crops being planted on the same land throughout the year and several different wet 
season crops being planted in one dry season crop area. This presents a problem for the 
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WEAP model, since the model assumes that the precipitation in a particular sub-basin falls 
year-round on every hectare with a crop designated. In other words, one hectare of winter 
wheat is assumed to receive rainfall throughout the year, even though that hectare may also 
be included under the area of summer wheat. This could lead to double counting of rainfall 
and an overestimate of runoff from irrigated areas (i.e. because the winter wheat area would 
appear to have significant runoff in the summer, even though in reality that rainfall might be 
completely used by evapotranspiration from summer crops on the same land). Of course, this 
is not a problem for perennial crops, nor is it a major problem for wet season crops (i.e. 
because when there is no crop in the field there is also almost no rainfall, from May to Oct). 
The problem is with dry season crops, in those sub-basins where irrigated area could become 
a significant share of total land area. The solution to this in WEAP is to “turn off” the 
precipitation on dry season crop area during the summer months, by making precipitation a 
function of crop stage. In other words, when the crop coefficient (Kc) is zero, this means there 
is no crop in the field. During the months when Kc is zero (generally October to April for dry 
season crops), the precipitation inputs for that area are set to zero, so that this precipitation is 
recorded instead under the area designated for wet season irrigated crops. This correction is 
only necessary in sub-basins where irrigated area is a significant share of total land area (i.e. 
sub-basins 11, 24, 26 and 27). 
Crop coefficients are also sourced from the MSIOA study, which provides decadal (e.g. 10 
days) estimates of crop coefficients for all the relevant crops. These are converted to monthly 
coefficients for the WEAP model (see Annex D). Reference evapotranspiration (ETo) varies 
by sub-basin and is related to local climate parameters. For the historical data series and two 
climate futures, monthly ETo is extracted from the ZDSS for each sub-basin. The historical 
averages are shown in Table 28. Effective precipitation differs from actual precipitation, 
because in high rainfall periods some water runs off before it can be utilised by vegetation. 
According to the research behind the MSIOA study, any rainfall above 150 mm/month will be 
lost to surface runoff, so the actual monthly precipitation is capped at 150 mm/month to yield 
effective precipitation. 
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Table 28. Monthly ETo for selected sub-basins 
Sub-
basins 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Sum 
1 118 105 117 122 125 114 128 156 181 176 129 117 1588 
2 114 102 113 118 121 111 124 151 176 171 125 113 1539 
3 114 102 114 118 121 110 124 151 175 170 125 113 1537 
4 121 109 121 126 129 117 132 161 187 181 133 120 1637 
5 125 112 124 130 133 121 136 165 192 186 137 123 1684 
6 134 119 134 129 121 105 117 149 184 194 156 141 1683 
Source: ZDSS Model 
For the future scenarios, ETo is adjusted for projected temperatures in each climate scenario 
as explained in Box 2.  
 
Irrigation efficiency depends on the mode of irrigation. Gravity-fed schemes are 39% efficient, 
while pivot/sprinkler systems are 50% efficient (World Bank 2010b: Table A3.6). The MSIOA 
study notes that the Kafue and Luangwa sub-basins widely use pressurised irrigation, but for 
the other sub-basins there is either evidence of a large share of gravity fed schemes or no 
information at all on the shares. The model therefore uses pressurised irrigation efficiency for 
Kafue (sub-basins 12, 13 and 14) and Luangwa (sub-basin 15) and gravity-fed schemes 
efficiency for other areas. 
Box 2. Evapotranspiration and future climate 
Long-term mean monthly potential evapotranspiration (mPET) data were obtained 
for the ZDSS analysis from the CLIMWAT dataset of FAO for 30 stations in the 
region. The Penman-Monteith method was used in the CROPWAT model of FAO to 
calculate the sensitivity of mPET to changes in temperature. Thus, time-series of 
monthly potential evapotranspiration (PET) were obtained with the following simple 
equation: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ (∆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐹𝐹 + 1) Eq. 1 
where PETt is the monthly potential evapotranspiration of time-step t in [mm], 
mPETi is the long-term mean monthly potential evapotranspiration of the month i in 
[mm], ∆Tt is the temperature difference between the current time-step t and the 
long-term mean monthly temperature of month i in [°C], and F is an empirical factor 
obtained from sensitivity tests with Penman-Monteith method and specified as 
0.025 in [mm/(mm.°C)]. 
The equation above shows that for an increase in temperature by +1°C there is an 
increase in PET by +2.5%. The sensitivity analysis did not find significant 
differences in this factor between stations and months. 
Source: Kling (2013) 
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 Urban demand 
Change in urban demand in the water model is driven entirely by population growth25. The 
current per capita consumption is taken from the Rapid Assessment Final Report for the 
Integrated Water Resources Management Strategy for the Zambezi River Basin study 
(Euroconsult and Mott MacDonald 2007, 37), as 70 litres per day in urban areas and 20 litres 
per day in rural areas. Given the fact that urban demand is already a very small percentage of 
runoff in the basin, only the largest urban centres are considered: Lusaka, Harare, Bulawayo, 
Lilongwe, Blantyre, Copperbelt (Ndola and Kitwe) and Livingstone-Victoria Falls area. 
The water source of each major urban centre was identified, as well as the discharge location, 
because these are not always in the same sub-basin. For Lusaka, the water abstraction is 
from the Kafue River before the Kafue Gorge Upper hydropower station. The discharge, 
however, is into the Luangwa River basin. Harare uses the Lake Manyame catchment.26 For 
Bulawayo, current water supplies are from dams outside the Zambezi River Basin (e.g. 
Ncema, Inyankuni, Inciza, Umzingwane). Bulawayo has experienced chronic water shortages, 
however, and had to severely ration water during recent drought years.27 The Matabeleland 
Zambezi Water Trust Project has been proposed to draw water from the Zambezi River to 
alleviate Bulawayo’s water shortages, although this project has seen numerous delays due to 
political and economic challenges in Zimbabwe.28 The government of Zimbabwe announced 
in July 2012 that China had committed $1.2 billion to this project, and that the 400km pipeline 
and associated dams would be complete within three years.29 For this reason, Bulawayo water 
demand is only included in the WEAP model from 2015, and then drawing from the Zambezi 
River at Lake Kariba. 
 Inter-basin transfers30 
While a number of inter-basin transfers have been mentioned in the literature (World Bank 
2010a; SWECO 1996; WRC 2010; Heyns 2003; JICA 2009), none is at an advanced stage of 
feasibility study, nor is there any political agreement on these. The MSIOA includes a scenario 
that considered a proposed scheme for abstracting water from the Chobe-Zambezi area for 
                                               
25 This is a simplification, since urban areas would also include industrial and commercial demand related to economic 
development.  However, because urban demand is such a small portion of total water demand in the basin, a more 
sophisticated modelling approach would be unlikely to significantly change the results. 
26  http://www.waterworld.com/news/2012/10/11/harare-water-woes-no-solution-in-sight-75-years-later.html. 
27  http://allafrica.com/stories/201208310055.html. 
28  http://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/10/02/bulawayo-water-woes-a-crisis-of-leadership/. 
29  http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-8476-China+funds+$1,2bn+Zambezi+Water+Project/news.aspx. 
30  This analysis of inter-basin transfers was provided by Arthur Chapman, OneWorld Sustainable Investments, Cape Town. 
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the Dikgatlhong reservoir in Botswana (in connection with the North-South Carrier Water 
Project), which would remove 25.7 cms or 810 million cubic metres (mcm)/year. This would 
be the second phase of the proposed Pandamatanga agricultural abstraction transfer, which 
would draw up to 16 cms from the same area, before the pipeline is extended all the way to 
Botswana’s North-South Carrier (WRC 2010). Flows at Kasane, however, are rarely below 
108 cms – only in 1.3% of the months between 1960 and 1990 – so this withdrawal is unlikely 
to have major downstream impacts. These smaller-scale transfers have not been included in 
the modelling.  
 Demand priorities 
The model must be clear about which demands to prioritise in case of a shortfall, or, rather, 
the order in which to fill those priorities. In WEAP this is specified by setting demand priorities 
for reservoir filling, hydropower generation, irrigation demand and urban demand – with 1 
being the highest and 99 being the lowest. WEAP then allocates water to the highest priority 
demands first, regardless of their position within the basin. As discussed in Chapter 2, if 
upstream demands would, in practice, have first access to flows, then this should be reflected 
by assigning them a higher priority than downstream demands. Even when there are groups 
of plants near one another (e.g. Cahora Bassa and Mphanda Nkuwa), in practice the lower 
reservoir would most likely have a lower priority. In addition, the small size of the “holding 
reservoirs” at Batoka Gorge (1,680 mcm), Mphanda Nkuwa (2,324 mcm) and Kafue Gorge 
Upper (785 mcm) means that these must be kept almost full to maintain the head necessary 
to generate power. For these three plants, therefore, reservoir storage priority should be higher 
than hydropower, while for all other plants the opposite is true (Table 29). Because urban 
demand is very small compared to all other demands and is likely to be prioritised for political 
reasons, urban demand is set at 5 in all scenarios. 
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Table 29. Demand priorities for hydropower and irrigation 
 Generation Reservoir filling Irrigation 
IA1, IA2, IA3, IA4   4 
Barotse  5  
IA6, IA7   6 
Caprivi-Chobe  7  
IA8   8 
Victoria Falls 9   
Batoka Gorge 11 10  
IA11a, IA9   12 
Devils Gorge 13 14  
IA10   15 
Kariba 16 17  
IA13   12 
Itezhi-tezhi 13 14  
Kafue Flats  14  
IA14,    15 
Kafue Gorge Upper 17 16  
Kafue Gorge Lower 18 N/A  
Lunsemfwa-Mulungishi 17 18  
IA15, IA16   19 
IA11b, IA17a, IA17b, IA18, IA19   19 
Cahora Bassa 20 21  
IA21   22 
Mphanda Nkuwa 24 23  
Boroma 25 N/A  
IA23, IA24   26 
Lupata 27 N/A  
Chemba 28 29  
IA25, IA26 26   
Kholombizo, Nkula A & B 27   
Tedzani I, II, III 28   
Kapichira I & II, Mpatamanga 29   
IA27 30   
Note: All “IA” entries are irrigated areas (see Annex B for locations). 
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4.3 Model calibration 
Because the WEAP model uses runoff data that has already been calibrated in the ZDSS, all 
that is necessary is to calibrate the modelling of the operation and evaporation from reservoirs 
(including demand priorities, and the treatment of wetlands as natural reservoirs) and to check 
that downstream flows are still accurately modelled when historical irrigation and urban 
demand are included. In addition, irrigation demand is also compared with published studies 
(see Section 4.3.3) to check the crop demand model. 
 Natural reservoirs 
Calibration of discharges from natural reservoirs was done by comparing downstream gauge 
data with modelled discharges. In addition to visual calibration of the model results, which 
WEAP facilitates from the graphical reporting formats available, several statistics were 
calculated: correlation, bias ratio, variability ratio and a “modified KGE statistic” (Gupta et al. 
2009; Kling and Preishuber 2012). The KGE statistic combines correlation, bias ratio and 
variability ratio, so that the model calibration balances the temporality of flows with the mean 
volumes and variability, rather than only focusing on one of these issues.  
For Kafue Flats, the Nyimba gauge is in the middle of the Flats, so would not be appropriate. 
The only gauge between the Flats and Kafue Gorge Upper HPP is Kasaka, but this gauge has 
been affected by the backwater from Kafue Gorge Upper since the plant was in full operation 
in the late 1960s. For this reason, data from the Kasaka gauge for the period from January 
1961 to December 1970 is used for the calibration. As Figure 15 shows, there is a close 
correlation between the modelled results and observed gauge readings. The statistical results 
are reported in Table 30. The shift in the hydrograph shown in Figure 16 shows how 
significantly these large wetlands both attenuate the upstream flows and shift the peak flows, 
which is consistent with the findings in other modelling studies in the Zambezi, as discussed 
earlier. 
 79 
Figure 15. Observed versus modelled flows at Kasaka (1961–1970) 
 
Figure 16. Average monthly flows above and below Kafue Flats (1961–1970) 
 
For Barotse, the challenge is that that ZDSS research showed that Senanga tends to under-
report peak flows, while Katima Mulilo tends to over-report them. For this reason, the Senanga 
and Katima Mulilo records are only used to identify the peak flow periods. As Figure 17 below 
shows, the modelled flows follow the hydrographs for the two gauges very closely, even 






























































































































































Figure 17. Comparison of hydrograph of modelled Barotse flood plain with Senanga and 
Katima Mulilo gauges 
 
The best calibration for Barotse, and the Chobe-Caprivi wetlands as well, is at the Victoria 
Falls gauge. The modelled flows versus gauge are shown in Figure 18, demonstrating the 
good calibration of the model at this point. The calibration statistics are reported in Table 30. 
Figure 18. Observed versus modelled flows at Victoria Falls 
 
 Human-made reservoirs 
For man-made reservoirs, calibration may be based on observed versus modelled reservoir 
volume or on discharges. As with natural reservoirs, the KGE statistic is used, as well as its 
statistical components. For Itezhi-tezhi, the gauge data from GRDC for the outflow point of the 
reservoir is used, and this has been confirmed by data from ZESCO. The calibration period 
starts in 1977, when the reservoir was commissioned, and ends in 1990. Note that the Itezhi-



































































































































(2001), and the calibration statistics with the DFRC showed that this assumption more closely 
matched the observed data.  
 Figure 19. Observed versus modelled discharge at Itezhi-tezhi (1977–1990)  
 
For Lake Kariba, modelled reservoir levels (volume) are also well correlated with observed 
volume, even during the very dry period of 1983 to 1988, as shown in Figure 20. 
Figure 20. Observed versus modelled volume at Lake Kariba 
 
Similarly, for Cahora Bassa, modelled volume is compared with observed volume provided by 
the Mozambique National Directorate for Water. The difficulty with Cahora Bassa, however, is 
that during the period from 1983 to 1997, when the transmission lines to South Africa were 





















































































































































































reservoir was drawn down even though there was sufficient inflow to maintain higher levels. 
In addition, operation was erratic during the earlier years after commissioning. For these 
reasons, a formal calibration is not feasible for Cahora Bassa. Figure 21 does show, however, 
the model correctly implements the specified DFRC for Cahora Bassa. 
Figure 21. Observed versus modelled volume at Cahora Bassa 
 
Kafue Gorge Upper has only a small holding reservoir, so the calibration is conducted with 
modelled discharge versus gauge data (Figure 22). 
Figure 22. Observed versus modelled discharge at Kafue Gorge Upper hydropower plant 
 
The calibration statistics at key points in the ZRB system are shown in Table 30, demonstrating 













































































































































Table 30. Summary reservoir calibration statistics 





Kafue Flats Kasaka 1961–90 0.881 1.054 0.989 0.869 
Barotse & 
Chobe-Caprivi 
Vic Falls ZRA 1961–90 0.925 0.948 1.065 0.888 
Itezhi-tezhi Itezhi-tezhi 1977–90 0.799 0.932 1.025 0.787 





1973–90 0.843 0.907 1.110 0.787 
Note: * Calibration to reservoir volume, instead of monthly discharge. 
 Irrigation demand 
Table 31 shows the calculated irrigation water demand in the WEAP model for the current 
irrigated area versus the estimated abstractions from the MSIOA study. The WEAP sub-basin 
data are aggregated to the sub-basins from the MSIOA for comparison. The total abstraction 
demand is virtually the same, and all the major basins are within 10–20%. This is a good fit 
considering the large uncertainties in irrigation system efficiencies, which are included in the 
abstraction requirement estimates of both studies. 
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Table 31. Calculated abstraction requirements for current irrigated area compared to the 
MSIOA study 
Sub-basin names and numbers Total abstraction (MCM) 
 




Upper Zambezi 12 1 37.6 40.2 107 
Kabompo 13 2 4.8 5.6 116 
Lungue Bungo 11 3 15.7 16.6 106 
Luanginga 10 4 14.2 14.1 99 
Barotse 9 6 3.5 3.6 104 
Cuando / Chobe 8 7 10.1 10.8 107 
Kariba 6 8,9,10,11 649.2 528.4 81 
Kafue 7 12,13,14 626.0 727.8 116 
Luangwa 5 15,16 120.5 170.7 142 
Mupata 4 17 308.6 296.6 96 
Tete 2 18,19,20, 21,23,24 669.0 612.6 92 
Lake Malawi / 
Shire 
3 25,26 648.6 717.3 111 
Zambezi Delta 1 27 127.0 143.2 113 
Total 
  
3,234.8 3,287.4 102 
 
Having specified the scenarios that were analysed using the calibrated WEAP model for the 
ZRB, the following section presents the results of the modelling. 
4.4 Results 
The results are presented in successive steps to answer the overall questions of how future 
climate and irrigation expansion in the ZRB affect hydropower generation potential. The 
following sub-questions help to identify the most important drivers of change in hydropower 
production for existing and new hydropower plants:  
• How will future climate and development impact existing hydropower plants? 
• How will future climate and development impact new hydropower plants? 
• What is the relative impact of increased irrigation demand for water versus climate on 
the performance of existing and new hydropower plants? 
• To what extent does the pace of development (i.e. the alternative development future) 
for hydropower and irrigation affect the results? 
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 Water modelling scenarios 
The scenarios follow the core modelling scenarios explained in in Chapter 3 (see Table 32). 
In addition, two additional scenarios are added to understand the relative impact of additional 
downstream hydropower demand (e.g. on Kariba) versus the impact of increased irrigation 
demand.31 As discussed in Chapter 3, future hydropower production for the existing plants is 
compared with baseline modelled generation using historical climate data (1960–1990), to 
eliminate any bias in the comparisons with future scenarios. In all the subsequent figures 
displaying the results of the analysis, annual and monthly variables are shown based on 
processing data inputs from a given climate scenario to determine projected storage levels 
and generation, based on the modelling specifications presented earlier in this chapter.  As 
discussed in section 3.1, this is not meant to be a prediction, but rather a presentation of a 
plausible future and an illustration of the response of the modelled system to alternative 
climate inputs. 
Table 32. Specification of scenarios in water supply and demand analysis 
 Hydropower 
development 
Irrigation development Climate 
BAU Baseline BAU BAU Historical 
BAU Dry BAU BAU Dry 
BAU Wet BAU BAU Wet 
BAU Dry Hydro 
only 
BAU Historical Dry 
BAU Wet 
Hydro only 
BAU Historical Wet 
SADC Int Dry SADC Int SADC Int Dry 
SADC Int Wet SADC Int SADC Int Wet 
GD Baseline Grand Deal Grand Deal Historical 
GD Dry Grand Deal Grand Deal Dry 
GD Wet Grand Deal Grand Deal Wet 
Note: BAU = business as usual; SADC Int = SADC Integration; GD = Grand Deal. 
In terms of the effects of irrigation on water demand, Figure 23 illustrates the increase in 
irrigation demand under the BAU scenarios driven by the increase in irrigated area (i.e. the 
“BAU Dry Hydro only” and “BAU Wet Hydro only” scenarios do not include any increase in 
irrigated area, only modest increases in demand from higher average temperatures). Under 
the “Grand Deal” development scenario, the same demand levels would be reached 10 to 20 
                                               
31  The scenarios “BAU Dry Hydro only” and “BAU Wet Hydro only” show how hydropower would perform without any change 
in irrigation demand, while the normal BAU scenarios include this growth in irrigation demand. 
 86 
years earlier. However, this increase in demand has limited impact on the overall hydropower 
generation potential, as explained in section 4.3.4.   
Figure 23. Total Zambezi Basin irrigation demand growth under different climate and 
development futures 
 
The following sub-sections present the analysis and results that address the questions posed 
at the opening of section 4.4. These results are then summarised and discussed in sections 
4.4.6 and 4.5. 
 Future climate and development impact on existing hydropower plants 
This section considers how the three major existing hydropower plants – Kariba, Cahora 
Bassa and Kafue Gorge Upper – could be affected by different climate futures, assuming BAU 
development (i.e. irrigation development, new plant commissioning, and population growth). 
As shown in Section 4.3.1, while the model results are highly correlated with historical 
measurements, there is still some bias. To eliminate this bias in interpreting the results of the 
future simulations, it is important to compare future generation with modelled generation using 
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using historical climate data, and taking into consideration the expansions on the North and 
South Banks and BAU development in the basin, results in mean generation of 6,759 GWh.32  
Figure 24 below shows that climate has a dramatic effect on hydropower production at Kariba. 
Mean generation under a wetting climate would only be about 2% higher than the baseline, 
while a drying climate would lead to a 13% drop in average annual generation (2011–2070) 
(see summary in Table 33 for mean values). 
Figure 24. Future annual generation at Kariba under BAU development 
 
It is important to remember that actual historical production is also highly variable due to 
normal climate variability. Figure 25 shows historical monthly generation at Kariba North, 
Kafue Gorge Upper and Victoria Falls, which all vary by season and between years. 
                                               
32  Average annual generation for Kariba from 1960–1990 was approximately 5,750 GWh/yr (Tumbare 2000). More recent 
average generation from 1993 to 2012 was 6 934 GWh/yr. Kariba North generation is from ZESCO, while Kariba South is 






















































Figure 25. Historical monthly generation (1993-2012) at ZESCO hydropower plants 
 
Source: ZESCO (2013c) 
In terms of monthly generation, Figure 26 shows that the drop in generation under the drying 
scenario is primarily in July to November. The higher generation in February is from lowering 
the lake level as per the DFRC. The model assumes this additional outflow will pass through 
the turbines for as long as the flow is less than the maximum turbine flow (which is the case 
at Kariba). 





























































































The reservoir levels generally follow the DFRC for the wetting climate, but even with buffering 
in the reservoir, the drying climate leads to severe draw-down of the reservoir over the driest 
decades, which in turn reduces the efficiency of power generation (Figure 27).33 
Figure 27. Future reservoir volume at Kariba under BAU development 
 
For Cahora Bassa, modelled generation using historical climate data and BAU development 
is 16,864 GWh/year. This is about 10% higher than the current target stated by Hidroeléctrica 
de Cahora Bassa of 15,500 GWh/year. For purposes of comparison with future scenarios, it 
is therefore important to use the modelled baseline generation, to accurately show the 
percentage change in generation due to climate and upstream development. While the wetting 
climate would result in more substantial increases compared to Kariba, the drying climate still 
results in a more than 7% decline in mean annual generation (Figure 28).  
                                               
33 For the BAU Dry scenario, mean storage is 32.3 BCM (Coefficient of Variation=0.46), while for the BAU Wet scenario, mean 






























































Figure 28. Future annual generation at Cahora Bassa under BAU development 
 
Monthly generation declines under a drying climate most significantly in July to November as 
at Kariba (Figure 29).  

























































































Reservoir levels are maintained at the level specified in the DFRC under a wetting climate, 
but the severe drought years in the drying climate result in dramatic draw-down of the reservoir 
(Figure 30).34 
Figure 30. Future reservoir volume at Cahora Bassa under BAU development 
 
For Kafue Gorge Upper, baseline modelled production is 4,734 GWh/year under BAU 
development.35 Kafue Gorge Upper future generation can only meet this level in the future 
under a wetting climate (Figure 31), with lower generation under a drying climate in almost all 
months.  
                                               
34 For the BAU Dry scenario, mean storage is 33.1 BCM (Coefficient of Variation=0.36), while for the BAU Wet scenario, mean 
storage is 41.6 BCM (Coefficient of Variation=0.18). 






























































Figure 31. Future annual and monthly generation at Kafue Gorge Upper under BAU 
development 
 
 Future climate and development impact on new hydropower plants 
The key new hydropower plants analysed are Batoka Gorge, Chemba, Itezhi-tezhi, Mphanda 
Nkuwa, and Kafue Gorge Lower. In addition, Mpata Gorge and Devils Gorge are considered 
briefly, because of their size (i.e. >1000 MW). For each of the new plants, annual generation 
under future climates is compared with modelled generation under the historical baseline 
climate, as well as the target stated by the utilities or in the literature, where this is available. 
Only the Mphanda Nkuwa feasibility study reports a variable monthly target generation, 
however, so for the other plants the monthly target is simply constant. 
The modelled baseline generation at Itezhi-tezhi under the historical climate is 437 GWh/yr 
over the period 2030–2070. This is considerably lower than the stated target of 611 GWh/yr 
in the literature. This suggests that, even without changes in climate, it would be difficult for 
Itezhi-tezhi to meet generation demands, in part due to the growth of irrigation upstream 
(which is included in the BAU development scenarios). There may also be some model bias, 
because under calibration period modelled outflows were 7% lower than gauged outflows 
(Table 30). In terms of climate impacts, mean generation at Itezhi-tezhi does increase 
somewhat under a wetting climate and falls almost 8% under a drying climate (Figure 32 and 





































































Figure 32. Future annual generation at Itezhi-tezhi under BAU development 
 
Figure 33. Future monthly generation at Itezhi-tezhi under BAU development 
 
In the future dry years, the reservoir generally follows the DFRC, although it is drawn down 






















































Figure 34. Future reservoir volume at Itezhi-tezhi under BAU development 
 
According to the ZRA, the Batoka Gorge feasibility study is currently being revised, but the 
most recent estimate of generation is 8,728 GWh/year. The modelled generation based on 
historical climate, however, is considerably lower than this, at just under 7,400 GWh. Under 
both drying and wetting future climates, however Batoka barely even achieves this level of 
production, due to inter-annual variability, increased upstream demands and variations in 
rainfall across the basin (Figure 35, Table 34). The monthly generation curves (Figure 36) 
show very low generation levels in the dry season, but this is expected, given that Batoka 











































































Figure 35. Future annual generation at Batoka Gorge under, BAU development 
 
Figure 36. Future monthly generation at Batoka Gorge under BAU development 
 
The published target for Mphanda Nkuwa is 8,600 GWh/yr for a 1500 MW plant, which 
represents a net availability of 65%. Whether the expansion of 750 MW in phase II would have 
a similar availability is questionable, given the limited size of the reservoir (i.e. 2,324 mcm vs 
65,000 mcm for Cahora Bassa). The modelled baseline production for both phases over the 
2035–2070 period is 9,600 GWh/yr, or an average availability of 48%. Under BAU 
development, the drying climate would reduce generation by more than 10% on average, while 
a wetting one would increase the mean by 4% (Figure 37, Table 34). Because Mphanda 
























































Bassa discharge (compare Figure 29 with Figure 38), and annual generation shows high 
volatility.  
Figure 37. Future annual generation at Mphanda Nkuwa under BAU development 
 
Figure 38. Future monthly generation at Mphanda Nkuwa under BAU development 
 
For Chemba, a wetting climate increase mean generation by 4% while a drying climate 





















































Figure 39. Future annual generation at Chemba under BAU development 
 
As a run-of-river hydropower plant, Kafue Gorge Lower generation is based entirely on 
releases from Kafue Gorge Upper. This added vulnerability leads to a greater loss of 
generation under a drying climate (i.e. 15%), with modest (4%) increases under a wetting 
climate (Figure 40). 








































Vulnerabilities for Devils Gorge and Mpata Gorge are reported below in Table 34, with Mpata 
Gorge showing the highest vulnerability to a drying climate (>25% loss in mean annual 
generation). 
 Relative impact of increased irrigation demand versus climate on the 
performance of existing and new hydropower plants 
In the previous sections, the hydropower results assumed that irrigation demand also grew 
under the development future (see Section 4.2.6). This section presents additional scenarios 
for the water analysis where irrigation demand is capped at historical levels. This means that 
the difference between these scenarios and the BAU Dry and Wet scenarios presented in the 
previous section will show the impact on hydropower generation of irrigation demand versus 
climate.  
For Kariba, while the climate futures have a dramatic impact on generation, the impact of 
irrigation demand is modest, despite the large growth within that sub-basin in irrigation for 
identified projects (i.e. 97,000 ha) and high-level potential (i.e. 470,000 ha).   
Figure 41. Future annual generation at Kariba, BAU development with and without growth in 
irrigation demands 
 
For Cahora Bassa, although the changes are slightly greater (i.e. 6% versus 3% at Kariba – 
see green versus red line in the later decades) the overall impact is still much less than from 


































































Figure 42. Future annual generation at Cahora Bassa, BAU development with and without 
growth in irrigation demands 
 
The results for Itezhi-tezhi are more similar to Kariba, with virtually no change in generation 
whether irrigation demand is included or not (i.e. the lines for “BAU Dry” and “BAU Wet” are 
not visible because they are the same as the other lines) (Figure 43). This also reflects the 
modest size of the irrigated areas upstream of Itezhi-tezhi (i.e. high level potential of 25,000 
ha, as compared to 430,000 ha around Kariba). The same phenomenon is observed at Kafue 
Gorge Upper, but at Kafue Gorge Lower the lack of a substantial reservoir means that 




















































Figure 43. Future annual generation at Itezhi-tezhi, BAU development with and without 
growth in irrigation demands 
 
Figure 44. Future annual generation at Kafue Gorge Lower, BAU development with and 
without growth in irrigation demands 
 
The results for Mphanda Nkuwa are, not surprisingly, more similar to Cahora Bassa. Irrigation 











































Figure 45. Future annual generation at Mphanda Nkuwa, BAU development with and without 
growth in irrigation demands 
 
Batoka Gorge is impacted by irrigation demand more than Kariba is, due to the small reservoir 
size. Mean generation declines by 6% under both drying and wetting scenarios (Figure 46 and 
Table 34). 
Figure 46. Future annual generation at Batoka Gorge, BAU development with and without 
growth in irrigation demands  
 
The hydropower plant most affected by irrigation demand is Mpata Gorge, with losses of 10–












































Figure 47. Future annual generation at Mpata Gorge, BAU development with and without 
growth in irrigation demands 
 
This analysis shows that the impact of irrigation demand depends on the location of the 
hydropower plant within the overall river basin. Higher up in the system, Itezhi-tezhi and Kariba 
are less affected, but the lower reservoirs at Mpata Gorge, Cahora Bassa and Mphanda 
Nkuwa are more vulnerable, because more of the potential irrigated area is lower in the basin. 
In addition, plants with smaller reservoirs tend to be more vulnerable. Nevertheless, the impact 
of irrigation demand is in almost all cases less than the impact of alternative climates. 
 Effect of the pace of hydropower and irrigation investment on generation 
potential 
The previous section demonstrated that irrigation demand does have an impact on generation 
lower in the ZRB, particularly when reservoirs are small. The development futures discussed 
earlier include the possibility that irrigation demand could grow more quickly than under the 
BAU future, and that new hydropower investments could also be brought forward. Specifically, 
under the Grand Deal future, the year for achieving “identified irrigation projects” is brought 
forward from 2030 to 2020 and “high level potential” from 2060 to 2040. This means that 
irrigation demand rises much faster in the 2000-2030 period, and has reached a maximum by 
2040. To test the impact of these alternative development futures, this section compares the 
results under the BAU scenarios with the Grand Deal scenarios. 
This comparison is illustrated for Kariba in Figure 48. With the exception of a few years where 
the earlier implementation of other hydropower plants impacts generation, there is almost no 
























Figure 48. Future generation at Kariba under BAU and Grand Deal development 
  
For Cahora Bassa and Mphanda Nkuwa, performance also shows limited overall change 
based on the pace of irrigation and hydropower development (Figure 49 and Figure 50).  
Figure 49. Future generation at Cahora Bassa with different levels of hydropower and 



























































































































Figure 50. Future generation at Mphanda Nkuwa with different levels of hydropower and 
irrigation development, all with irrigation prioritised 
 
For the other plants, there is rarely more than 1% difference in mean generation due to the 
change in the development scenario, except for Mpata Gorge, which loses 2–4%, and Batoka 
Gorge, which losses 2% more production under the Grand Deal versus BAU scenarios. 
 Summary of aggregate results 
In terms of the impact of the different climate futures, Kariba is the most vulnerable of the 
current major hydropower plants, while Cahora Bassa and Kafue Gorge Upper benefit more 





























































Figure 51. Generation relative to modelled baseline climate for existing plants under BAU 
development 
 
Among the proposed new hydropower plants, almost all would lose 10–15% of mean 
generation under a drying climate, with Mpata Gorge seeing declines of 25% (Figure 52). The 
total change between the wetting and drying climates (i.e. the spread between BAU Dry and 
BAU Wet or between GD Dry and GD Wet) is 12–16% of mean generation for all three existing 
plants, while the range varies much more for new plants, from 8-12% for Batoka, Itezhi-tezhi 
and Chemba, up to 20% for Devils Gorge and almost 30% for Mpata Gorge.  
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In terms of the impact of irrigation demand on hydropower production, most of the existing and 
new plants would lose 4–7% of mean annual generation regardless of the climate (Figure 53), 
because irrigation reduces the instream flows available for hydropower generation. Losses 
under drying climates are typically 1% greater than under wetting climates. Itezhi-tezhi and 
Mpata are the extremes, with the former being untouched by irrigation demand and the latter 
losing 10–15% of generation due to demands from upstream irrigation. 
Figure 53. Impact of irrigation on generation (change in % mean generation) 
  
Table 33 and Table 34 summarise the results for existing and new hydropower plants, 
respectively, in terms of changes in mean generation versus the generation under the baseline 
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Table 33. Summary results for existing hydropower plants with expansions under different 
climates and irrigation scenarios 
 2011–70 mean generation (GWh) and coefficient 
of variation in generation (%) 
Generation versus 
baseline (%) 
Scenario Kariba Cahora 
Bassa 




BAU Baseline 6,770 30% 16,832 20% 4,704 30% 100 100 100 
BAU Dry 5,868 24% 15,591 19% 4,482 28% 87 93 95 
BAU Dry Hydro only 6,079 23% 16,553 18% 4,702 25% 90 98 100 
BAU Wet 6,876 16% 18,543 12% 5,160 21% 102 110 110 
BAU Wet Hydro only 7,095 17% 19,738 13% 5,338 19% 105 117 113 
GD Baseline 6,810 29% 16,479 18% 4,680 31% 100 100 100 
GD Dry 5,883 24% 15,557 20% 4,451 28% 86 94 95 
GD Wet 6,857 15% 18,347 12% 5,139 21% 101 111 110 
SADC Int Dry* 5,882 24% 15,685 19% 4,466 28% 
   
SADC Int Wet* 6,850 15% 18,497 11% 5,149 21% 
   
Note: *the SADC Int scenarios does not have generation versus baseline because there is no “SADC Baseline” scenario – they 
are only shown to illustrate the negligible difference with the Grand Deal scenarios. 
Table 34. Summary results for new hydropower plants under different scenarios (2030-70 
average annual generation, GWh) 










BAU Baseline 7,378 11,845 5,795 439 2,630 3,726 9,601 
BAU Dry 6,662 10,885 5,025 406 2,234 2,821 8,558 
BAU Dry Hydro only 7,117 11,662 5,364 409 2,392 3,336 9,159 
BAU Wet 7,236 12,361 6,268 459 2,740 3,924 10,003 
BAU Wet Hydro only 7,670 13,031 6,426 463 2,870 4,377 10,740 
GD Baseline 7,261 11,721 5,692 442 2,623 3,675 9,475 
GD Dry 6,541 10,736 5,087 408 2,220 2,718 8,476 
GD Wet 7,119 12,242 6,252 461 2,732 3,865 9,950 
SADC Int Dry 6,601 10,846 5,133 407 2,227 2,768 8,540 
SADC Int Wet 7,177 12,307 6,265 460 2,736 3,920 9,995 
 
4.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The objective of this chapter has been to answer the question: “How could future climate and 
irrigation expansion in the Zambezi River Basin affect hydropower generation potential?”, 
based on an analysis of impacts on specific, major ZRB hydropower plants. The analysis 
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covered major existing plants (i.e. Kariba, Cahora Bassa and Kafue Gorge Upper), extensions 
to existing plants (i.e. Kariba North and South Bank, Cahora Bassa North Bank) and major 
new plants (i.e. Batoka Gorge, Chemba, Itezhi-tezhi, Mphanda Nkuwa, Kafue Gorge Lower 
and, to a lesser extent, Devils Gorge and Mpata Gorge).  
While future climate is subject to scientific uncertainty, the impact of irrigation is a policy and 
economic uncertainty. The latter is both because the level of irrigation investment is driven by 
political and economic priorities, and because the priority given to irrigation demand versus 
hydropower demand for water is a political decision. In the context of the ZRB, prioritisation is 
an international political decision as well, because of the different countries utilising the 
resources of the Zambezi. However, because there is currently no regime to negotiate the 
priorities of various water demands across sectors and countries, upstream abstraction or use 
has de facto higher priority. In other words, by not setting deliberate priorities, the riparian 
states are essentially agreeing to de facto priorities entirely based on geography (i.e. upstream 
users get first use of the water). 
Change in future climate is the overwhelming driver of future production at almost all 
hydropower plants. The difference in mean generation under wetting and drying climates is 
substantial for existing plants, ranging from 12–16% of mean generation. For new plants, 
however, the variation could even be greater for some sites – as much as 30% – although for 
Batoka Gorge it is estimated at 8% of generation. The impact of irrigation, on the other hand, 
is mainly an issue for plants below Kariba, and even then the magnitude is typically less than 
a third of the impact of the alternative climates. The water modelling results, therefore, do not 
vary significantly across alternative development futures, because the accelerated irrigation 
development is still not large enough to dramatically impact hydropower. That said, a 5–6% 
decline in mean generation for a power plant that is already marginal in terms of financial 
returns could be enough to impact the economic viability of some new investments. This needs 
to be considered on a case-by-case basis in the feasibility studies for new hydropower plants. 
While most of the focus here is on the relative changes in generation, some discussion of the 
absolute levels of production is also important. Average output at Kariba between 1993 and 
2012 has been more than 6,400 GWh/yr (MEWD 2010; IEA 2011; ZESCO 2013b), and the 
national utilities expect an additional 1500 GWh/yr from the Kariba North and South Bank 
expansions (MEWD 2010; Nexant 2007). The modelling suggests, however, that, even with 
the additional turbines available, there may not be enough water to generate significantly more 
than historical levels. The limitations on output have become clear in recent years, as 
continued drought and lack of coordination on discharges have drawn down Lake Kariba to 
perilously low levels (Tsiko 2016), jeopardising future generation. Similarly, for Cahora Bassa, 
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the North Bank extension is expected to deliver another 2,835 GWh on top of a current target 
for 15,500 GWh (Nexant 2007; HCB 2013). Only the wetting scenarios demonstrate the 
possibility of achieving this level of output, while the drying scenarios fall far short of this level. 
In terms of new plants, the Zambezi River Authority has stated that Batoka Gorge should 
deliver more than 8,700 GWh/yr (ZRA 2013; MEWD 2010), but there are no modelled 
scenarios in which generation is this high. Even taking into consideration the possibility of 
model bias, this calls into question the prospects of meeting these generation targets. Output 
at Mphanda Nkuwa is beyond the first phase target of 8,600 GWh, but this is only after adding 
additional turbines for the second phase. The second phase could be underutilised, with 
overall availability falling to less than 50%. Whether this is problematic or not depends on the 
incremental costs of the second phase expansion, and what levels of production are needed 
to make this project financially viable.  
The dramatic potential impacts of future climate on hydropower potential in the Zambezi River 
Basin point to the need to explicitly consider climate change in both project planning and 
overall system expansion planning. The next chapter presents that electricity sector model for 
the region that will be used for this assessment, while Chapter 6 takes the results for the water 
modelling and integrates them with the power system analysis. 
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5 Electricity supply and demand scenarios for the Southern 
African Power Pool36 
The previous chapter addressed the first research question of how future climate and irrigation 
expansion in the Zambezi River Basin affect hydropower generation potential. This chapter 
now turns to the second research question: How could development in Southern Africa affect 
power demand, and how might this demand be met? To answer this question, this chapter 
presents the modelling methodology, assumptions, and results for electricity supply and 
demand for the SAPP. The relationship to the overall thesis methodology is shown in Figure 
4, highlighting the analysis in this chapter.  
Section 5.1 defines the scope, followed by 5.2 with the structure of the demand modelling. 
Both the underlying development drivers and the electricity intensity assumptions for the 
demand modelling are presented in Section 5.3. The inputs for electricity supply modelling are 
presented in Section 5.4, after which Section 5.5 outlines the assumptions on transmission 
and trading. Section 5.6 then covers the model calibration, where the base year modelling 
results are compared to actual reported electricity demand and available capacity. The results 
for both demand and supply modelling, including costs and environmental impacts, are 
presented in Section 5.7, followed by discussion and conclusions in 5.8. 
Figure 54. Role of Chapter 5 in the overall methodology 
 
 
5.1 Scope of electricity modelling  
As with the water modelling, the base year for the electricity modelling is 2010, with the first 
simulation year being 2011, which was the most recent year with reasonable complete 
                                               






















datasets for all of the countries included. The study period of 2010–2070 is considerably longer 
than that for other studies on the SADC (or even national) energy demand and supply 
(Merven, Davis, and Hughes 2010; SAPP 2014; DoE 2013; Economic Consulting Associates 
2009). The system boundary for costs is electricity generation only (i.e. not demand-side costs 
and not transmission and distribution costs)37, and all costs are reported in 2010 US dollars. 
The system boundary for electricity modelling, however, includes demand projections.  
The electricity model covers the 12 continental SADC countries: Angola, Botswana, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Even though Angola, Malawi and Tanzania are 
not currently connected to the SAPP regional grid, there are inter-connector projects currently 
underway. In terms of the LEAP dataset, all 12 of the countries are considered “regions” and 
inherit key equations and parameters from a generic country template. 
The SADC dataset developed for this research covers only the electricity sector (supply and 
demand) and the fuel inputs for power generation. It does not address primary energy sources 
used for non-electric end uses (e.g. biomass) or the use of other fuels directly in electricity 
consuming sectors (e.g. fuel use in boilers). Power plants are grouped into existing plants, 
specific plants (i.e. new planned projects where the project site is specified), and generic 
plants (i.e. ones that could be built anywhere in the country). 
5.2 Sectoral demand structure  
The starting point for disaggregating sectoral demand is the primary economic sectors used 
in the World Development Indicators database (agriculture, manufacturing, other industry, and 
services),38 plus the residential sector. This also matches the main International Energy 
Agency (IEA) categories (IEA 2014c), as shown in Table 35. 
                                               
37  Because transmission and distribution costs are not expected to vary significantly across the scenarios, this exclusion does 
not materially affect the results of the analysis. 
38  The WDI reports “industry” as a percentage of GDP, and “manufacturing” as a sub-set of industry. The difference between 
total industry, and manufacturing, which is “other manufacturing”, is what is called “extractive” in this study because it includes 
mining, quarrying and oil extraction. 
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Table 35. Demand sector definitions  
Sector name in 
 this study 
World Development 
Indicators  
International Energy Agency 
Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture/ forestry, fishing 
Manufacturing Manufacturing All of industry except mining and quarrying 
Extractive Industry – manufacturing Mining and quarrying 
Services Services Commerce and public services 
Residential N/A Residential 
 
Because transportation sector consumption of electricity is almost non-existent in most SAPP 
countries, this was not included in the modelling. The exception is South Africa, where electric 
rail for passengers and freight is included because electricity consumption from rail could 
become increasingly important in the future. Residential demand was further disaggregated 
into urban and rural households, as shown in Table 36.  
Table 36. Residential demand structure for all countries except South Africa 
Sector Sub-sector Additional level 
Residential Urban Electrified   
Unelectrified  
Rural Electrified   
Unelectrified 
Source: Adapted from ERC (2013) 
For South Africa, more detailed data is available on sub-sector energy demand and demand 
drivers, created for this study but based on previous research by the Energy Research Centre 
(ERC 2013), so this country has more detailed demand structure in the modelling, as shown 
in Table 37. 
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Table 37: Demand structure for South Africa 
Sector Sub-sector Additional level 
Residential  Urban Low income electrified  
 Middle income electrified  
 High income electrified  
 Low income non-electrified 
  Middle income non-electrified 
 Rural Low income electrified 
  Middle income electrified 
  High income electrified 
  Low income non-electrified 
  Middle income non-electrified 
Agriculture None End uses 
Manufacturing Iron and steel End uses 
Chemicals 
Precious and non-ferrous metals 
Food beverages tobaccos 
Non-metallic metals 
Pulp and paper 
Other industry 
Extractive Mining End uses 
Services None End uses 
Transport Passenger Road   
Rail  
Freight Road   
Rail 
Source: Adapted from ERC (2013) 
5.3 Demand modelling 
The future demand projections used in this modelling analysis are entirely “bottom-up”, 
meaning that they are based on an understanding of the fundamental drivers of demand and 
how these may evolve over time. This bottom-up approach is one of the most important value-
added components of this research versus other regional energy and electricity analysis, 
which typically use aggregated, “top-down” assumptions for electricity demand growth. The 
detailed logic and assumptions behind the development scenarios are presented in Chapter 
3, including the inputs for population and economic development that are used in the electricity 
demand model. The sections below first present the additional inputs on drivers of demand 
beyond what is included in Chapter 3, and then (from Section 5.3.3 onward) outline the 
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assumptions used to link the development drivers to electricity final demand (i.e. the electricity 
intensity of different activities). Importantly, the bottom-up approach means that it is possible 
to disaggregate the effects of changing activity levels (e.g. GDP), changing structure of 
demand (e.g. electricity access, share of GDP) and energy intensity (e.g. consumption per 
household or per dollar of GDP).  
 Access to electricity 
The current access to electricity for each country is shown in Table 38. The Grand Deal 
scenario assumes that all countries reach 100% access in rural and urban areas by 2040. For 
the other two scenarios, the access levels in 2070 are shown in Table 39. For those countries 
that reach 100% in the latter two scenarios, Table 40 shows the year when that is reached. 
Table 38. Share of population with access to grid electricity, 2010 (%) 
Country Total Urban Rural 
Angola 40 63 8 
Botswana 45 68 10 
DRC 15 37 4 
Lesotho 17 43 7 
Malawi 9 37 2 
Mozambique 15 36 2 
Namibia 44 78 23 
South Africa 76 88 76 
Swaziland 30 65 20 
Tanzania 15 46 4 
Zambia 19 48 2 
Zimbabwea 37 79 11 
Sub-Saharan Africa 29 58 12 
Latin America 93 99 70 
China & East Asia 90 96 86 
North Africa 99 100 98 
ASEAN 72 91 55 
Note: a=ZESA reports that current Zimbabwe rural access is 18%. 
Source: IEA (2012), Legros et al. (2009), StatsSA (2013) 
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Table 39. Rural and urban electricity access projections by 2070 in BAU and SADC 
Integration scenarios 
 
BAU SADC Int 
Country Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Angola 80 40 90 50 
Botswana 100 100 100 100 
DRC 70 30 80 40 
Lesotho 70 30 80 40 
Malawi 70 30 80 40 
Mozambique 70 30 80 40 
Namibia 80 40 90 50 
South Africa 100 100 100 100 
Swaziland 80 40 90 50 
Tanzania 70 30 80 40 
Zambia 70 30 80 40 
Zimbabwe 80 30 90 40 
Source: author’s own assumptions based on discussions with regional experts. 
Table 40. Forecast year in which 100% electricity access is achieved (only for countries 
achieving 100% access) 
 BAU SADC Int 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Botswana 2050 2050 2070 2070 
South Africa 2050 2050 2070 2070 
Note: other countries do not reach 100% access in the study period. 
 Transportation drivers 
The assumptions and detailed analysis of transportation energy use are taken directly from 
an earlier Energy Research Centre analysis of the South African transport sector (Merven et 
al. 2012). 
 Residential electricity intensity 
For residential demand, the electricity intensity parameter is the average electricity 
consumption per household with access to electricity. This will, of course, be much higher than 
average consumption across all households, because of the low levels of access in most 
countries. For six countries, consumption per household can be calculated directly from 
residential demand reported by utilities and the estimated number of households with 
electricity access in those countries. This data was available for Botswana, Lesotho, 
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Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia. This also means that, for these six 
countries, modelling residential electricity demand in 2010 is exactly the same as reported 
data. For DRC, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, the average consumption was estimated to be the 
same as Mozambique (based on similar socio-economic characteristics), while Malawi was 
set at the same level as Lesotho. For Angola and Tanzania, the Mozambique consumption 
levels had to be adjusted downward so that modelled national electricity demand (i.e. across 
all sectors) would match reported demand. These lower consumption levels may reflect 
different patterns of electricity usage, or they may point to other uncertainties in the data on 
number of households with access (i.e. there may be fewer households that have access than 
the data used to estimate access levels in this study). 
Urban households with access to electricity typically consume more than rural households, in 
large part due to income differences. A detailed bottom-up analysis of electricity use in urban 
and rural households from South Africa shows that urban households consume 1.9 times the 
amount of electricity that rural households do. This ratio was used, along with the number of 
urban and rural electrified households, to estimate per household consumption in urban and 
rural areas in each country (Table 41).  
Table 41. Estimated annual electricity consumption per household with access to electricity, 
2010 (kWh) 
Country National Urban Rural 
Angola 900 943 505 
Botswana 3,641 3,770 2,019 
DRC 1,017 1,097 587 
Lesotho 2,146 2,517 1,348 
Malawi 1,976 2,149 1,151 
Mozambique 1,093 1,130 605 
Namibia 3,364 3,828 2,050 
South Africa 3,803 4,411 2,363 
Swaziland 3,479 4,303 2,305 
Tanzania 900 968 519 
Zambia 5,809 6,015 3,221 
Zimbabwe 1,093 1,193 639 
Source: Based on residential sectoral demand (IEA 2015b, 2015a; BPC 2010; LEC 2011; Banda 2015; EdM 2011; Hatch 2012; Simelane 
2015; CSO 2013) and population, access and urbanisation assumptions presented earlier. Rural versus urban consumption 
derived from ERC SATIM analysis (ERC 2013, 2014). 
To estimate future consumption per household, the relationship between per capita income 
and household consumption was investigated, using data from six different household types 
in South Africa (ERC 2014, 2013). The regression analysis showed that, for each increase of 
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$1 of annual income per capita, annual consumption increases by 0.14 kWh. Assuming a 
constant ratio of GDP to household income of 1.71, based on South African data, this means 
that an increase in $1 of GDP per capita leads to an increase in household consumption of 
0.0826 kWh (Figure 55).39 
Figure 55. Relationship between income and electricity consumption, South Africa 
 
Source: ERC (2013, 2014) 
For the South African demand analysis, electricity consumption is further disaggregated into 
end-uses, as shown in Table 42. 
                                               
39 While other factors outside of income could also affect consumption, and the relationship between income and consumption 
may not be precisely linear, there is insufficient data available to reliably describe a more complex relationship.  Given the 
very small impact of household consumption on overall flows in the Zambezi, this assumption would not affect the results of 
the analysis. 





















Income per capita ($2011 PPP)
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Table 42: Electricity consumption per household by consumer type and end use, South 
Africa (electrified households only) 





Urban Low income  248 876 1,314 290 365 
Middle income 117 370 767 456 913 
High income 218 1,004 2,190 1,102 1 323 
Rural Low income  61 730 657 286 730 
Middle income 117 730 1,314 602 730 
High income 255 443 1,095 1,013 1,323 
Source: Based on household data from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA 2013) and electricity consumption from Eskom’s annual 
report (Eskom 2014). 
 Other sectoral final energy intensity and elasticity of demand 
For the other major sectors, in eight countries sectoral electricity intensity can be calculated 
from current aggregate sectoral electricity consumption and current sectoral GDP: Botswana, 
DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia (Table 43). For the 
other four countries, the starting point was to use a country with similar income levels, but 
adjusted to match modelled national demand with reported national consumption from SAPP 
and the IEA (see Section 10.1). These assumptions are used in the model to calculate sectoral 
demand each year using total GDP, sectoral share of GDP and electricity intensity in that year. 
Table 43. Final electricity intensity by sector (kWh/$2011 PPP GDP) 
Country Agriculture Manufacturing Extractive Service 
Angola 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.008 
Botswana 0.106 0.126 0.126 0.055 
DRC 0.005 0.634 0.311 0.019 
Lesotho 0.002 0.300 0.148 0.009 
Malawi 0.004 0.467 0.229 0.014 
Mozambique 0.000 3.135 0.255 0.067 
Namibia 0.090 0.306 0.451 0.037 
South Africa 0.393 0.988 0.611 0.074 
Swaziland 0.002 0.234 0.115 0.007 
Tanzania 0.002 0.234 0.115 0.007 
Zambia 0.026 0.202 1.384 0.031 
Zimbabwe 0.008 1.085 0.533 0.032 
Note: Extractive is the difference between the World Bank/IMF categories “industry” and “manufacturing” (World Bank 2014), and 
is essentially mining and quarrying (including oil production but not processing). 
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Source: Based on sectoral demand sources (IEA 2015b, 2015a; BPC 2010; LEC 2011; Banda 2015; EdM 2011; Hatch 2012; Simelane 
2015; CSO 2013) and GDP data presented in Chapter 3. 
For future electricity intensity, the IEA (2008) reports that, between 1990 and 2005, the energy 
intensity of IEA member countries declined by an average of –0.9% per year (p.26), while 
industrial energy intensity declined by an average of –1.4% per year (p.29). For the service 
sector, the same report showed that energy intensity declined in Canada and Japan but 
increased in the USA (p.55). While energy intensity levels in developing countries are 
generally higher than industrialised countries when GDP is reported at market exchange rates, 
this is not the case when GDP is reported in purchasing power parity (PPP) (p.21). Based on 
these trends, sectoral energy intensity growth rates for the different development scenarios 
are included as shown in Table 44. 
Table 44. Change in final energy intensity (2010-2070) (% per year) 
Country Manufacturing and extractive Service Agriculture 
 BAU SADC Int Grand Deal All All 
All 
countries 
0.0 -0.7 -1.4 0.0 0.0 
Source: Based on IEA (2008) 
The more detailed demand analysis for South Africa is based on useful energy analysis (i.e. 
the energy services required by various end-uses). Useful energy is the product of final energy 
demand and the efficiency of a process of technology. The useful energy demand for industrial 
end-uses in shown in Table 45. 
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Electric heating 0.473 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.066 0.009 0.029 
Compressed air 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.002 
Lighting 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.007 
Cooling 0.024 0.042 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.031 
HVAC 0.021 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.016 0.023 
Pumping 0.024 0.119 0.000 0.040 0.019 0.124 0.031 
Fans 0.043 0.027 0.000 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.013 
Other motive 0.392 0.068 0.050 0.030 0.090 0.050 0.088 
Electrochemical 0.000 0.026 0.607 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Boiler process 
heating 
1.169 0.386 0.006 0.330 0.502 0.823 1.301 
Average intensity 2.16 0.69 0.68 0.51 0.71 1.04 1.53 
Source: Based on SATIM modelling (ERC 2013, 2014) 
Technological improvements in efficiency usually happen as a result of fuel-switching or 
retrofitting of more efficient appliances using the same fuel. The analysis assumes that there 
is limited fuel-switching (e.g. from electricity to other fuels and vice versa). There is a possibility 
of switching from coal to natural gas in boilers to reduce GHG emissions, but this is not 
included in the analysis because the focus of this study is power generation rather than other 
industrial fuel applications.  
In terms of energy efficiency improvements at the end-use level, electrical appliances in South 
Africa are assumed to increase their efficiency by 5%, 10% and 30% by 2030, 2050 and 2070 
respectively, across all sectors. 
 System peak-load shape 
Electrical load forecasts form the basis of power system planning and an integral part of 
electricity sector modelling, as this forecast provides information on expected consumption 
increases (Malik and Kuba 2013). To represent the variation in loads over time, a load curve 
is often used. While this curve often shows the percentage of the annual peak-load in each 
time period, the LEAP optimisation algorithm requires a load curve that provides the share of 
total annual consumption in each time slice (i.e. share of GWh, not percentage of maximum 
demand). The definition of time slices should balance accuracy (i.e. representing the variation 
in demand) with computational requirements (i.e. too many time slices makes the optimisation 
unsolvable with the linear programme tool in a reasonable amount of time). Based on previous 
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experience modelling the South African power system, this study uses eight time slices, as 
shown in Table 46. A further advantage of seasonal (rather than time-of-day) time slices, is 
that the water model that will be used to project hydropower availability operates on monthly 
time slices. 
Table 46. Definition of time slices for electricity modelling 
Name Start End Days Hours 
Summer weekday 1-Dec 28-Feb 64 1,536 
Summer weekend 1-Dec 28-Feb 26 624 
Autumn weekday 1-Mar 31-May 66 1584 
Autumn weekend 1-Mar 31-May 26 624 
Winter weekday 1-Jun 31-Aug 66 1,584 
Winter weekend 1-Jun 31-Aug 26 624 
Spring weekday 1-Sep 30-Nov 65 1,560 
Spring weekend 1-Sep 30-Nov 26 624 
 
Hourly load data was available for South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia, so for 
these countries this data was aggregated into the time slices presented above. The other 
countries were assigned the South Africa yearly load shape as a proxy. The shares of energy 
use in each time slice for the four countries are shown in Figure 56. 
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5.4 Electricity generation modelling 
To complement the analysis of electricity demand, this section elaborates on the assumptions 
uses for project electricity supply, and includes the options available to each country. The 
analysis includes all of the major existing power plants in the SAPP region, as well as on future 
generation options. For future plants, these are separated into “specific plants” (i.e. where 
there is a site specified as well as some technical and financial data) and “generic plants” (i.e. 
plants that could be located anywhere within a country and in any country). The sections below 
summarise this generation capacity, while the detailed assumptions are presented in Annex 
E, Annex F, and Annex G. 
 Existing plants in SAPP countries 
The capacity of existing power plants by type in each country is shown in Table 47. More than 
78% of the existing capacity is in South Africa, and 75% of the region’s existing capacity is 
thermal (of which almost 90% is coal-fired). In contrast to South Africa and Botswana, most of 
the other countries in the region rely primarily on renewable power, all of which is hydropower 
outside of South Africa (Figure 57). The technical and financial characteristics of these plants 
are shown in Annex E.  
Table 47. Existing capacity by type and country, 2014 (MW) 
Country Renewable Thermal Nuclear Storage Total 
Angola 776 1,075 0 0 1,851 
Botswana 0 450 0 0 450 
DRC 1,689 0 0 0 1,689 
Lesotho 74 0 0 0 74 
Malawi 334 46 0 0 380 
Mozambique 2,175 399 0 0 2,574 
Namibia 347 125 0 0 472 
South Africa 1,640 44,582 1,860 1,580 49,662 
Swaziland 171 0 0 0 171 
Tanzania 562 684 0 0 1,246 
Zambia 2,077 0 0 0 2,077 
Zimbabwe 750 394 0 0 1,144 
Total 10,595 47,755 1,860 1,580 61,789 
Note: Storage = pumped storage plants; for detail of plants and sources, see Annex E. 
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Figure 57: Share of existing capacity by type, 2014 
 
The pumped storage facilities in South Africa are a special case because, although they are 
hydropower generators, the water is pumped into the storage reservoir at night using 
predominantly coal-fired power from the South African grid. These plants are therefore 
designated as coal-fired in the LEAP model, and their efficiency is the efficiency of large coal 
plants multiplied by the efficiency of the pumped storage unit (i.e. 0.38 for coal x 0.75 for 
storage) (Yang and Jackson 2011). 
 Specific planned plants  
This section covers planned future plants where there is a specific site identified and some 
technical and/or economic data available, as opposed to the generic options discussed in the 
next section. The total capacity of specific future plants considered in the modelling is shown 
in Table 48 by country and type. Note that the South Africa Integrated Resource Plan calls for 
more than 36,000 MW of new coal by 2030, but not all of this is a “specific” plant (DoE 2013). 
In this research, part of this growth will be captured in the generic plant options.  
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Table 48: Total capacity of specific proposed plants by type and country (MW) 
Country Renewable Thermal Nuclear Storage Total 
Angola 5,165 500 0 0 5,665 
Botswana 0 600 0 0 600 
DRC 45,821 0 0 0 45,821 
Lesotho 205 0 0 1,200 1,405 
Malawi 845 100 0 0 945 
Mozambique 6,545 2,225 0 0 8,770 
Namibia 300 774 0 0 1,074 
South Africa 10,663 9,656 0 1,332 21,651 
Swaziland 137 300 0 0 437 
Tanzania 2,262 2,340 0 0 4,602 
Zambia 4,108 600 0 0 4,708 
Zimbabwe 2,593 3,350 0 0 5,943 
Total 78,644 20,445 0 2,532 101,621 
Note: For detail of plants and sources, see Annex F. 
 
The largest individual specific project is the Grand Inga hydropower cascade in the DRC, with 
an estimated total potential of more than 42 GW (Taliotis et al. 2014). Because this area must 
be developed in stages, in each scenario Grand Inga is commissioned in 3,000–7,000 MW 
sections each five years, the difference being the starting date and total capacity. For the 
Grand Deal and SADC Integration scenarios, the full capacity is eventually realised, with the 
first phase in 2025 and 2030, respectively. As with existing plants, the detailed technical and 
financial characteristics of all of these plants are presented in Annex F.  
 Generic future options 
This section considers generic power generation options that are available to the SAPP 
countries, beyond the list of specific planned plants presented in the previous section. The 
wide range of generic future options for generation included in the modelling is shown in Table 
49. The detailed technical and financial characteristics of these plants are presented in Annex 
G. Note all plants types are available in each country (e.g. South Africa does not have large 
hydropower), so these limitations are also shown in Annex G.  
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Table 49. Generic power generation technologies used in the modelling 
Fuel Technologies 
Biomass Pulverised bed, fluidised bed, combined 
cycle 
Municipal waste Combined heat of power, landfill gas open 
cycle combustion 
Diesel Utility scale open cycle 
Geothermal Direct 
Hydro Large and small scale 
Natural gas Open cycle, combined cycle 
Coal Fluidised bed, supercritical (with and without 
CCS), integrated gasification combined 
cycle 
Nuclear Pressurised water reactor 
Heavy fuel oil Open cycle  
Solar PV Utility scale 
Solar thermal Parabolic trough with and without storage  
Wind 20% and 30% load factors 
Source: Adapted from Miketa and Merven (2013) 
A key feature of new emerging technologies is the potential for significant cost reductions over 
time from global experience (IEA 2014b; IEA and OECD 2000). For the Grand Deal scenario, 
the most optimistic cost reductions from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 
study are used for the technologies shown in Table 50.  
Table 50.Technology learning: annual reduction in capital costs for Grand Deal scenario (%) 
Technology 2010–2015 2015–2020 2020–2030 2030-2050 
Bagasse 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
Biomass BFB 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
Biomass CC 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
Geothermal 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
Hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Small hydro 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Solar PV utility fixed  4.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 
Solar parabolic trough 0 storage 3.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 
Solar parabolic trough 03 hrs 
storage 
3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 
Wind (20% CF) 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.5 
Wind (30% CF) 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.5 
Source: Optimistic scenario in IRENA SAPP study (Miketa and Merven 2013) 
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The BAU scenario uses the “pessimistic” scenario (i.e. no reductions), while the SADC 
Integration scenario (Table 51) uses the “reference case” assumptions. No cost reductions 
were included for nuclear or fossil fuel technologies. 
Table 51.Technology learning: annual reduction in capital costs for SADC Integration 
scenario (%) 
Technology 2010–2015 2015–2020 2020–2030 2030–2050 
Bagasse 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 
Biomass BFB 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 
Biomass CC 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 
Geothermal 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 
Hydro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Small hydro 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Solar PV utility fixed  2.0 1.0 0.8 0.5 
Solar parabolic trough 0 storage 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 
Solar parabolic trough 03 hrs storage 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.8 
Wind (20% CF) 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3 
Wind (30% CF) 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3 
Source: Reference scenario in IRENA SAPP study (Miketa and Merven 2013) 
 Fuel characteristics and costs 
The technical characteristics of the fuels used in the generation modelling are shown in Table 
52. “Other coal” refers to the “other bituminous” coal most common in Southern Africa. Coal 
is based on the assumptions in the South Africa TIMES model (ERC 2013),40 while the other 
fuels are from IEA data (IEA 2014c). GHG emission factors for fossil fuels are shown in Table 
53. 
                                               
40  TIMES is an acronym for “The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System”. 
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Table 52. Technical characteristics of fuels used in the modelling 




Natural gas 34.2 MJ/m3 0.90 0.000712 
Residual fuel oil (HFO) 40.2 GJ/t 0.95 0.95 
Diesel 43.3 GJ/t 0.95 0.87 
Other coal 21.0 GJ/t 0.95 1.33 
Bagasse 8.2 GJ/t 0.90 0.60 
Biomass (solid) 15.5 GJ/t 0.90 0.71 
Industrial waste 14.0 GJ/t 0.90 0.30 
Municipal waste 14.0 GJ/t 0.90 0.30 
Source: DoE (2013); IEA (2014c) 
Table 53. Fuel emission factors (tonnes CO2 per TJ) 
Fuel Emission factor 
Diesel 74.1 
Residual fuel oil 77.4 
Other coal (sub- bituminous)  94.6 
Natural gas 56.1 
Source: IPCC (2006) 
This research uses the same fossil fuel costs as the IRENA SAPP study (Miketa and Merven 
2013). Fuel prices increase over time in real terms during the study period, as shown in Table 
54. 
Table 54. Fuel price assumptions, current and future 
Fuel 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Oil price ($/bbl) 100.0 120.0 135.0 135.0 135.0 
All other costs in ($/GJ) 
    
HFO coastal 12.9 15.5 17.4 17.4 17.4 
HFO inland 16.3 19.6 22.0 22.0 22.0 
Diesel coastal 21.9 26.3 29.6 29.6 29.6 
Diesel inland 25.2 30.2 34.0 34.0 34.0 
Gas domestic 8.5 9.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Gas imported 11.0 12.3 14.2 14.2 14.2 
Coal domestic 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Coal imported 3.0 4.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Source: IRENA SAPP Study (Miketa and Merven 2013) 
The change in oil and oil product prices is close to that values in the IEA’s Energy Technology 
Perspectives (ETP) forecasts (IEA 2014b) (i.e. 0.75% in this study vs –0.4% to +1.1% in ETP). 
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The coal price increases are higher, at 1.75% per year average between 2012 and 2050, but 
this reflects the very low absolute prices of coal in southern Africa (i.e. almost half of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development import price)41 and the move 
towards greater uniformity of prices over the coming decades. For the natural gas prices, this 
study includes a steeper increase than the ones forecast for North American and Japan.  
Biomass prices depend on the specific fuel type. In the countries with the largest sugar 
industries (i.e. Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia), the fuel is essentially free, 
but it is not available in the other countries.  
 Planning reserve margin  
According to the SAPP Coordination Centre, the short-term goal for reserve margin is 10.2%, 
rising to 15% in 2020 (Maviya 2014). This is used for all countries to derive the capacity 
requirements to meet peak demand after 2015. Up to 2015, the actual regional reserve margin, 
as reported by SAPP, is used (Maviya 2014; SAPP 2012b).  
5.5 Transmission, distribution and trade  
 Losses and own use 
Technical losses occur during local distribution, intra-national transmission, and international 
transmission. The combined transmission and distribution losses for each country are shown 
in Table 55. Own use by power plants is also shown for each country in the same table. Both 
losses and own use are held constant throughout the study period. 
                                               
41  Data from the EIA also shows South African coal prices being only a fraction of those in North America and Europe 
(http://www.eia.gov/countries/prices/coalprice_elecgen.cfm).  
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Table 55. Transmission and distribution losses and own use by country, 2010 
Country % losses % own 
use 
Angola 11.8 2.5 
Botswana 10.6 1.9 
DRC 18.1 1.8 
Lesotho 9.0 1.0 
Malawi 24.0 1.0 
Mozambique 24.0 1.0 
Namibia 10.4 1.0 
South Africa 10.0 1.8 
Swaziland 24.0 1.0 
Tanzania 20.0 2.4 
Zambia 15.0 2.4 
Zimbabwe 9.8 3.0 
Source: Losses: IEA (2014a), National utilities and regulators (LEC 2015; NERSA 2006; ZESCO 2013b, 2013a; EdM 2010) with 
additional historical IEA energy balances; Malawi and Swaziland estimated from Mozambique. Own use: IEA (2014a), National 
utilities and regulators (LEC 2015; NERSA 2006; ZESCO 2013b, 2013a; EdM 2010); Malawi and Swaziland estimated from 
Mozambique. 
 Existing electricity trade flows 
Trade flows are specified exogenously in LEAP, because the least-cost optimisation 
calculation for future capacity expansion and operation does not consider trade as a resource 
in a multi-region model. The starting point for trade-flow projections is the current imports and 
exports, as reported by SAPP member utilities in the SAPP annual reports, as well as in IEA 
statistics (SAPP 2014, 2010, 2013, IEA 2014a, 2011). The SAPP data are reported per utility, 
however, and not per country, which requires adjustments for Mozambique and South Africa. 
For Mozambique, national exports are the net quantity of electricity sent to South Africa – 
which is the exports from Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa to South Africa less the re-import of 
this electricity via Motraco for the Mozal aluminium smelter (Mahumane and Mulder 2015a, 
2015b). This is why Mozambique exports in the last column of Table 57 are 3,609 GWh and 
not 12,712 GWh as cited by the IEA (note that the SAPP data refer only Electricidade de 
Moçambique imports and exports). Similarly, South Africa imports and exports are also net of 
the wheeling of 8,466 GWh from northern Mozambique to Mozal in southern Mozambique 
through South Africa. The reason for this accounting practice is that, over the study period, 
the high capacity transmission line from northern to southern Mozambique will be complete 
so it will not be necessary to use the South African grid to wheel electricity to the Mozal or 
other industrial developments in southern Mozambique. In addition, LEAP treats each country 
as an integrated grid, rather than multiple sub-grids. 
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LEAP uses four parameters to simulate trade flows. First, “in-area import fraction” is the share 
of imports for each country that come from within the area covered by the model (i.e. the SAPP 
region in this case). Because there are negligible imports from outside the SAPP region, this 
value is set to 100% of electricity for all countries. Secondly, the “in-area export fraction” is the 
share of total exports within the region originating from a given country. For example, Table 
57 shows that for 2010 approximately 44% of the exports in the region originated in South 
Africa. The third parameter is an import target (in GWh) for each country, which is part of the 
specifications of the transformation module in LEAP, and is shown in the second to last column 
of Table 57. Because LEAP does not allow exports and imports in the same country (i.e. a 
country must either be an importer or an exporter), the actual LEAP inputs are “net imports” 
(i.e. imports less exports). 
Table 56. Trade flow assumptions for 2010 (GWh) 
 
Imports Exports LEAP Inputs  









2010 2010 2010 
Angola 27 27 0 0 0 0 27 0 
Botswana 2,945 2,945 2,985 0 0 0 2,945 0 
DRC 38 38 161 871 871 916 161 871 
Lesotho 49 49 201 7 7 6 49 7 
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 21 
Mozambique* 2,326 2,326 7,928 309 309 12,712 67 3,609 
Namibia 2,462 2,462 2,462 294 294 207 2,462 294 
South Africa 10,047 10,047 18,851 13,754 13,754 13,899 1,581 5,288 
Swaziland 909 909 909 0 0 0 909 0 
Tanzania 2192 52 52 5 0 0 2,192 0 
Zambia 0 0 13 942 942 578 0 942 
Zimbabwe 1,531 710 5,338 1,025 0 56 1,531 1,025 
Total 20,334 19,565 38,900 16,331 15,301 28,394 11,924 12,057 
Notes: Mozambique imports and exports in SAPP column are EDM only. LEAP inputs for Mozambique are net national trade 
(i.e. Cahora Bassa export to South Africa less re-imports for Mozal via Motraco). South Africa imports and exports under SAPP 
are for Eskom, while LEAP inputs for South Africa does not include import and re-export of Cahora Bassa power for Mozal. 
Zambia exports in SAPP column are from ZESCO statistics Tanzania imports in SAPP column are for 2011/2012 (and are also 
reported at this level for 2012/13). 
Source: IEA (2011), Mahumane and Mulder (2015a, 2015b), National and regional utilities (ZESCO 2013b, 2013a, SAPP 2011, 2012a)  
 Future electricity trade flows 
Because transmission infrastructure is one of the main constraints on trade, the scenarios with 
the highest foreign and regional investment rates would have the most trade. For the most 
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aggressive growth scenario – Grand Deal – trade at the end of the study is based on the most 
optimistic forecast in the IRENA study (i.e. the "renewables promotion" scenario in Miketa and 
Merven 2013), as shown in the last two columns of Table 58. The SADC Integration Scenario 
is set to 60% of this trade, while BAU is 20% (which is still almost three times current trade 
flows). The exception to using the IRENA study inputs is the case of Angola and Lesotho, 
which both have large investments in capacity within “specific plants” that are being 
constructed for exports. Generation from this capacity (i.e. Kobong Pumped Storage Scheme 
for Lesotho and Kuanza Basin developments in Angola) has been used as the proxy for 
exports from these countries after their construction, and so does not vary across scenarios. 
Table 57. Trade flow assumptions by scenario (net imports, GWh) 
 BAU SADC Int Grand Deal 
Country 2030 2070 2030 2070 2030 2070 
Angola –7,000 –10,500 –7,000 –10,500 –7,000 –10,500 
Botswana –2,144 –1,461 –4,288 –2,921 –6,497 –4,426 
DRC –11,424 –20,648 –22,848 –41,295 –34,618 –62,569 
Lesotho –2,630 –2,630 –2,630 –2,630 –2,630 –2,630 
Malawi –82 386 –163 772 –247 1,169 
Mozambique –9,537 –3,657 –19,074 –7,315 –28,900 –11,083 
Namibia –1,835 –623 –3,670 –1,246 –5,561 –1,888 
South Africa 20,554 12,580 41,109 25,160 62,286 38,122 
Swaziland –1,338 –1,259 –2,677 –2,519 –4,056 –3,816 
Tanzania 11 2 23 4 35 6 
Zambia 2,396 7,988 4,791 15,976 7,260 24,206 
Zimbabwe –988 –1,843 –1,977 –3,687 –2,995 –5,586 
Source: Based on IRENA SAPP study (Miketa and Merven 2013) 
5.6 Model calibration 
Calibration with current data is important to validate the potential of any model to create 
accurate scenarios for the future. The SAPP LEAP model was calibrated to actual demand 
and supply data for 2010, the base year for the analysis. For future projections, uncertainties 
depend on both the drivers of demand but also whether these relationships could change as 
the power sector evolves. This section presents the calibration results for the base year. 
 Demand calibration 
Modelled national electricity demand was compared with reported consumption from SAPP 
annual reports and/or other utility and official sources, as shown in Table 59. The modelled 
results are within less than 1% in all cases. 
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Table 58. Modelled versus reported national electricity demand, 2010 (GWh)  
Country Modelled Reported Source for actual 
% difference 
Angola 3,499 3,498 SAPP 0 
Botswana 2,933 2,936 SAPP 0 
DRC 6,262 6,263 IEA 0 
Lesotho 615 615 LEC 0 
Malawi 1,420 1,419 SAPP 0 
Mozambique 10,920 10,920a EDM, HCB 0 
Namibia 3,332 3,376 IEA -1 
South Africa 225,164 225,813a Eskom, NERSA 0 
Swaziland 1,019 1,019 SAPP 0 
Tanzania 4,160 4,176 MEM 0 
Zambia 9,107 9,107 CSO 0 
Zimbabwe 7,352 7,367 SAPP 0 
Total 275,755 276,509   
Note: a. Mozambique national demand includes Mozal, although this power is provided contractually by Eskom. The Mozal 
demand has been removed from South African demand (see Mahumane and Mulder (2015a)).  
Source: Actual demand for 2010 taken from SAPP (SAPP 2011), IEA (IEA 2011), Eskom (Eskom 2010); Zambia CSO (CSO 
2013); EDM (EdM 2011); MEM (MEM 2013); LEC (LEC 2011); National Energy Regulator for South Africa; and HCB (HCB 
2011) 
 Supply calibration 
For the supply calibration, modelled capacity was compared with reported available capacity. 
LEAP does not directly distinguish between installed and available capacity, except through 
the “maximum availability” parameter,42 so the model should match the available power and 
not include installed plants that are not operational (these can be added back in future years). 
The installed and available capacity reported by SAPP is generally only the power plants 
owned by the SAPP utilities. For this reason, the national utilities were asked to update 
national capacity, taking into consideration IPPs and municipal generation, as well as any units 
that were out of service in 2010. Table 60 shows that the modelled capacity is very close to 
this updated utility capacity in all cases. For DRC, where updated capacity was not available, 
the modelled capacity is between the reported installed and available capacities. The ongoing 
renovation of Inga 2 and Inga 3 during this period meant that different units were not available 
in different years. Given these uncertainties, therefore, the calibration results are positive.  
                                               
42  For example, if a power plant with six units had two units out of service for the full year, the maximum availability for the entire 
plant could be 60% (or less, considering other planned and unplanned outages on the available units). 
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Table 59. Modelled versus reported generation capacity, 2010 (MW) 





Angola 1,090 1,399 1,142 N/A 
Botswana 120 132 120 120 
DRC. 1,647 2,442 1,200 N/A 
Lesotho 74 72 70 74 
Malawi 316 287 267 316 
Mozambique 2,175 2,308 2,249 2175 
Namibia 365 393 360 365 
South Africa 42,114 44,175 40,870 42,117a 
Swaziland 172 71 70 171b 
Tanzania 1,246 1,008 780 1,246 
Zambia 1,657 1,812 1,215 1,657c 
Zimbabwe 1,144 1,962 1,240 1,145d 
Total 52,120 56,061 49,583  
Notes: N/A = not available from utility; a = includes sugar plant cogeneration, Sasol generation, Steenbras pumped storage 
(owned by City of Cape Town), non-Eskom small hydro, and gas combined heat and power plants; b = included sugar plant 
cogeneration; c = includes IPPs and only 750 MW for Kafue Gorge Upper; d = includes municipal-owned coal plants 
Source: actual capacity taken from SAPP reports (SAPP 2011, 2012b) and personal communications with members of the SAPP 
Planning Sub-Committee. 
5.7 Electricity modelling results 
The electricity modelling results are presented in the following sections, starting with national 
and sectoral demand trends in Section 5.7.1. This is followed by the results for difference 
types of electricity supply in Section 5.7.2 – existing plants, specific new plants and generic 
plants that are added to optimise future supply to meet demand.  
 Demand 
Depending on the scenario, total electricity demand for the SAPP region increases by 8–14 
times over the period from 2010 to 2070 (Table 61). In fact, by 2070, the rapidly growing 
countries of DRC, Mozambique, and Zambia reach demand levels higher than current South 
African demand under most scenarios. High growth rates in Tanzania put this country at a 
level higher than current South African demand in one scenario as well, while Malawi has 
rapid growth but it still relatively small as a demand centre. 
Although total demand for the region increases across the three scenarios (e.g. BAU as 
lowest, then SADC Integration, then Grand Deal), this is not necessarily true for each country. 
This is because the scenarios are not meant to be “low”, “middle” and “high”, but are, instead, 
independent storylines and approaches to envisioning the future (see Chapter 5.3 above) and 
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do not simply change proportionally across each scenario. This is why Zambia, for example, 
has higher total demand in the SADC Integration scenario than under the Grand Deal 
scenario. 
Table 60. Total electricity final demand by scenario, all sectors, 2010 and 2070  
(000 GWh) 
  2070 
Country  2010 BAU SADC Int Grand Deal 
Angola 3.5 15.1 69.6 33.2 
Botswana 2.9 8.8 14.3 12.3 
DRC 6.3 425.3 276.8 876.2 
Lesotho 0.6 4.0 5.2 10.4 
Malawi 1.4 36.9 29.7 72.4 
Mozambique 10.9 232.8 823.5 510.9 
Namibia 3.3 15.9 16.9 16.7 
South Africa 225.2 779.7 1,176.0 1,572.2 
Swaziland 1.0 3.2 3.5 6.6 
Tanzania 4.2 103.3 214.2 164.9 
Zambia 9.1 404.3 557.5 465.0 
Zimbabwe 7.4 140.0 106.5 167.2 
Total  275.8 2,169.3 3,293.7 3,908.1 
 
The sectors driving the growth in demand are primarily manufacturing and extractive, as 
shown in Table 62. In fact, demand from the extractive sector increases between 44 and 58 
times from 2010 and 2070, because of both GDP growth and a rapid industrialisation of the 
region’s economies. These combined effects lead to a 6.5–7.0% compound annual growth 
rate for extractive sector demand. 
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Table 61. Total electricity final demand by sector, all countries, 2010 and 2070  
(000 GWh) 
  2070 
 Sector 2010 BAU SADC Int Grand Deal 
Residential  57   185   275   376  
Agriculture  6   4   6   8  
Services  40   166   321   383  
Manufacturing  111   787   1,514   1,392  
Extractive  53   913   1,074   1,349  
Transport  10   114   104   402  
Total  276   2,169   3,294   3,908  
 
Changes in electricity demand are a product of the changes in the activity level of key drivers 
(e.g. population, GDP), changes in energy intensity (e.g. industrial electricity intensity, 
consumption per household), and changes in the structure of demand (e.g. share of GDP by 
sector, share of households with access, urbanisation). Figure 58 below shows the 
contribution of each of these three components to the total change in electricity demand over 
the study period under the Grand Deal scenarios.  
Figure 58. Decomposition of changes in demand into activity level, structure of demand, and 
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Note: CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate; “Intensity”, “structure” and “activity” show the growth rates with the other two 
components of demand held constant. 
Activity level growth is clearly the main driver of demand growth, although changes in structure 
of demand are also important for many countries. The decreases in energy intensity, while 
important, are much smaller than the changes in activity levels.43 
 Supply 
As discussed earlier, power generation capacity in the region has three components: existing 
plants, specific planned plants, and generic plants (i.e. necessary beyond the existing and 
specific plants to meet growing demand). Existing plant capacity increased from 2010 to 2015 
due to expansions at existing facilities, largely coal plants in South Africa, and some small 
increases in the region are still scheduled for the next two years (Figure 59). Existing plants 
are largely decommissioned during the study period (based on their estimated life from 
previous studies (ERC 2013, 2014) and from inputs from SAPP Planning Sub-Committee 
members). Much of the South African coal fleet is retired, although some large South African 
coal plants operate until 2070 and large hydropower in the Zambezi continues throughout the 
study period (Figure 60). This assumes that these large power plants will not only be 
maintained but also rehabilitated over time when necessary, which has been the case in recent 
decades. 
Figure 59. Capacity of existing plants over time by region and fuel, all scenarios 
 
Note: hydro in this figure includes all pumped storage (1580MW), although coal-fired power is used as supply for these plants 
in South Africa. 
                                               
43  Demand can increase even in the “intensity” scenario because decreases in industrial electricity intensity are offset by 
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Figure 60. Generation from existing plants by fuel, BAU scenario  
 
Growth in capacity from new specific power plants is fastest in the Grand Deal scenario, and 
adds a total of nearly 80,000 MW to regional generation (Figure 61). The difference in the 
peak of the BAU scenario and the others is the lower total capacity from Grand Inga. In 
addition, the timeframe to 2070 is sufficiently long that some new plants in early years must 
be retired before the end of the study period. The declines from 2040 to 2044, for example, 
are the decommissioning of some of the solar and wind power in South Africa that is installed 
early in the study period. 
Figure 61. Capacity from specific planned plants under each scenario 
 
The largest component of specific planned capacity is the Grand Inga Dam, which represents 
up to 42,000 MW in the DRC (see Figure 62). The South African expansion, which includes 
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and in part on the generic plants used in optimisation, so specific plant capacity does not show 
the full expansion of coal in South Africa in the coming two decades. Specific plant capacity 
for the other two scenarios would look the same as the illustrated in Figure 62, but shifted 
forward by four and seven years for the SADC Integration and Grand Deal scenarios, 
respectively. 
Figure 62. Capacity from specific planned plants by region, BAU scenario 
 
Note: hydro includes new pumped storage (4,030 MW total) 
The growth of generic capacity, however, is far greater than the other two capacity types over 
the longer term, because of the very large increase in demand that must be met. As discussed 
in Section 5.7.1, by 2070 demand in the region could increase to between eight and thirteen 
times current levels. Capacity will therefore need to increase similarly, as shown in Figure 63. 
As discussed earlier, a key assumption behind the supply analysis is that generation will be 
built to meet all of demand, regardless of the investment requirements. The reason for ignoring 
the constraints on capital in the region is that the focus of the overall analysis is how climate 
change will impact generation choices, costs and emissions, not on the other financial and 
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Figure 63. Total capacity for all plants by scenario 
 
Figure 64 shows that, out of that total, generic capacity of 800 to 1,400 GW will be needed by 
2070 to supply the region, compared to the total regional capacity in 2010 of 52 GW. 
Figure 64. Capacity from generic plants by scenario 
 
The dramatic growth in demand and supply over the full study period would result in a major 
shift in the regional power sector, both in terms of geography and fuel mix. As shown in Figure 
65, already by 2030 South Africa’s share of regional capacity is declining in all scenarios, as 
DRC, Mozambique and Zambia’s power sectors rapidly expand. The fuel mix shifts away from 
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Figure 65. Share of generation by country and fuel, 2030 
  
By 2070 the shift is even more dramatic, with South Africa generating only a third of the 
region’s power, and the fuel dominated by renewables – particularly utility-scale solar 
photovoltaics (Figure 66). The share of renewables increases under the SADC Integration and 
Grand Deal scenarios because of the declines in capital costs over time as discussed in 
Section 5.4.3 above. 
Figure 66. Share of generation by country and fuel, 2070 
  
Total capacity for each country in 2030 and 2070, as well as the base year, is shown in Table 
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Table 62. Generation capacity by country and scenario, 2030 and 2070 (GW) 














Angola 1.09 5.35 7.45 6.74 6.90 42.07 18.65 
Botswana 0.12 1.48 3.04 3.24 2.49 9.16 9.28 
DRC 1.65 13.53 13.06 19.89 164.18 73.11 327.35 
Lesotho 0.07 1.54 1.66 2.21 2.61 3.48 6.95 
Malawi 0.32 1.61 1.63 6.43 7.66 18.17 52.44 
Mozambique 2.18 13.29 14.23 17.83 42.08 272.54 219.54 
Namibia 0.36 2.19 3.66 4.35 4.28 8.14 9.22 
South Africa 42.11 71.42 68.29 121.16 134.50 309.84 395.65 
Swaziland 0.17 0.63 0.87 2.23 0.98 1.92 7.28 
Tanzania 1.25 5.95 5.93 8.51 26.57 101.79 72.48 
Zambia 1.66 11.73 12.15 16.13 92.28 205.72 196.34 
Zimbabwe 1.14 7.97 8.83 7.71 25.60 54.98 102.87 
Total 52.12 136.70 140.79 216.42 510.13 1100.94 1418.04 
 
To understand the implications of the scenarios for individual countries, a more disaggregated 
view of the scenario results is required. The starting fuel mix for each country in 2010 is 
presented in Figure 67, showing the domination of hydropower for most of the SAPP countries 
except Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe – countries with rich coal resources that have 
been well developed. 
























Even under the BAU scenario, this fuel mix starts to shift by 2030, with Tanzania developing 
geothermal power, solar PV playing a larger role in a few countries, coal starting in Zambia, 
Swaziland and Malawi, hydropower increasing in Namibia, and nuclear playing a larger role 
in the South African electricity mix (Figure 68). 
Figure 68. Share of generation by fuel and country, 2030, BAU scenario 
 
By 2070 under the BAU scenario, however, the role of coal has increased dramatically, 
because most large-scale hydropower resources are already exploited by 2040 or 2050. 
Nuclear provides the major source of South Africa’s generation, while most other countries 
are dominated by coal. The exceptions are a large share of solar PV in Lesotho and DRC, a 
























Figure 69. Share of generation by fuel and country, 2070, BAU scenario 
 
Under the Grand Deal scenario, solar PV and wind have already become much more 
prominent in the generation mix by 2030 (Figure 70). Solar PV plays a significant role in 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia, while wind is 
a significant share of generation in Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Zambia, displacing gas in 
some of those countries. The share of coal in South Africa is down to less than 60%. By 2070 
under the Grand Deal scenario, declining capital costs makes solar PV a low-cost resource 
for most countries, and solar PV comprises the majority of generation in nine of the twelve 
countries (Figure 71). Including biomass, solar thermal, wind and geothermal, renewable 
power provides the majority of generation in all SAPP countries except South Africa, where 























Figure 70. Share of generation by fuel and country, 2030, Grand Deal scenario 
 
Figure 71. Share of generation by fuel and country, 2070, Grand Deal scenario 
 
 System costs 
The scope of cost analysis is limited to the costs of generation, including all investment, 
operating and maintenance and fuel costs required for generating electricity over the entire 
study period. Transmission and distribution costs are not included, nor are the cost of end-use 
appliances and energy-using equipment. No external costs of generation are included, 
although carbon dioxide emissions are calculated. This is not only because of a lack of data 
for the other costs, but also because the focus of the research is how development and climate 
change impact generation options and costs. For capital costs, the amortised investment costs 












































than all in one or two years. This means that “unit generation costs” are essentially average 
costs.   
The total cost for all three scenarios is shown in Figure 72, showing GD and SADC with higher 
system costs than BAU, while the shift towards capital costs and, under the Grand Deal, 
variable operating and maintenance costs is shown in Figure 73. These costs do not include 
the “sunk costs” of the existing generation plants, even though the utilities may well have 
outstanding debt that must still be paid on those plants. This means that the total cost shown 
here underestimates utility cost in the early years of the scenarios. In addition, these costs do 
not include revenue from exported electricity or the cost of imported electricity – they only 
include the costs of domestic generation.  
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Figure 73. Share of generation cost by component, BAU and Grand Deal scenarios 
  
Although total costs increase in future years, the unit cost of generation for the entire region 
is relatively stable across all scenarios, as shown in Figure 74. This reflects both the fact that 
the annual change in capacity is relatively small across the entire region, and includes the 
influence of averaging across also 12 countries.  For the different scenarios, renewable power 
options only displace fossil fuels when they have simlar costs, so the average cost for the 
entire sector does not vary significantly across scenarios. 
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At a country level, unit costs vary more widely because each time a new plant is built, the 
added amortised capital costs are added to the total generation cost even before the plant is 
fully utilised.  
 Greenhouse gas emissions 
The IPCC emission factors shown earlier included CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. 
Only CO2 emissions are included in the assessment, as these account for the vast majority of 
power station emissions.44 Currently the majority of emissions are from South Africa, due to 
the amount of coal-fired capacity in that country versus total regional capacity (Table 47). Note 
also that previous research has shown that increasing access does not, on its own, contribute 
significantly to CO2 emissions (Tait and Winkler 2012), which fits with the primary role of 
industrial and manufacturing growth in driving electricity demand shown in this study (see 
Table 62). 
Total emissions for the region for each scenario is shown in Figure 75. All the scenarios show 
large growth in CO2 emissions, starting from a low base, because fossil fuel power increases 
in absolute terms even though the share of total power generation from fossil fuels declines 
Emissions at the end of the study period are equivalent to Japan’s CO2 emissions in 2012 (i.e. 
approximately 1,200 million tCO2). Because so much of the additional capacity in the Grand 
Deal scenario, when compared to the BAU and SADC Integration scenarios, is from renewable 
power, the GHG emissions of the three scenarios are largely the same. This means that the 
per unit emissions for the Grand Deal scenario is much lower than for the other two, given the 
much higher generation in this scenario (Figure 76). 
                                               
44  While new hydropower reservoirs in shallow, heavily vegetated river valleys can lead to methane emissions from decaying 
submerged vegetation, the large hydropower plants in SAPP are on existing reservoirs and/or are in narrow, steep canyons 
with limited vegetation and therefore would not have significant methane emissions (see explanation of methane issues in 
Hertwich (2013)). 
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Figure 75. Carbon dioxide emissions for each scenario 
 
Figure 76. Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of electricity generated for each scenario 
 
5.8 Discussion and conclusions 
The analysis in this chapter addressed the second research question: How could development 
in Southern Africa affect power demand, and how might this demand be met? Over the study 
period, changes in the underlying drivers of demand lead to not only a dramatic increase in 
total electricity demand but also a shift across sectors and countries within the region. The 
modelling results show that, given the assumptions described earlier, SAPP electricity 
demand increases by 8–14 times between 2010 and 2070. The combined demand of the 
rapidly-growing countries of DRC, Mozambique, and Zambia reaches 120% of South Africa’s 
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than 5% for the extractive and manufacturing sectors push their share of total demand from 
59% in 2010 to 70% by 2070 under the Grand Deal scenario. Although changes in structure 
of demand are also important for many countries, activity level growth is the main driver of 
demand growth. An additional 400–1400 GW of new capacity is required to meet 2070 
demand, or 8–20 times the current capacity of the region.45 More strikingly, the mix of energy 
supply sources shifts from almost 80% coal-fired power to only 24–44% coal by 2070, with the 
balance being supplied mainly by solar, wind, hydropower and nuclear generation. The 
regional shift is no less dramatic, as higher growth rates in countries such as DRC, 
Mozambique and Zambia lead to South Africa’s share of total generation declining from 84% 
to only a third of the region’s power.  
Comparing these results to other studies in the region provides a useful context for discussion. 
Because other studies of regional electricity supply and demand have generally only extended 
to 2025 or 2030, however, only a medium-term comparison of results is possible. The 
modelling results for demand are within the range of other studies that considered future 
demand out to 2025 (i.e. the last year of the SAPP forecasts). The earlier studies to which the 
present analysis is compared are RESAP (CEEEZ 2012); SAPP (SAPP 2014) and IRENA 
(Miketa and Merven 2013). For the region as a whole, the modelled results are 450,000–
610,000 GWh total final demand for electricity, while the three other studies cited range from 
440,000–560,000 GWh. Given the optimistic assumptions used in the Grand Deal scenario 
(e.g. very rapid economic growth, full access to electricity by 2040), the fact that the high end 
of the modelled results for that scenario exceed the other studies is reasonable. This 
comparison is important for understanding the longer-term results for this modelling exercise, 
because it means that the mid-term starting point (i.e. 2025) is also similar to what other 
regional initiatives considered. At the same time, the level of uncertainty obviously increases 
with the longer time period for analysis. As discussed earlier, the methodology assumes that 
demand is not constrained by lack of available investment and so provides a picture of what 
investment is necessary to meet development needs.  
There are some important differences in the demand results at a country level (Figure 77) that 
also highlight the importance of bottom-up approaches to demand simulation. The RESAP 
(CEEEZ 2012) study, for example, used a constant growth rate for regional demand applied 
to each country (i.e. a top-down approach), so this assumes that countries all grow at the 
same rate. Most of the SAPP forecasts, compiled from individual utilities, use almost the same 
                                               
45  The variation for supply is greater than for demand because of the low capacity factor renewable energy generation units 
included in the supply anlaysis. 
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growth rate in each year, even though this varies by country. The more detailed approach 
used in this study yields more conservative demand projections for Angola, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe, but more ambitious ones for Zambia. Note that the differences in Angola may also 
be related to the poor data availability, because the current data reported to SAPP imply very 
different energy intensities than other countries (i.e. suggesting that there could be underlying 
reporting problems). The major differences in Mozambique are because of the geographic 
definition of demand. Mozal and similar industrial demands, which are not part of Mozambique 
demand in other studies or SAPP reports, are considered part of the Mozambican national 
demand in this study. Because this study takes an approach that considers all demand within 
national boundaries as part of national demand, Mozambique demand is therefore much 
higher than forecast in SAPP reports, because it covers the full industrial base within the 
country. This is critical for policy-makers in Mozambique, since it implies a different trajectory 
of power sector development to support industrial growth. For all the countries, an important 
advance in this study is that the demand projections are based on scenarios covering national, 
regional and global development, which can be updated over time or used to test alternative 
assumptions about the future. 
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Figure 77. Modelled demand versus other studies, 2025 
Note: the two charts have different scales but the same legend. 
Sources: RESAP Study (CEEEZ 2012); SAPP (2014); IRENA SAPP Study (Miketa and Merven 2013) 
One of the challenges of greater regional integration is maintaining national supply security, 
and the political acceptability of relying on imports for a substantial portion of national demand. 
Table 64 shows net imports (i.e. imports minus exports) as a share of national demand, to 
illustrate where national energy security concerns might arise. Countries with negative net 
imports are net exporters, which is almost all countries except Zambia and South Africa, as 
well as Malawi in 2070. By 2070, imports for these countries are less than 5% of national 
demand in all scenarios. In the medium term, however, net imports by 2030 could be a 
significant share of domestic demand under the SADC Integration and Grand Deal scenarios. 
This tension between the savings from trade and national energy security has been a recurring 
theme in many previous studies (Nexant 2007; Economic Consulting Associates 2009; 
Rowlands 1998; Graeber and Spalding-Fecher 2000), and must be addressed at a political as 




























Table 63. Net imports as a share of national final demand by country (%) 
 2030 2070 
 







Angola -57 -48 -43 -34 -9 -20 
Botswana -23 -45 -75 -8 -12 -22 
DRC -18 -29 -102 -2 -9 -4 
Lesotho -125 -78 -139 -32 -29 -16 
Malawi -1 -1 -4 1 3 2 
Mozambique -13 -27 -44 -1 -1 -1 
Namibia -16 -34 -61 -2 -4 -7 
South Africa 5 8 17 2 2 2 
Swaziland -56 -81 -197 -20 -42 -36 
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zambia 5 8 17 2 3 5 
Zimbabwe -3 -7 -11 -1 -2 -2 
Note: The similarity between the South Africa and Zambia results in 2030 is coincidental, as the underlying total demand is 
entirely different. 
The potential transformation of the supply sector presented in these scenarios would require 
a fundamental shift in resource use, grid management and infrastructure development in the 
region. For decades, South Africa, Botswana and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe have built 
largely coal-fired plants while the rest of the region has been dominated by hydropower, with 
more recent inroads from gas-fired power. Given the assumptions in this research about the 
declining costs of renewable energy technologies – particularly solar photovoltaics and wind 
– the shift away from fossil fuels toward renewables could be dramatic over the coming 
decades, and not driven by political or environmental reasons but by economic and financial 
ones. This follows a global trend highlighted by recent research showing renewable power not 
only achieving parity with traditional generation, but become less expensive and therefore 
comprise the majority of future generation (see, e.g. BNEF 2015; Randall 2015). Even with 
this shift, however, the absolute growth in fossil fuel generation means the regional CO2 
emissions will rise rapidly, just not as fast as they would without the larger share of renewables. 
One major gap in this type of electricity sector analysis, however, is that the availability of large 
hydropower plants is largely based on historical river flow data, as provided by the regional 
utilities and previous regional research studies. The contribution of this thesis is, in part, to 
integrate the climate vulnerability demonstrated in the water analysis into the electricity sector 
analysis, as explained in Chapter 1. The next chapter therefore links the projected seasonal 
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availability of ZRB hydropower plants under alternative future climates to the inputs for 
electricity sector modelling. 
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6 Integrated water and electricity scenarios 
This chapter addresses the third key research question: How could the changes in water 
availability for hydropower (i.e. due to climate change and development) affect regional 
electricity expansion plans, costs and greenhouse gas emissions? To do so, the chapter 
combines the electricity supply and demand analysis for SAPP (Chapter 5) with the water 
supply and demand analysis of the Zambezi River Basin (Chapter 4) to show how the climate 
change and irrigation impacts on water availability for specific existing and planned 
hydropower plants will affect the expansion of the regional electricity system (i.e. driven by 
socio-economic development), as well as the costs and GHG emissions from that system. 
Figure 4 illustrates the chapter’s role in the overall methodology of the thesis. 
Figure 78. Role of this chapter in overall methodology 
 
 
The water supply and demand analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrated that there were no material 
differences in the performance of the hydropower plants across the development scenarios, 
but dramatic impacts across the alternative climate futures, as well as important interactions 
between irrigation and hydropower. For this reason, the integrated scenarios only consider 
two of the development future – BAU and Grand Deal. The integrated scenarios are therefore 
a combination of these two development futures with the two climate futures, as shown in 
Table 65 (a condensed version of Table 1). The integrated scenarios are compared to 






















Table 64. Condensed set of integrated scenarios 
  Climate futures 
 
 
Marker scenarios with 
“drying” (e.g. drying in 
many sub-basins) 
Marker scenarios 
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The rationale for exploring the WEAP-LEAP linkage for this analysis is related to the policy 
questions for decisions-makers in the region. For example, from the point of view of most 
SAPP utilities, the question is not so much: What is the optimal power system under changing 
climate and development conditions? But rather: How will our current expansion plans be 
affected by changing climate and development conditions? Applying the WEAP and LEAP 
tools for an integrated multi-country system is a methodological advance pioneered in this 
thesis, showing that the integrated methodology can provide information to answer the third 
overall research question of this thesis: How could the changes in water availability for 
hydropower (i.e. due to climate change and development) affect regional electricity expansion 
plans, costs and greenhouse gas emissions? In addition, using WEAP and LEAP facilitates a 
capacity-building process with decision-makers to walk through the flow of the scenarios and 
simulations. In a highly uncertain environment, what decision-makers need is not necessarily 
the one “best solution” or the optimal one, but the solution or solutions that are robust under a 
wide variety of conditions. This, again, is where simulation models combined with some 
optimisation functionality provide transparent and user-friendly tools to guide decision-makers 
through an assessment of how their current plans may be impacted by future climates or 
development. 
It is important to bear in mind that hydropower constitutes only 10–14% of total generation by 
2070 across the three development scenarios (23–26% in 2030), and only 24% of potential 
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regional hydropower capacity is located in the ZRB (i.e. 17,600 MW of 76,100 MW). This 
means that ZRB hydropower capacity would be between 2.5% and 6% of total regional 
capacity, even though this is much higher in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi 
because of their dependency on hydropower. Note that, as discussed in Chapter 5, because 
the electricity supply results for the SADC Integration scenario were similar to those for the 
Grand Deal scenario, results are only shown for the BAU and Grand Deal development 
futures. In addition, to focus the analysis on the most important contributors to total capacity, 
the integrated scenario analysis focuses on existing and new plants of 300 MW or larger (see 
Table 66). Other smaller plants are still included in the water and electricity model, but their 
availability is held constant rather than driven by the climate futures. 
Table 65. ZRB hydropower plants using availability derived from the water model  
Name Capacity (MW) 
Cahora Bassa  2,075 
Batoka Gorge 1,600 
Mphanda Nkuwa I 1,500 
Mphanda Nkuwa II 750 
Kariba North & South existing 1,470 
Cahora Bassa North Bank Extension 1,245 
Mpata Gorge 1,086 
Chemba I & II 1,000 
Devils Gorge 1,000 
Kafue Gorge Upper 900 
Kafue Gorge Lower 750 
Lupata 600 
Kariba North Extension 360 
Kariba South Extension 300 
 
The following sections present the results of the integrated modelling for hydropower 
availability, power sector expansion plans, power sector operation, and GHG emissions. 
6.1 Impact on hydropower availability 
As an example of integrated results that are the core of this thesis research, the average 
availability of Kariba (existing plant and all extensions) is shown in Figure 79, with variations 
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in both climate and development taken into consideration. In other words, the figure shows 
how the combination of different changes in climate and changes in the pace of irrigation and 
hydropower development would affect the availability of the power station (i.e. the amount of 
power generation as a share of the maximum possible generation). 
While availability increases somewhat in the short term, over the long term it declines 
dramatically, and even the wetting climate shows lower availability by 2051–2070. The results 
do not vary significantly for alternative development futures.  
Figure 79. Average annual availability at Kariba under different climate and development 
scenarios, by time period  
 
For Cahora Bassa, availability similarly declines 5–8% under a drying climate but increases 
by 2–8% in a wetting climate (Figure 80). This is despite an almost 50% increase in capacity 
up to 2020 (bearing in mind that the new capacity is for peaking and is expected to have a low 
load factor).  
Figure 80. Average annual availability at Cahora Bassa under different climate and 












































For both Kariba and Cahora Bassa, water availability increases in the 2011–2030 period under 
both future climates. This is largely a function of how the baseline climate data is generated. 
The baseline climate data series starting in 2011 is a repeat of historical climate data from the 
1960–1990 period. The specific data used for the early years of the future scenarios (e.g. 
2011–2030) are from a historical period with above-average rainfall. This is not predicted for 
2011–2020 by the climate models used as the sources for the “Dry” and “Wet” scenarios. The 
comparison over the entire period is more important, therefore, than for only this early period. 
This also relates to the presentation of figures in Chapter 4 with an average value across the 
entire period for the baseline climate. The impacts, over the entire study period, of alternative 
climate and development futures on plant output is summarised below in Figure 81 and Figure 
82.  
Figure 81. Change in average annual generation from existing plants, 2011-2070  
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6.2 Impact on power sector expansion 
If hydropower is less available during certain time periods under a different future climate, then 
other capacity must be installed to meet electricity demand during these time periods. 
Conversely, if increased water availability consistently increases production, less capacity 
from other technologies may be needed. One way of understanding the impact of climate 
change on the power system, therefore, is to examine how the capacity of other types of plants 
(including hydropower outside of the ZRB) would change under different climates, based on 
the need to optimize for a least-cost power system to meet the same demands (explained in 
Chapter 1). Because the optimisation algorithm in LEAP has “perfect foresight”,46 loss of one 
type of capacity not only leads to both increases and decreases of other generation types, but 
also the model attempts to find the optimal mix - over the entire time period - of baseline load 
and peaking plants from a new combination of technologies, taking into consideration the 
existing and specific planned plants whose commissioning dates are fixed exogenously.  
Figure 83 shows the changes in capacity under the BAU development scenario for both dry 
and wet climates by 2030 and 2070. In the BAU dry scenario, an additional 1.4 GW of wind 
and 0.4 GW of gas are built by 2030, with a small drop in new coal capacity. Overall, alternative 
capacity must increase by 1.8 GW by 2030 and by 8.9 GW by 2070 under the dry climate to 
replace the loss of hydropower generation, with the additional 2070 capacity coming from 
solar. Note that there is no decline in hydropower capacity because all large hydropower plants 
are treated as “specific” plants, that will definitely be built but whose commissioning date varies 
by development scenario. The optimisation algorithm used to choose the best mix of “generic” 
plants to meet regional demand does not include large hydropower as an option, since the 
potential locations for these plants is limited. 
In the BAU wet scenario, significantly less coal and natural gas capacity is needed by 2030 
because of higher hydropower output – 1.7 GW less in total. There are still increases in wind 
capacity, possibly because large hydropower reservoirs with ample water supply allows for 
greater use of intermittent resources, and is the most economical during this period. By 2070, 
however, the costs of solar PV have declined enough to make this is a more economical 
intermittent power supply source, which expands with the help of increased water availability 
for reservoirs to balance the intermittency. Modest increases in water available cannot lead to 
more hydropower capacity, however, because, as discussed above, additional large 
                                               
46  Perfect foresight models are used widely in energy system optimisation, and work as though there is a decision-maker who 
has complete information about the future. This is not meant, however, as an assumption about how the sector actually 
operates, but rather as a way to show what the optimal solution would be with sufficient information about the future. Examples 
of such analysis include Azar, Lindgren, and Andersson (2003); Barreto and Kypreos (2002); Ma (2010). 
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hydropower sites (i.e. beyond those presented in Chapter 4) are limited, so they are not part 
of the generic capacity options available to optimise future supply and demand. 
Figure 83. Change in capacity due to dry or wet climate versus baseline climate, BAU 
development, 2030 (left) & 2070 (right) 
  
In addition to constructing alternative capacity, the operation of installed plants (existing and 
new) may also change because of changes in hydropower availability. Figure 84 shows the 
average annual change in generation (i.e. over 20-year periods) for each major technology in 
the dry and wet climates under BAU development. This shows the substantial decreases in 
hydropower generation under a dry climate after 2030 (see hydro in red), replaced largely with 
generation from coal-based thermal power stations. Under a wet climate, hydropower 
generation does increase over the 2011–2050 period, and displaces the need for higher 
marginal cost coal and gas.  
Under the Grand Deal development scenario (Figure 85), the more rapid fall in solar PV costs 
means that lower hydropower generation under a dry climate is replaced almost entirely by 
solar. Conversely, the increased generation from a wet climate in the 2011–2050 period under 
the Grand Deal development scenario displaces fossil fuels (coal and gas), but it also 
displaces renewable power (both solar and wind), because renewable power capacity would 
need to be constructed if hydropower average generation levels were higher. The absolute 
magnitude of these changes under the wet climate scenarios is lower in all cases, which is 
related to the fact that potential increases under a wet climate are much smaller than losses 








































Figure 84. Change in average annual generation compared to modelled baseline for dry 
(left) and wet (right) climates, BAU development  
  
Figure 85. Change in average annual generation compared to baseline for dry (left) and wet 
(right) climates, Grand Deal development 
  
6.3 Impact on electricity generation system costs 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the electricity cost analysis includes the full cost of generation, but 
not transmission and distribution. Decreased production from low-cost hydropower resources 
would potentially increase total generation costs for the region, because of both additional 
capital costs for replacement capacity and the higher operating costs of fossil fuel plants. 
Figure 86 shows the impact on generation costs for the 20-year time periods, in terms of 


























































percentage of total generation costs). As expected, costs increase under the drying scenario 
and decrease under a wetting scenario.  
Figure 86. Change in total regional generation costs due to dry and wet climate, by time 
period 
  
Although the cost increases are almost $7 billion in total, this is less than 1% of total generation 
costs for the entire electricity system over the period. For individual countries that are 
dependent on hydropower, the impact is obviously much greater. Figure 87 shows that for 
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe the impact on generation costs could be up to 5%, while 
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Figure 87. Change in generation cost relative to baseline climate (% total generation cost) 
for selected hydro-dependent countries  
  
 
6.4 Impact on greenhouse gas emissions 
If hydropower generation is replaced by fossil fuel generation, then a drying climate could lead 
to increases in GHG emissions. Conversely, if increased hydropower generation can displace 
fossil fuel generation, the opposite would be true. Figure 88 show the changes in average 
annual CO2 emissions, during each period, under the different climates. By way of 
comparison, a 1000 MW coal fired power plant operating at 70% load factor would emit roughly 
6 MtCO2 per year. Under a dry climate, emissions typically increase by up to 6.7 MtCO2 per 
year, while a wet climate would decrease emissions by up to 5 MtCO2 per year. This effect is 
less pronounced under the Grand Deal development scenarios, because increased 
hydropower output leads to less construction of solar as well as displacement of fossil fuels 




































































Figure 88. Average annual difference in emissions versus baseline climate 
 
6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
The analysis presented in this chapter has shown how the changes in water availability for 
hydropower affect regional electricity expansion plans, costs and GHG emissions, addressing 
the third key question for this thesis. The reduction in hydropower generation under a drying 
climate will lead to a shift in both capacity expansion choices and the operation of the regional 
power system, while the increases in hydropower output under a wetting climate are smaller. 
At an aggregate level, the increases in costs are a small share of total generation costs (less 
than 1% over the full study period). The impact on generation costs for hydro-dependent 
countries such as Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe is larger, with significant savings 
under a wetting climate. Finally, because some hydropower could be displaced by coal, 
regional GHG emissions could increase by the equivalent of a large coal-fired power station 
under a drying climate. The implications of these results are discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter, which not only summarises the entire thesis research but also considers the 















2011-30 2031-50 2051-70 2011-70
 165 
7 Conclusions 
The purpose of this final chapter is threefold: first, to articulate the answers to the original 
research questions and evaluation of its hypothesis, based on the findings of the PhD 
research; second, to clarify the limitations of the research and the conclusions; and, finally, to 
reflect on the broader policy implications of the results – both for the regional power sector 
and for the climate policy in the region. 
7.1 Recap of results and evaluation of hypothesis 
The hypothesis for this thesis was that the combination of future changes in climate and 
development (primarily irrigation) in the ZRB threatens the technical and economic viability of 
existing and planned hydropower plants, and in turn the expansion plans and costs of the 
regional power system for Southern African countries (see Section 1.2, together with detailed 
research questions).  
The first step in addressing this hypothesis was to answer the question: How could future 
climate and irrigation expansion in the Zambezi River Basin affect hydropower generation 
potential? As demonstrated in Chapter 4, change in future climate is the overwhelming driver 
of future production at almost all hydropower plants. The difference in mean generation under 
wetting and drying climates (compared to a modelled baseline using the historical climate) is 
12–16% (i.e. the difference between the values under a wet and dry scenario) for individual 
existing plants. This difference is as much as 30% for individual new plants, with all plants 
other than Batoka showing variation in mean annual generation or more than 13%. The impact 
of irrigation, on the other hand, is mainly an issue for plants downstream from Kariba, and 
even then the magnitude is typically less than a third of the impact of the alternative climates. 
The water modelling results therefore do not vary significantly across alternative development 
futures, because the accelerated irrigation development is still not large enough to dramatically 
impact hydropower.  
The second step in the research was to answer the question: How could development in 
Southern Africa affect power demand, and how might this demand be met? The electricity 
sector analysis in Chapter 5 shows that the underlying socio-economic drivers of demand lead 
to both a dramatic increase in total electricity demand and a shift across sectors and countries 
within the region. Total electricity demand for the SAPP region increases by 8–14 times over 
the period from 2010 to 2070, with the combined demand from the rapidly growing countries 
of DRC, Mozambique, and Zambia becoming larger than South African demand by 2070. At 
the sectoral level, the share of total demand from the extractive and manufacturing sectors 
increases from 59% in 2010 to 70% in 2070 under the Grand Deal scenario, based on a 
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compound annual growth rate of consumption in excess of 5%. Activity-level growth is the 
main driver of demand growth. Comparison with other studies in the region show that the mid-
term demand estimates (e.g. 2025–2030) in this study are generally within the range of other 
research, with somewhat higher demand estimates from the Grand Deal scenario. Total 
electricity supply required over the longer term is met through the addition of 400 to 1400 GW 
of new capacity, or 8–20 times the current capacity of the region. More strikingly, the power 
mix shifts from almost 80% coal-fired power to 24–44% coal by 2070, with the balance being 
supplied mainly by solar, wind, hydropower and nuclear generation. The regional shift is no 
less dramatic, with South Africa’s share of total generation declining from 84% to only a third 
of the region’s power, based on the higher growth rates in countries such as DRC, 
Mozambique and Zambia. 
The third question investigate in this research was: How could the changes in water availability 
for hydropower (i.e. due to climate change and development) affect regional electricity 
expansion plans, costs and greenhouse gas emissions? As discussed in Chapter 6, applying 
the WEAP and LEAP tools to an integrated multi-country system is a methodological advance 
pioneered in this thesis, showing that the integrated methodology can provide information to 
answer this question. The analysis shows that the reduction in hydropower generation under 
a drying climate will lead to a shift in both capacity expansion choices and the operation of the 
regional power system, while the increases in hydropower output under a wetting climate are 
smaller. In other words, the “downside” of future climate changes is larger than the potential 
“upside”. At an aggregate level, the increases in costs are a small share of total generation 
costs (i.e. less than 1% over the full study period compared to the baseline climate). The 
impact on generation costs for hydro-dependent countries such as Mozambique, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, however, is considerably larger, and these countries also gain more under a 
wetting climate. Finally, because some hydropower could be displaced by coal, regional GHG 
emissions could increase by more than 6 MtCO2 per year in the medium term, or the equivalent 
of a large coal-fired power station. These results of the integrated analysis are fundamental to 
the contribution of this PhD thesis to knowledge.  
7.2 Limitations of the analysis  
While the thesis makes a contribution to knowledge, the scope is necessarily limited and 
therefore it may not address all of the questions related to the impacts of climate change and 
hydropower on regional electricity sector development. One limitation discussed in Section 
1.4 is not being able to include new transmission investments in the optimisation analysis. The 
modelling tools chosen to integrate energy and water modelling – for the reasons discussed 
in Chapter 1 – do not allow this type of analysis, although the inputs on trade drawn from the 
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IRENA SAPP study were the result of a combined transmission and generation optimisation. 
This means that the optimisation is a country-by-country optimisation rather than a combined 
regional one. In addition, future work using time-of-day time slices in the generation modelling 
might provide additional insights on the value of trading, because peak demand is not at the 
same time in each of the SAPP countries, nor is the availability of renewable energy sources 
constant across time and space.   
The geographical scope of the thesis is the ZRB. Linking additional Southern Africa river 
basins (e.g. the Congo Basin) to the SAPP electricity model would also provide valuable 
insights, because patterns of wetting and drying in the river basins are not necessarily the 
same. Similar trends in the Zambezi and Congo could exacerbate the vulnerabilities 
highlighted here, while contrasting climate patterns could reduce the overall impacts of climate 
change, assuming sufficient transmission capacity is available for the required regional trade 
(see discussion below on regional cooperation). 
The thesis focuses on the impact pathway from climatic change to water availability at 
hydropower plants, and how this then influences power system operation and expansion. An 
alternative approach, however, would be to explore how prioritizing hydropower production 
over irrigation demand under a changing climate could affect food production, although this 
analysis could be conducted using only the WEAP model.  
Finally, the costs included for optimising power generation expansion include only the private, 
financial costs for power plant construction and operation – because the purpose of the 
analysis is to simulate the current investment decision-making environment.  The construction 
and operation of hydropower plants, however, as well as other forms of power generation, has 
additional environmental and social impacts.  Including these external costs in the energy 
optimisation analysis could be an important subject of future research. 
7.3 Energy policy implications 
The electricity modelling presented in Chapter 5 has important policy implications for the 
energy sector in its own right, even without considering climate change. The potential 
transformation of the electricity supply sector would require a fundamental shift in resource 
use, grid management and infrastructure development in the region. For decades, South 
Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe have built largely coal-fired plants, while the rest of the region 
has been dominated by hydropower, with more recent inroads from gas-fired power. Because 
of the declining levelised costs of non-hydro renewable energy technologies – particularly 
solar photovoltaics and wind – the shift away from fossil fuels toward renewables could be 
dramatic over the coming two to three decades. More importantly, this shift may not be driven 
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by political or environmental reasons but by economic and financial ones. This trend has been 
seen recently in South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement 
Programme (REI4P) and follows a global trend highlighted by recent research showing 
renewable power not only achieving parity with traditional generation but becoming less 
expensive and therefore comprising the majority of future capacity additions (see, e.g., BNEF 
2015; Randall 2015; Eberhard, Kolker, and Leigland 2014; Eberhard et al. 2016). None of the 
short-to-medium-term plans put forward for the region (e.g. the consolidated SAPP forecasts 
for capacity and demand) fully address the magnitude of this transition to a more diverse 
energy mix over the longer term, and many ignore it entirely. The modelling approach in this 
study not only allows for a deeper and longer-term analysis of supply, but also a more nuanced 
understanding of demand drivers (i.e. as opposed to the straight-line growth projections in 
some other studies). 
This shift in the resource base for electricity generation will pose challenges for grid integration 
and balancing supply and demand across countries and load centres. In fact, the lack of 
availability of adequate transmission capacity, the ability to balance dispatchable and non-
dispatchable sources of supply, and the lack of availability of cost-effective storage, could be 
the most important limitations on realising an optimal expansion plan. Although the SAPP 
Coordination Centre does manage the regional short-term “day ahead market”, trading in this 
market is very small, and so there is currently no regional-level mechanism for forecasting and 
balancing supply on the scale required. In addition, currently the only major storage in the 
region other than the two major hydropower reservoirs at Kariba and Cahora Bassa currently 
is the pumped storage capacity in South Africa (1.58 GW). Even with another 1.2 GW of 
storage in South Africa and 1.3 GW in Lesotho planned, these are far smaller than the 
additional solar and wind power investments over the next two decades. Major advances in 
chemical or other storage technologies are therefore important in realising the magnitude of 
solar power expansion. In the short-to-medium term, exploring the possibility of “banking” 
energy from non-dispatchable resources (e.g. solar PV, wind) in large hydropower reservoirs 
in the region, as mentioned earlier, could be one important strategy for this new supply regime. 
This will require a greater focus on commissioning new transmission capacity, but also an 
analysis of whether modifying the operating rules at major regional hydropower reservoirs 
could comprise their other functions (e.g. flood control, ecological flow releases).  
Historically, the development of transmission capacity, and the resulting trade in electricity, 
has been constrained by the political and economic realities of the region. The tension 
between the potential for savings from trade versus the additional costs of maintaining national 
self-sufficiency has been a recurring theme in many previous studies (Nexant 2007; Economic 
Consulting Associates 2009; Rowlands 1998; Graeber and Spalding-Fecher 2000), and 
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requires both political and technical solutions to address security of supply concerns. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, while this electricity sector analysis does not imply compromising 
energy security for SAPP countries in the medium-to-long term, South Africa and Zambia 
would potentially be relying on imports for up to 17% of domestic consumption in 2030 under 
the Grant Deal scenario. Regional infrastructure plans have identified political commitment, 
as well as strong institutions, as keys to greater cooperation (SADC 2012). To date, trade in 
the short-term electricity market has been thin, and the SAPP Coordination Centre has not 
directly facilitated longer-term contracts and negotiations. For the largest source of demand in 
the region – South Africa – imported electricity has played a very limited role in future planning 
(DoE 2013; Resnick, Tarp, and Thurlow 2012). There are signs that the politics could be 
shifting, however, for several key reasons. The first is the political commitment and financing 
available for major regional energy infrastructure projects. At the continental level, the 
Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa initiative of the African Union and the New 
Partnership for African Development represent a new level of political commitment to mobilise 
several hundred billion dollars for infrastructure projects, including regional energy 
infrastructure projects to facilitate greater energy trade (Mandelli et al. 2014). In Southern 
Africa specifically, the World Bank launched the SAPP Program for Accelerating 
Transformational Energy Projects to provide transaction advisory and other services to 
address the technical and economic barriers large and complex transmission projects.  
The differences in medium-term demand projections for some countries between this study 
and the SAPP compilation of utility forecasts (Figure 77) also suggest that the lack of national 
planning frameworks driven by bottom-up demand analysis could lead to significant over- or 
under-investment. Capacity among utilities for developing detailed bottom-up demand 
analysis and supply optimisation analysis varies widely. Several SAPP utilities reported to the 
author that they have no planning model for their power sector, and this reflects the weak 
institutional capacity in utilities and regulators across Africa (Eberhard et al. 2011; Eberhard 
and Shkaratan 2012). A dedicated capacity-building program for the regional utilities could 
address this, but only if it combines both management level buy-in on greater cooperation with 
greater technical skill, data sharing and collaborative planning among member utilities.  
The findings of this research, as well as interacting with stakeholders during the process of 
the doctoral research, also highlight some of the benefits of using LEAP as a tool for national 
and regional planning in Southern Africa. The author had the opportunity to meet with regional 
electricity planners as part of related research projects (see Chapter 1.5), to discuss both the 
conceptual framework and the modelling tools. That fact that LEAP has the ability to combine 
simulation analysis with optimisation analysis allows the current SAPP Planning Framework 
to be used as an input to the analysis. This has important implications for the policy impact of 
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this approach because decision-makers contributing elements of the SAPP plan have a 
greater stake in the outputs. The SADC RESAP study (CEEEZ 2012) also used LEAP, and 
has been reviewed by not only SADC staff and management but also the energy ministers. 
Because some of the barriers to greater regional cooperation relate to institutional and 
technical capacity, the accessibility of the analytical tool is relevant to the policy impact of the 
analysis. In addition, the affordability of the tools is relevant to policy impact, because 
affordability influences whether regional institutions can continue to update and use the 
analysis in the future. LEAP is available without cost to public sector and academic users in 
developing countries, and is supported by a professional team at no cost to these users.  
7.4 Integrated modelling policy implications 
An important contribution of this thesis is developing integrated regional scenarios based on 
energy-water modelling, to understand how these sectors interact under an uncertain future 
climate. The integrated scenario analysis not only addresses the immediate questions about 
generation choices, system costs and GHG emissions, but also points to important policy 
implications that extend beyond the electricity sector.  
The relatively low consumption of water in the ZRB in the past meant that explicit trade-offs 
across sectors and across countries posed less of a challenge for the basin overall. 
Hydropower plant operators and development have therefore not needed to consider changes 
in water availability as a constraint on power sector expansion. This is very likely to change in 
the future, as increased demand from all sectors, and major potential changes in climate will 
require more explicit agreements across both countries and user groups on how to best utilise 
a limited resource. In fact, Turton (2016) suggests that the growing scarcity of water in the 
largest economies of Southern Africa, which will be exacerbated by climate change, could 
force a political shift, as the relative political power of countries with more water and other 
unexploited natural resources grows. 
For the expansion of existing hydropower plants and construction of new ones (both reservoir 
and run-of-river), this research demonstrates the tools that could be used to integrate both 
climate change and upstream development demands into the feasibility studies before 
investment decisions are made, and to consider possible adaptations in design and operation. 
Ignoring these factors could lead to “stranded assets” for investors due to climate change 
impacts (Caldecott 2017; Burton et al. 2016). Beyond the level of individual investments, 
however, the research also illustrates the first steps toward integrating climate change and 
upstream development considerations into national and regional electricity planning. The 
effects of climate change on hydropower may mean that diversity of power sources must be 
given a higher priority than it has had in the past, and that this quality must be included in the 
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supply optimisation analysis. Future research could also address whether changes in 
operating rules at the major reservoirs could increase the resilience of the electricity system, 
as well as how demand-side improvements in water and energy use efficiency could minimize 
the impacts of decreased water availability. 
This research also has important implications against the background of the multi-year drought 
that has left Lake Kariba at only 29% full in September 2016 (Tsiko 2016). A combination of 
excessive use of the reservoir and unseasonably low rainfall is crippling the power sectors – 
and in turn the economies – of Zambia and Zimbabwe, despite Kariba being the largest 
human-made reservoir in the world, by volume. This points not only to the risks from climate 
variability and long-term climate change but also to the need for strong and cooperative 
governance arrangements to manage shared water resources in the region, across both 
countries and sectors. The expansion of irrigation and construction of numerous new 
hydropower reservoirs and power plants along the main stem of the Zambezi River will only 
intensify the need for shared governance. As discussed earlier, ZAMCOM has only recently 
been operationalised with a Secretariat, and there is no formal cooperation with SAPP. 
Cooperative governance may need to look beyond simple allocation of resources, however, 
because of the differential impacts of climate change on countries that are more or less 
vulnerable. For example, if a hydropower plant is constructed in Mozambique for export, but 
future changes in climate could reduce the performance of that asset, the electricity export 
price and contractual arrangements will need to anticipate possible future fluctuations or 
additional investments needed (e.g. larger storage, alternative power supply sources) to 
guarantee future delivery of power.  
An additional policy implication is related to global climate change governance. With the entry 
into force of the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC in November 2016, all of the countries 
in the SAPP region will have some form of climate change-related commitments (Obergassel 
et al. 2016; UNFCCC 2015). Most of the countries, including hydro-rich Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, included quantitative commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions relative 
to a specified “business-as-usual” growth path in their nationally determined commitments 
(NDCs) (Mozambique and Malawi have only committed to actions, not quantitative reductions) 
(UNFCCC 2017). The challenge specifically for Zambia and Zimbabwe is that the impacts of 
climate change could potentially make it more difficult to meet their mitigation commitments. 
The request for international support to meet their commitments, as elaborated in their NDCs, 
is therefore critical, because they will need financing, capacity building and technology transfer 
to achieve mitigation goals within the context of an uncertain climate. 
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The electricity and water sectors are important contributors to the development of the SADC 
region, and hydropower in the ZRB lies at the intersection of these fields. Climate change, 
however, has the potential to add increased stress on these sectors, both directly and 
indirectly, and yet is not being considered in many individual hydropower power investments, 
or in national or regional electricity planning. The integrated scenario analysis approach in this 
thesis demonstrates how the impacts of climate change could be assessed not only for specific 
hydropower plants and for the entire sector power sector. The results suggest that the 
downside from a drying climate is significant, particularly for countries with high dependency 
on hydropower, while the benefits of a wetting climate are limited. Preparing for this possible 
range of future climates can increase the resilience of the sector and reduce the risk of 
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Annex A. Hydropower plant and reservoir data 
Table 66. Volume-elevation curve for Cahora Bassa 
Volume (mcm) 0 4,745 10,689 17,963 26,699 37,026 51,704 62,977 65,991 
Elevation (m amsl) 295 300 305 310 315 320 326 330 331 
Area (km2) 838 1,065 1,317 1,597 1,902 2,233 2,665 2,974 3,054 
Spillway (cms) 6,760 7,990 9,060 10,020 10,890 11,700 12,600 14,173 15,683 
Source: HCB (2013), Beilfuss (2001)  
Table 67. Turbine efficiency rating for Cahora Bassa 
Net head (m) 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 125 130 
Efficiency 89.3% 92.7% 95.8% 95.6% 95.6% 95.9% 95.6% 95.2% 94.2% 92.9% 
Source: Beilfuss (2001) 
Table 68. DFRC for Cahora Bassa 
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Level (m amsl) 321.7 323.6 325.6 325.7 325.4 325.1 324.5 324 323.1 322.2 321.3 320.6 
Source: ZDSS (modified from HCB data, based on observation of more recent actual operation) 
Table 69. Tailwater curve for Cahora Bassa 
Discharge 
(cms) 
0 500 1,000 2,000 3,000 5,000 8,000 10,500 15,000 22,000 
Level (m 
amsl) 
194 198.89 201.08 204.29 206.86 211.05 216.05 221.5 226.14 232 
Source: HCB (2013), Beilfuss (2001)  
Note: Maximum turbine flow at Cahora Bassa is 2,250 cms (HCB) 
Table 70. Volume-elevation curve for Lake Kariba 
Volume (mcm) 54 2,272 6,706 11,278 15911 20613 25962 30,408 
Elevation (m amsl) 475.5 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 
Area (km2) 4354 4,405 4,507 4,608 4,709 4,811 4,901 4,991 
Spillway (cms)         7,528 7,751 7,973 8,168 
 
Volume (mcm) 35,427 40,568 45,778 51,088 56,507 64,798 76,854 
Elevation (m amsl) 483 484 485 486 487 488.5 489.5 
Area (km2) 5,081 5,171 5,261 5,350 5,440 5,577 5671 
Spillway (cms) 8,381 8,584 8,786 8,974 9,161 9,445 9,515 
Source: Beilfuss (2001) 
Table 71. DFRC for Lake Kariba 
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Level (m amsl) 484 485.4 487.75 488.5 488.5 488.5 488 487.5 487 486.5 486 485.5 
Source: ZRA (2013), SADC (2011)  
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Table 72. Tailwater rating curve for Lake Kariba 
Discharge 
(cms) 
0 479 719 959 1,319 1,518 3,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 
Level (m 
amsl) 
380 383.7 384.86 386.19 387.67 388.48 391.96 399.87 402.55 404.55 
Source: Beilfuss (2001) 
Table 73. Volume-elevation curve for Kafue Gorge Upper 
Volume (mcm) 0 20 69 170 423 785 1,178 2,845 
Elevation (m amsl) 972.3 973 974 975 976 9,76.6 977 978 
Area (km2) 20 35 70 142 430 805 1,175 2,160 
Spillway (cms) 780 1,076 1,420 1,804 2,220 2,496 2,668 3,132 
Source: (Beilfuss 2001) 
Table 74. Volume-elevation curve for Itezhi-tezhi 
Volume (mcm) 699 894 1,119 1,377 1,673 2,008 2,387 
Elevation (m amsl) 1,006 1,008 1,010 1,012 1,014 1,016 1,018 
Area (km2) 90 105 120 138 158 177 203 
 
Volume (mcm) 2,814 3,291 3,551 4,118 4,746 5,439 5,624 7,049 
Elevation (m amsl) 1,020 1,022 1,024 1,026 1,028 1,029 1,029.5 1,035 
Area (km2) 224 253 284 314 346 364 374 446 
Source: Beilfuss (2001) 
Table 75. DFRC for Itezhi-tezhi 
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
Elevation (m amsl) 1023.5 1025.9 1027.5 1028.5 1028.6 1028.2 
Month Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Elevation (m amsl) 1,027.6 1,026.8 1,025.7 1,024.5 1,023.2 1,022.5 
Source: Beilfuss (2001) 
Table 76. Volume-elevation curve for Mphanda Nkuwa 
Elevation (m) 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 
Area (km2) 4 6 10 13 17 24 32 41 




185 190 195 200 205 210 215 220 
Area (km2) 51 62 73 84 97 109 123 136 
Volume 
(mcm) 
863 1,144 1,480 1,872 2,324 2,838 3,418 4,065 
Source: HMNK (2012) 
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Table 77. Volume-elevation curve for Batoka Gorge 
Elevation (m) 620 640 660 680 700 720 740 760 780 800 
Area (km2) 1.30 3.80 5.65 9.22 12.48 16.15 20.24 25.07 30.72 37.31 
Volume (mcm) 0 51 146 294 511 798 1161 1615 2172 2853 
Source: ZRA (2013) 
Table 78. Volume-elevation curve for Devils Gorge 
Elevation (m) 468 476 484 492 500 508 516 524 532 
Area (km2) 8.8 21.5 37 56.8 80 104.3 132.7 165.4 203.1 
Volume 
(mcm) 
83.6 153.5 384.2 760 1,002 2,040 2,995 4,182 5,643 
Elevation (m) 540 548 556 564 572 580 588 596 
Area (km2) 246.7 297.3 352.9 424.6 497 570 666 762 
Volume 
(mcm) 
7,443 ,9663 12,218 15,853 19,560 23,268 28,547 33,947 
Source: : ZRA (2013)  
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Annex B. Irrigation area data 
Table 79. Current irrigated area by crop and sub-basin 





















































































































































Upper Zambezi IA1 1 12   1,000  750       750         2500 
Kabompo IA2 2 13  136   64   45    23  82 88    48  350 
Lungue Bungo IA3 3 11   500  250       250         1,000 
Luanginga IA4 4 10   250  250       250         750 
Barotse IA6 6 9  78   36   26    13  47 51    27  200 
Cuando/Chobe IA7 7 8 I.08.01-3 0 350 0 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 620 
Kariba IA8 8 6 I.06.01-4 613 0 0 278 0 0 202 21 2 4 99 0 356 387 8 0 10 209 0 1,575 
Kafue IA13 12.13 7 I.07.01 4,135           42   4,135     4177 
 IA14 14 7 I.07.03 1,275       33,068  596  82   773   502  35,021 
Kariba IA9 9 6 I.06.09 503   84   126 356 42 63 42  84 121 131  171 81  1,300 
 IA10 10 6 I.06.10 8,362   1,394   2,090 5,920 697 1,046 697  1,394 2,007 2,174  2,843 1,338  21,600 
 IA11a 11 6 I.06.07-8 389 0 0 123 0 0 113 137 16 24 48 0 149 173 50 0 66 99 0 999 
 IA11b 11 6 I.06.11-12 836 0 0 415 0 500 297 0 0 0 137 25 502 562 0 0 500 293 0 2,712 
Luangwa IA15 15 5 I.05.02 464   250 24  47    155  60 302    162  1,000 
 IA16 16 5 I.05.01 4,225   2,275 217  433    1,408  542 2,746    1,479  9,100 
Mupata IA17a 17 4 I.07.05 960              960     960 
 IA17b 17 4 I.04.01-2 5,240 0 0 1,072 0 0 1,277 3,618 426 1,069 646 0 852 1,311 1,329 0 1,737 864 0 14,200 
 IA18  2 I 02.01 8,552   1,426   2,137 6,055 713 1,063 713  1,426 2,053 2,224  2,908 1,368  22,085 
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Tete IA19 18, 19, 
21, 22, 
23, 24 
2 I.02.02    10                10 
 IA21  2 I.02.03     2      8   1      10 
 IA24  2 I.02.04   95 170       50   48 17 8 23   315 
 IA23  2 I.02.05-6. 4,898 0 0 817 60 0 1,224 3,468 408 613 408 0 817 1,206 1,285 5 1,679 784 0 12,713 
Lake Malawi/  IA25 25 3 I.03.04-12 0 13,250 2,804 1,277 0 0 0 6,000 2,060 0 0 0 0 1,402 505 224 673 0 13,250 25,391 
Shire IA26 26 3 I.03.01-3 0 450 775 50 0 0 0 13,750 2,000 0 0 0 0 388 140 62 186 0 450 17,025 
Zambezi Delta IA27 27 1     666    5,666   666         6,998 
Total     4,0666 15,800 3,674 11,802 303 500 8,017 78,059 6,364 4,478 6,488 149 6,311 12,846 13,731 299 10,796 7,254 13,700 182,611 
Source: World Bank (2010b) 
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Table 80. Identified irrigation projects area by crop and sub-basin 





















































































































































Upper Zambezi 12 1  IA1        5,000            5,000 
Kabompo 13 2  IA2 2455   1,145   819    409  1,472 1,596    859  6,300 
Lungue Bungo 11 3  IA3  250  125       125         500 
Luanginga 10 4  IA4  5000                  5,000 
Barotse 9 6  IA6 1603   3,801   1    1,601  2 1,042    561  7,008 
Cuando / Chobe 8 7 I.08.01-3 IA7 150   150    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 
Kariba 6 8 I.06.01-4 IA8 539  5,000 1,681   161 166 20 29 3,070 0 222 5,254 2,061 2,300 80 144 0 13,346 
Kafue 7 12,13 I.07.01 IA13 5760   120       120    5,760     6,000 
Kafue 7 14 I.07.03 IA14      80  6570         80   6,650 
Kariba 6 9 I.06.09 IA9 219   37   55 155 18 27 18  37 52 57  74 35  566 
 6 10 I.06.10 IA10 2014   336   504 1426 168 251 168  336 483 524  685 322  5,203 
 6 11 I.06.07-8 IA11a 539 0 0 181 0 0 161 166 20 29 70 0 222 254 61 0 80 144 0 1,388 
 6 11 I.06.11-12 IA11b 37,649 0 0 6,306 0 0 9,417 26,586 3,130 4,696 3,146 0 6,319 9,076 9,763 0 12,767 6,042 0 97,249 
Luangwa 5 15 I.05.02 IA15 687   370 35  70    229  88 361    361  1,479 
 5 16 I.05.01 IA16 3,570    200      355  525 2,658    1,113  4,651 
Mupata  17 I.07.05 IA17b 950           10   950     960 
  17 I.04.01-2 IA17c 1,611 0 0 777 0 0 319 905 107 1,261 670 0 213 523 332 0 434 320 0 5,863 
  18 I 02.01 IA18 2,912   486   728 2,062 242 363 242  486 699 758  991 466  7,521 
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Tete 2 19 I.02.02 IA19                    0 
  21 I.02.03 IA21   75  75         75 27 12 36   150 
  24 I.02.04 IA24 11,000             5,500 1,980 714 2,640   11,000 
  23 I.02.05-06 IA23 1,418 0 0 4,236 4,000 0 354 1,004 118 177 118 0 236 2,340 1,088 320 1,442 227 0 11,661 
Lake Malawi / 3 25 I.03.04-12 IA25 0 11,030 7,611 1,929 942 503 1,812 0 60 0 0 0 0 4,277 1,541 685 2,053 0 11,040 23,887 
Shire  26 I.03.01-3 IA26  4,919 12,460 0 0 6,172 954 11,120 0 0 0 0 0 7,803 3,816 754 83 0 4,919 35,625 
Zambezi Delta 1 27  IA27  22,055      55,000           22,055 77,055 
Total     73,076 43,254 25,146 21,680 5,252 6,755 15,355 110,160 3,883 6,833 10,341 10 10,158 41,993 28,718 4,785 21,445 1,094 38,014 331,903 




Table 81. High level potential irrigation area by crop and sub-basin 














































































































































Upper Zambezi 12 1  IA1  5,000  2,500       2,500         10,000 
Kabompo 13 2  IA2 3,897   1,817   1,300    649  2,337 2533    1,364  10,000 
Lungue Bungo 11 3  IA3  5,000  2,500       2,500         10,000 
Luanginga 10 4  IA4  5,000  2,500       2,500         10,000 
Barotse 9 6  IA6 2,287   5,424   1    2,285  3 1487    801  10,000 
Cuando / Chobe 8 7 I.08.01-3 IA7    3,000    12,000            15,000 
Kariba 6 8 I.06.01-4 IA8   5,000 1,500       3,000   5,000 2,000 2,300    12,300 
Kafue 7 12,13 I.07.01 IA13                    0 
  14 I.07.03 IA14 12,000   250  150  12,350   250    12,000  150   25,000 
Kariba 6 9 I.06.09 IA9                    0 
 6 10 I.06.10 IA10                    0 
 6 11 I.06.07-8 IA11a                    0 
 6 11 I.06.11-12 IA11b 167,095 0 0 53,595 0 0 48,916 57,559 6,777 10,166 20,857 0 65,035 75,281 21,137 0 27,640 43,037 0 430,000 
Luangwa 5 15 I.05.02 IA15                    0 
 5 16 I.05.01 IA16 15,408   3,125 833  591    2,888  2,155 10,197    6044  25,000 
Mupata  17 I.07.05 IA17a                    0 
  17 I.04.01-2 IA17b                    0 
  18 I 02.01 IA18                    0 
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Tete 2 19 I.02.02 IA19 50,000   25,000 25,000         37,500 13,500 6,000 18,000   100,000 
  21 I.02.03 IA21                    0 
  24 I.02.04 IA24 50,000   25,000 25,000         37,500 13,500 6,000 18,000   100,000 
  23 I.02.05-6 IA23                    0 
Lake Malawi /  3 25 I.03.05-12 IA25  42,280 4974 2,487     259     2,487 895 398 1,194  42,280 50,000 
Shire  26 I.03.01-3 IA26  27,023 114932 20,162 14,015 18,481 28,757 76,631      68,058 26,795 9,764 24,329  27,023 300,001 
Zambezi Delta 1 27  IA27  25,000      75,000           25,000 100,000 
Total     30,0687 109,303 124,906 148,860 64,848 18,631 79,565 233,540 7,036 10,166 37,429 0 69,530 240,043 89,827 24,462 89,313 51,246 94,303 1,207,301 
Source: World Bank (2010b) 
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Annex C. Surface flow points and irrigation abstraction 
points 













SI1 Upper Zambezi 12 1 All of SB1 
SI2 Kabompo 13 2 All of SB2 
SI3a Lungue Bungo 11 3 Lungue Bungo within SB3 
SI3b   11 3 Additional Zambezi and Kabompo inflows within SB3 
SI4 Luanginga 10 4 All of SB4 
SI5 Barotse 9 5 Additional Zambezi inflows within SB5 
SI6   9 6 Additional Zambezi inflows within SB6 
SI7 Cuando / Chobe 8 7 All inflows in SB7 (Cuando and Luiana) 
SI8a   8 8 Additional Zambezi/Chobe inflows to Caprivi Floodplain 
SI8b  8 8 Additional Zambezi inflows down to Victoria Falls 
SI13 Kafue 7 12,13 SB12 and 13 above Itezhi-tezhi 
SI14a   7 14 Kafue inflows between Itezhi-tezhi and Kafue Flats 
SI14b   7 14 Kafue inflows between Kafue Flats and Kafue Gorge 
SI9 Kariba 6 9 All inflows in SB9 (Shangani and Gwayi) 
SI10   6 10 All inflows in SB10 (Sanyati-Umniati) 
SI11a   6 11 All Zambezi inflows from Vic Falls to Gwayi River inflow 
SI11b   6 11 All Zambezi inflows from Gwai River to Kariba Dam (incl 
into reservoir) 
SI15 Luangwa 5 15 All of SB15 
SI16a   5 16 Lunsemfwa and Mulungushi rivers up to their confluence 
SI16b   5 16 All of SB16 inflows except above confluence of Lunsemfwa 
and Mulungishi 
SI17 Mupata 4 17 All inflows to Zambezi between Kariba and Chogwe 
gauging station plus inflows to Kafue between Kafue Gorge 
and joining the Zambezi 
SI18a   2 18 Lake Manyame and upstream Hunyani River 
SI18b Tete 2 18 All of Hunyani/Panhane River flows below Lake Manyame 
SI19   2 19 All inflows to Zambezi between Chongwe and Cahora 
Bassa HPP 
SI20   2 20 SB20 - Luia and Capoche rivers 
SI21   2 21 Inflows to Zambezi between Cahora Bassa and Mphanda 
Nkuwa 
SI24a   2 24 Additional Zambezi inflows between Mphanda Nkuwa and 
Lupata 
SI24b   2 24 Additional Zambezi inflows between Lupata and Chemba 
SI23   2 23 All of Luenya and Mazowe in SB23 














SI25a Lake Malawi / 3 25 Inflows to Rumakali above Rumakali HPP 
SI25b  Shire 
 
25 Inflows to Ruhuhu above Masigira HPP 
SI25c   
 
25 Inflows to Songwe above Songwe HPP 
SI25d   
 
25 Inflows to North Rumphi above North Rumphi HPP 
SI25e   
 
25 Inflows to South Rukuru above Lower Fufu HPP 
SI25f   
 
25 All inflows to Lake Malawi 
SI25g 
 
3 25 Net outflow from Lake Malawi, from ZDSS 
SI26   3 26 All inflows from Lake Malawi to end of SB26 
SI27 Zambezi Delta 1 27 inflows in SB27 and below Chemba HPP in SB24 
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IA Point IA point description 
Upper Zambezi 12 1 I.12.01 IA1 All irrigation in SB1 
Kabompo 13 2 I.13.01 IA2 All irrigation in SB2 
Lungue Bungo 11 3 I.11.01 IA3 All irrigation in SB3 
Luanginga 10 4 I.10.01 IA4 All irrigation in SB4 
Barotse 9 6 I.09.01 IA6 All irrigation in SB6 
Cuando / Chobe 8 7 I.08.01-3 IA7 Cuando before entering Namibia 
Kariba 6 8 I.06.01-4 IA8 Chobe-Cuando above Zambezi 
 7 12,13 I.07.01 IA13 Above Itezhi-tezhi 
Kafue 7 14 I.07.02  No irrigation planed – not used 
 7 14 I.07.03 IA14 
Below Kafue Flats, above Kafue Gorge 
HPP 
  6 9 I.06.09 IA9 All irrigation in SB9 
  6 10 I.06.10 IA10 Sanyati river before Kariba 
Kariba 6 11 I.06.05-6   no irrigation planed –not used 
  6 11 I.06.07-8 IA11a 
Between Batoka Gorge and Devils 
Gorge (both sides) 
  6 11 I.06.11-12 IA11b Bottom of Kariba Reservoir 
Luangwa 5 15 I.05.02 IA15 all of SB15 
  5 16 I.05.01 IA16 SB16, all below HPPs 
Mupata 4 17 I.07.04  no irrigation planed – not used 
    17 I.07.05 IA17a between Kafue Lower and Zambezi 
    17 I.05.03-4  no irrigation planed – not used 
    17 I.04.01-2 IA17b 
between confluence of Kafue and 
Chongwe gauging station 
   18 I 02.01 IA18 All of SB18 
Tete 2 19 I.02.02 IA19 from Cahora Bassa Reservoir 
   21 I.02.03 IA21 
between Cahora Bassa and Mphanda 
Nkuwa 
   24 I.02.04 IA24 All of SB24 
    23 I.02.05-06 IA23 All of SB23 
Lake Malawi/ 3 25 I.03.04-12 IA25 All irrigation in SB25 
Shire    26 I.03.01-3 IA26 
All irrigation between Lake Malawi and 
confluence with Zambezi 
Zambezi Delta 1 27  IA27 All irrigation in SB27 
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Annex D. Crop coefficients 
Table 84. Crop coefficients by month 
Monthly 
mean 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Winter 
wheat 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.68 1.14 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Summer 
maize 
1.06 1.01 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.71 
Winter 
maize 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.71 1.06 1.01 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Summer 
rice 
1.13 1.19 1.20 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 
Winter rice 1.13 1.19 1.20 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 
Sugarcane 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Vegetables 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.86 1.07 1.10 1.10 1.10 0.68 0.10 0.00 
Soybeans 0.96 1.15 0.93 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 
Beans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.59 1.09 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tea 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.98 1.00 
Coffee 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 
Summer 
cotton 
0.90 1.15 0.98 0.65 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.53 
Winter 
cotton 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.53 0.90 1.15 0.98 0.65 0.11 0.00 
Tobacco 1.20 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.85 
Banana 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Citrus 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Pasture 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Other 
(tomatoes) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.86 1.07 1.10 1.10 1.10 0.68 0.10 0.00 
Sorghum 0.76 1.05 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 
Source: World Bank (2010b), Table A3.3 
 203 
Annex E. Existing power plant characteristics 
Table 85. Technical and financial characteristics of existing power plants 
Cou
ntry 











AGO AGO Diesel Diesel 7 33 86 19.00 4.18 
AGO Angola Diesel IC Diesel 13 30 80 0.80 3.00 
AGO Biopio Hydro 9 100 50 8.72 1.51 
AGO Cambambe I Hydro 192 100 60 8.72 1.51 
AGO Capanda I  Hydro 240 100 66 8.72 1.51 
AGO Capanda II Hydro 240 100 40 8.72 1.51 
AGO Gove Hydro 44 100 50 8.72 1.51 
AGO Mabubas Hydro 25 100 38 8.72 1.51 
AGO Matala Hydro 26 100 71 8.72 1.51 
AGO Angola SCGT Natural gas 1,035 20 86 19.00 4.18 
AGO Benguela Residual fuel oil 20 33 86 19.00 4.18 
BOT Morupule A Other coal 0 30 88 56.67 0.86 
BOT Morupule B Other coal 450 33 88 38.00 4.18 
DRC Inga 1 Hydro 250 100 76 8.72 1.51 
DRC Inga 2 Hydro 890 100 77 8.72 1.51 
DRC Mwadingusha Hydro 68 100 34 8.72 1.51 
DRC Nseke Koni Hydro 290 100 55 8.72 1.51 
DRC Nzilo Hydro 108 100 60 8.72 1.51 
DRC Zongo Sanga Hydro 83 100 12 8.72 1.51 
LES LES Small Hydro Hydro 2 100 46 8.72 1.51 















MAL Malawi Distillate Diesel 46 30 80 0.80 3.00 
MAL Kapichira I Hydro 64 100 76 8.72 1.51 
MAL Kapichira II Hydro 64 100 84 8.72 1.51 
MAL Nkula A Hydro 13.6 100 77 8.72 1.51 
MAL Nkula B Hydro 100 100 66 8.72 1.51 
MAL Tedzani I II Hydro 36 100 88 8.72 1.51 
MAL Tedzani III Hydro 52 100 68 8.72 1.51 
MAL Wowve Hydro 4 100 25 8.72 1.51 
MOZ Cahora Bassa Hydro 2,075 100 81 8.72 1.51 
MOZ Chicamba Hydro 38 100 15 8.72 1.51 
MOZ Corumana Hydro 14 100 20 8.72 1.51 
MOZ Mavuzi Hydro 48 100 75 8.72 1.51 
MOZ Aggreko Natural gas 224 37 60 19.00 4.18 
MOZ Ressano Garcia EDM SASOL Natural gas 175 48 95 19.00 4.18 
MOZ Moz Distillate Residual fuel oil 0 30 80 0.80 3.00 
NAM Ruacana Hydro 347 100 66 8.72 1.51 
NAM Van Eck Other coal 90 30 88 56.67 0.00 
NAM Anixas Residual fuel oil 22.5 30 96 4.86 5.35 
NAM Paratus Residual fuel oil 12 30 96 4.86 5.35 
SAF Biomass bagasse Bagasse 100 25 91 131.35 1.17 
SAF OCGT liquid fuels existing Diesel 2,460 32 95 8.95 0.00 
SAF Hydro existing Hydro 670 100 93 46.49 0.00 
SAF Biomass/coal CHPs existing Industrial waste 228 25 91 839.36 0.00 















SAF Sasol CCGT Natural gas 140 0 91 20.00 0.00 
SAF Nuclear existing Nuclear 1,860 100 91 664.96 0.38 
SAF Coal Eskom large dry Existing Other coal 13,660 34 90 304.16 1.25 
SAF Coal Eskom large existing Other coal 21,150 34 90 201.52 1.25 
SAF Coal Eskom small existing Other coal 6,503 29 90 304.16 1.25 
SAF Coal municipal existing Other coal 470 25 90 304.16 1.25 
SAF Drakensberg Other coal 1,000 70 19 8.11 0.43 
SAF Palmiet Other coal 400 70 19 8.65 0.57 
SAF Sasol Infrachem Other coal 50 25 90 304.16 1.25 
SAF Sasol SSF Other coal 50 25 90 304.16 1.25 
SAF Steenbras Other coal 180 70 19 6.22 0.57 
SAF SAIPPP PV existing Solar PV 388 100 25 28.11 0.00 
SAF SAIPPP wind existing Wind 255 100 30 1.45 0.00 
SWA RSSC Bagasse 70 38 65 8.72 1.51 
SWA Ubombo Bagasse 40 38 55 8.72 1.51 
SWA Ezulwini Edwaleni Maguduza Hydro 41 100 34 8.72 1.51 
SWA Maguga Hydro 20 100 44 8.72 1.51 
TAZ HNwMU Hydro 30 100 52 31.00 0.00 
TAZ Kidatu Hydro 204 100 57 6.00 0.00 
TAZ Kihansi Hydro 180 100 33 5.50 0.00 
TAZ Mtera Hydro 80 100 53 7.00 0.00 
TAZ Pangani Falls Hydro 68 100 52 8.00 0.00 
TAZ Taz Gas Natural gas 441 30 96 4.86 5.35 















ZAM Zam diesel Diesel 0 30 80 0.80 3.00 
ZAM Kafue Gorge Upper Hydro 990 100 59 8.72 1.51 
ZAM Kariba North Hydro 720 100 45 8.72 1.51 
ZAM Kariba North Extension Hydro 180 100 24 8.72 1.51 
ZAM Victoria Falls Hydro 108 100 65 8.72 1.51 
ZAM Zam small hydro Hydro 79 100 60 8.72 1.51 
ZIM Kariba South Hydro 750 100 55 8.72 1.51 
ZIM Zim coal existing Other coal 394 30 88 56.67 0.00 
Notes: Kariba North extension is 180 MW in 2014, but 360 MW in 2015. 
Source: Most original plant data from IRENA SAPP Study (Miketa and Merven 2013); All South African plants updated from Eskom and Energy Research Centre sources (ERC 2013; Eskom 2014, 2010; 
Marais 2015a), South Africa renewable programme data from South Africa Department of Energy and Eskom (Department of Energy 2014; Marais 2015b); Mozambique gas plants updated from 
Mahumane and Mulder (2015a); All plant capacities checked with the SAPP Planning Sub-Committee members, and have been either updated or confirmed. Availability date confirmed or updated 
from Spalding-Fecher et al. (2014).  
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Table 86. Combinations of existing plants treated as one plant in modelling 




Angola SCGT AGO 1,035 Lobito, Cabinda, Huambo, Kuito, Saurimo, Luena, Caala, Namibe, other existing gas plants (also covers 
TG12.5, etc.) 
Nseke Koni DRC 290 Nseke & Koni 
Zongo Sanga DRC 83 Zongo & Sanga 
LES small hydro LES 2 Katse, Semonkong 
Malawi distillate MAL 46 Lilongwe, Mzuzu, Blantyre 
Moz distillate MOZ 0 Maputo, Beira 
Biomass Bagasse existing SAF 100 Generic for all CHP in sugar industry 
OCGT liquid fuels existing SAF 2,460 Acacia, Ankerlig, Mossel Bay, Port Rex 
Hydro Existing SAF 670 Gariep, Vanderkloof and mini hydros (Bethlehem etc.) 
Biomass/coal CHPs existing SAF 228 Sappi Stanger, Mondi Merebank, Mondi Felixton,Mondi Umhlathuze 
Nuclear existing SAF 1,860 Koeberg  
HNwMU TAZ 30 Hale & Nyumba ya Mungu, Uwemba 
Taz Gas TAZ 441 SONGAS, IPTL, Ubongo Rented Aggreco, Ubungo Rented Richmo x 2, Tegata - Wartsila 
Taz distillate TAZ 243 Mwansa-ALSTOM, Thermal, Diesel remote 
Zam small hydro ZAM 79 Lunsemfwa, Mulungishi, ZESCO small hydro 
Zim coal existing ZIM 394 Hwange 1-6, Munyati, Bulawayo, Harare 
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Annex F. Specific new power plant characteristics 
Table 87. Technical and financial characteristics of specific new power plants 


















AGO Baynes Ago Hydro 300 100 55 8.72 1.51 1,778 2025 50 
AGO Caculo Cabaca Hydro 2,100 100 40 8.72 1.51 1,753 2025 50 
AGO Cambambe II Hydro 700 100 40 8.72 1.51 2,969 2016 50 
AGO Lauca Hydro 2,000 100 40 8.72 1.51 1,753 2017 50 
AGO Lomaum Hydro 65 100 40 8.72 1.51 2,969 2018 50 
AGO Soyo Natural gas 500 35 86 19.00 4.18 600 2017 30 
BOT Coal IPP B Other coal 600 37 88 20.00 0.96 2,624 2025 35 
DRC Busanga Hydro 240 100 60 8.72 1.51 1,250 2015 50 
DRC Grand Inga Hydro 42,081 100 75 8.72 1.51 671 2030 50 
DRC Inga 3  Hydro 3,500 100 75 8.72 1.51 494 2020 50 
LES Kobong Hydro 1,200 70 25 8.72 1.51 1,208 2030 50 
LES Muela II Hydro 110 100 9 8.72 1.51 1,938 2025 50 
LES Oxbow Hydro 80 100 59 8.72 1.51 1,938 2030 50 
LES Quthing Hydro 15 100 25 8.72 1.51 1,938 2030 50 
MAL Fufu Hydro 140 100 46 8.72 1.51 1,410 2015 50 
MAL Hamilton Falls Hydro 100 100 71 8.72 1.51 1,629 2030 50 
MAL Kholombizo Hydro 100 100 71 8.72 1.51 1,629 2018 50 
MAL Mpatamanga Hydro 265 100 55 8.72 1.51 1,527 2020 50 
MAL Songwe Mal Hydro 240 100 45 8.72 1.51 1,250 2022 50 
MAL Coal IPP M Other coal 100 37 88 20.00 0.96 2,624 2030 35 
MOZ Alto Malema Hydro 80 100 33 8.72 1.51 1,850 2020 50 
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MOZ Boroma Hydro 200 100 67 8.72 1.51 1,850 2022 50 
MOZ Chemba I Hydro 600 100 96 8.72 1.51 1,700 2020 50 
MOZ Chemba II Hydro 400 100 96 8.72 1.51 1,700 2022 50 
MOZ 
HCB North Bank 
Extension Hydro 1,245 100 26 8.72 1.51 907 2015 50 
MOZ Lugenda Hydro 150 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2024 50 
MOZ Lupata Hydro 600 100 79 8.72 1.51 1,700 2021 50 
MOZ Majawa Hydro 50 100 70 8.72 1.51 1,850 2022 50 
MOZ Massingir Hydro 27 100 35 8.72 1.51 1,375 2018 50 
MOZ Mavuzi II Hydro 38 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2023 50 
MOZ Messalo Hydro 50 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2024 50 
MOZ Meugeba Hydro 150 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2022 50 
MOZ Meutelele Hydro 50 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2022 50 
MOZ Molocue Hydro 40 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2023 50 
MOZ Mphanda Nkuwa I Hydro 1,500 100 65 8.72 1.51 1,538 2022 50 
MOZ Mphanda Nkuwa II Hydro 750 100 65 8.72 1.51 1,538 2025 50 
MOZ Pavue Hydro 300 100 70 8.72 1.51 1,850 2017 50 
MOZ Quedas and Ocua Hydro 180 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,858 2020 50 
MOZ Ruo Hydro 85 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2028 50 
MOZ Tsate Hydro 50 100 50 8.72 1.51 1,850 2021 50 
MOZ Central Buzi_Power Natural gas 20 35 70 19.00 4.18 600 2020 25 
MOZ Central Electrotec Natural gas 40 48 80 19.00 4.18 900 2017 30 
MOZ 
Central Termica de 
Maputo Natural gas 100 48 70 19.00 4.18 900 2018 30 
MOZ Gigawatt Natural gas 100 37 95 19.00 4.18 700 2016 30 
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MOZ Kuvaninga Natural gas 40 35 60 19.00 4.18 600 2016 25 
MOZ Projecto ENI Natural gas 75 35 70 19.00 4.18 650 2017 30 
MOZ Temane Sasol Natural gas 400 35 70 19.00 4.18 600 2018 30 
MOZ Benga Other coal 250 35 88 19.97 0.96 2,100 2016 35 
MOZ ENRC Chirondzi Other coal 150 34 70 19.97 0.96 1,800 2017 25 
MOZ Jindal Other coal 150 34 70 19.97 0.96 1,800 2018 30 
MOZ Moatize Other coal 300 35 70 19.97 0.96 2,126 2016 30 
MOZ Nacala Other coal 300 34 70 19.97 0.96 1,800 2018 25 
MOZ Ncondezi Other coal 300 34 70 19.97 0.96 1,800 2018 25 
NAM Baynes Nam Hydro 300 100 55 8.72 1.51 1,778 2025 50 
NAM Kudu Natural gas 774 53 94 0.00 1.64 909 2017 25 
SAF Coal IPP SA Other coal 800 36 96 49.32 13.39 3,337 2019 30 
SAF Ingula Other coal 1,332 70 19 8.70 1.51 1,548 2015 50 
SAF Kusile Other coal 4,428 37 88 61.49 1.67 2,678 2014 45 
SAF Medupi Other coal 4,428 37 88 61.49 1.67 2,624 2014 45 
SAF SAIPPP Solar PV  Solar PV 2,589 100 25 28.11 0.00 2,827 2016 25 
SAF SAIPPP Solar CSP Solar thermal 1,200 100 96 66.08 0.00 5,544 2016 30 
SAF SAIPPP Wind Wind 6,874 100 30 35.95 0.00 2,007 2016 25 
SWA Lower Maguduza Hydro 12 100 90 0.00 5.99 4,620 2019 50 
SWA Lower Maguga Hydro 5 100 90 0.00 5.42 4,620 2025 50 
SWA Ngwempisi Hydro 80 100 44 0.00 5.99 4,620 2022 50 
SWA Lubombo Other coal 300 37 88 20.00 0.96 2,624 2030 35 
SWA Solar PV SWA Solar PV 40 100 25 0.00 20.10 2,200 2020 25 
TAZ Kakono Hydro 53 100 72 8.72 1.51 2,326 2022 50 
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TAZ Masigira Hydro 118 100 61 8.72 1.51 2,326 2020 50 
TAZ Ruhudji Hydro 358 100 57 8.72 1.51 1,707 2020 50 
TAZ Rumakali Hydro 222 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,326 2020 50 
TAZ Rusomo Hydro 21 100 70 8.72 1.51 2,326 2018 50 
TAZ Songwe Taz Hydro 240 100 45 8.72 1.51 1,250 2022 50 
TAZ Stieglers Gorge Hydro 1,200 100 31 8.72 1.51 2,326 2023 50 
TAZ Kilwa Somanga Natural gas 320 42 85 24.01 1.45 1,044 2018 25 
TAZ Kinyerezi Natural gas 1,320 42 85 24.01 1.45 1,044 2018 25 
TAZ Kiwira Other coal 200 30 88 56.67 7.40 3,150 2020 35 
TAZ Mchuchuma Other coal 300 33 88 38.32 4.18 2,624 2023 35 
TAZ Ngaka Other coal 200 30 88 56.67 7.40 3,150 2024 35 
TAZ Singida Wind 50 100 30 0.00 14.29 2,310 2017 25 
ZAM Batoka Gorge Zam Hydro 800 100 62 8.72 1.51 2,500 2023 50 
ZAM Devils Gorge Zam Hydro 500 100 64 8.72 1.51 2,500 2026 50 
ZAM ItezhiTezhi Hydro 120 100 58 8.72 1.51 2,083 2016 50 
ZAM Kabompo Hydro 40 100 59 8.72 1.51 4,000 2018 50 
ZAM Kafue Gorge Lower Hydro 750 100 37 8.72 1.51 2,000 2019 50 
ZAM Kalungwishi expansion Hydro 220 100 46 8.72 1.51 3,000 2018 50 
ZAM Lunsenfwa expansion Hydro 14 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2019 50 
ZAM Lusiwasi expansion Hydro 86 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2019 50 
ZAM Mambililma Falls Hydro 326 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2025 50 
ZAM Mpata Gorge Zam Hydro 543 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2025 50 
ZAM Muchinga Hydro 263 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2023 50 
ZAM Mulungishi expansion Hydro 45 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2018 50 
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ZAM Mulungishi lower Hydro 100 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2025 50 
ZAM Mumbotula Falls Hydro 301 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2025 50 
ZAM EMCO Other coal 300 37 88 19.97 0.96 2,500 2020 35 
ZAM Maamba Other coal 300 37 88 19.97 0.96 2,500 2016 35 
ZIM Batoka Gorge Zim Hydro 800 100 62 8.72 1.51 1,563 2023 50 
ZIM Devils Gorge Zim Hydro 500 100 64 8.72 1.51 2,500 2026 50 
ZIM Gairezi  Hydro 30 100 68 8.72 1.51 4,000 2017 50 
ZIM Kariba South Extension Hydro 300 100 45 8.72 1.51 667 2018 50 
ZIM Middle Sabi Hydro 300 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2018 50 
ZIM Mpata Gorge Zim Hydro 543 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2025 50 
ZIM Mutare emergency Hydro 120 100 68 8.72 1.51 2,500 2017 50 
ZIM Lupane Natural gas 150 53 85 24.01 1.45 1,349 2021 25 
ZIM Gokwe North Other coal 1,400 37 88 19.97 0.96 1,144 2021 35 
ZIM Gwai Caseco Other coal 600 37 88 19.97 0.96 1,144 2018 35 
ZIM Hwange 78 Other coal 600 37 88 19.97 0.96 984 2019 35 
ZIM 
Southern Energy 
Makomo Other coal 600 37 88 19.97 0.96 1,144 2019 35 
Notes: Hydropower plants along Zambia-Zimbabwe border (e.g. Mpata Gorge) have 50/50 split of capacity;  
Source: Most original plant data from the SAPP IRENA study (Miketa and Merven 2013); South African specific plants updated from Eskom (Marais 2015a), South Africa renewable programme data 
from South Africa Department of Energy and Eskom (Department of Energy 2014; Marais 2015b); Mozambique plants updated from Mahumane and Mulder (2015a); All plant capacities and start date 
checked with the SAPP Planning Sub-Committee members, and have been either updated or confirmed. 
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Annex G. Generic power plant characteristics 
Table 88. Technical and financial characteristics of generic new power plants 


























Bagasse Bagasse 38 50 349 5.16 3,191 2,500 2016 30 100 
Biomass BFB Biomass 38 50 106 5.26 5,120 4,012 2025 30 100 
Biomass CC Biomass 57 50 356 17.49 10,472 8,205 2025 30 100 
Diesel Diesel 35 80 0 17.00 1,177 1,070 2016 25 100 
Geothermal Geothermal 100 85 0 5.02 5,105 4,000 2016 25 100 
Small Hydro Hydro 100 50 0 5.42 4,620 4,000 2016 30 0 
Landfill gas Municipal waste 35 50 129 0.00 3,635 2,848 2016 30 100 
Municipal waste Municipal waste 19.4 85 349 5.16 11,596 9,086 2016 30 100 
CCGT Natural gas 48 85 0 2.90 1,297 1,069 2016 30 100 
OCGT Natural gas 30 85 0 19.92 696 603 2016 25 100 
PWR nuclear Nuclear 33 85 65 3.60 7,906 5,028 2023 60 100 
Fluidized bed combustion coal Other coal 35.7 96 49 13.39 3,337 2,615 2031 30 100 
IGCC Other coal 36.9 90 112 1.95 4,671 3,660 2031 30 100 
Supercritical coal Other coal 37 96 61 1.67 3,358 2,631 2016 30 100 
Supercritical coal w CCS Other coal 28 96 0 35.98 4,842 3,605 2030 35 100 
HFO Residual fuel oil 35 80 0 15.00 1,559 1,350 2016 25 100 
Solar PV utility fixed  Solar PV 100 25 0 20.10 2,200 2,000 2016 25 5 
Solar parabolic trough 0 storage Solar thermal 100 25 57 0.00 5,601 4,376 2017 30 30 
Solar parabolic trough 3 hrs storage Solar thermal 100 30.9 69 0.00 7,638 5,967 2017 30 100 
Wind (20% CF) Wind 100 20 0 14.29 2,732 2,365 2016 25 10 
Wind (30% CF) Wind 100 30 0 14.29 2,310 2,000 2016 25 15 
Source: IRENA SAPP Study (Miketa and Merven 2013), ERC (2013) EPRI (2012) 
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Table 89. Availability of generic plants in each country 











Bagasse No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Biomass fluidized bed Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Biomass combined cycle Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal waste Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Landfill gas Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diesel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geothermal No No No No No No No No No Yes No No 
Small hydro Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CCGT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OCGT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PWR nuclear No No No No No No No Yes No No No No 
Fluidized bed combustion coal Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Integrated gasification combined cycle 
coal Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supercritical coal Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supercritical coal with CCS Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Heavy fuel oil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Solar PV utility fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Solar parabolic trough no storage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Solar parabolic trough 3 hrs storage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bulk wind (20% capacity factor) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bulk wind (30% capacity factor) No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 90. Fuel availability assumptions for generic plants 
Country Coal Gas Oil Biomass 
Angola Import Domestic Coastal Moderate 
Botswana Domestic 
Coalbed 
Methane Inland Moderate 
DRC Import Domestic Coastal Moderate 
Lesotho Not Available Not Available Inland Scarce 
Malawi Domestic Not Available Inland Moderate 
Mozambique Domestic Domestic Coastal Free 
Namibia Domestic Domestic Coastal Scarce 
South Africa Domestic Import Coastal Moderate 
Swaziland Domestic Not Available Inland Free 
Tanzania Import Domestic Coastal Free 
Zambia Domestic Import Inland Free 
Zimbabwe Domestic Import/CBM Inland Moderate 
